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New medical data is generated every second, adding to the source of potential “raw 
material” required for generating innovative and groundbreaking medical insights 
and expanding knowledge about health and well-being. For the first time in history, 
technologies exist that enable rapid and large-scale analysis of collected data, bring-
ing the possibility of personalizing medicine within reach. Such positive prospects 
are countered by serious ethical, social, and legal challenges. Procedures for access-
ing medical data for research purposes, as well as for the reuse of medical data from 
clinical trials or studies, are in place and include safeguards to protect individual 
rights. However, no comprehensive scheme to donate one’s medical data posthu-
mously exists, with the consequence of depriving individuals of the opportunity to 
act according to their moral values and preventing valuable datasets from being 
used in scientific research for the promotion of the public good. While the debate 
around the use of big data in medicine is far from new, this volume is the first to 
address the ethical issues with regard to the use of medical data after death. It brings 
together academic experts from ethics, law, and medical sciences to address the 
challenges associated with medical data donation. It is the result of a project devel-
oped at the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 
and funded by Microsoft Research.
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Chapter 1
Ethical Medical Data Donation:  
A Pressing Issue
Jenny Krutzinna and Luciano Floridi
Abstract While donation schemes with dedicated regulatory frameworks have 
made it relatively easy to donate blood, organs or tissue, it is virtually impossible to 
donate one’s own medical data. The lack of appropriate framework to govern such 
data donation makes it practically difficult to give away one’s data, even when this 
would be within the current limits of the law. Arguments for facilitation of such a 
process have been advanced but so far have not been implemented. Discussions 
on the ethics of using medical data tend to take a system-centric perspective and 
focus on what researchers and the health service may or may not do with data that 
are placed within their trust. Rarely, if ever, is the question of the data subjects 
preferences addressed beyond practical matters of obtaining valid consent. This 
constitutes an important omission in the ethical debate, which this volume seeks to 
address.
Keywords Data donation · Medical data ethics · Ethical code · Health records · 
Personal health data · Data philanthropy · Data ethics
1.1  Background
Donation has become a key concept in many areas of medicine, where it is now 
deeply engrained in everyday clinical practice, as well as in medical research. When 
physical donations are concerned, their importance of such medical donations is no 
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longer questioned, and increasingly medical governance systems are shifting from 
voluntary, opt-in models to opt-out schemes. Most recently, and in light of the intro-
duction of the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe (GDPR), discussions 
have centered on the use of medical records for research purposes without the need 
for individual consent procedures, which are perceived as a significant obstacle to 
the advancement of medical insight and development of new treatments (Mann 
et al. 2016).
While donation schemes with dedicated regulatory frameworks have made it 
relatively easy to donate blood, organs or tissue, it is virtually impossible to donate 
one’s own medical data. The lack of appropriate framework to govern such data 
donation makes it practically difficult to give away one’s data, even when this would 
be within the current limits of the law. Arguments for facilitation of such a process 
have been advanced but so far have not been implemented (Shaw et  al. 2016). 
Researchers are increasingly encouraged – and sometimes even required – to share 
their data in the name of science, and yet individuals cannot easily make their data 
available for scientific research purposes. This presents an ethically unjustifiable 
asymmetry in the biomedical research context: first, these datasets are of enormous 
importance for improvements in population health; and second, the difficulty 
infringes the autonomous decisions of many individuals who wish to contribute to 
the advancement of medical knowledge by making available their medical 
information.
Competing tensions on data control and ownership, respect of individual rights 
and consent, limited technical understanding, and the lack of adequate frameworks 
for coordination and ethical governance pose serious challenges to the donation of 
data and risk undermining its huge potential. The effect of the GDPR on medical 
data use is still uncertain, but some are concerned that it might be a serious impedi-
ment to scientific research and the re-use of data. Guidance to meet these challenges 
is urgently needed to ensure respect of users’ individual rights and consent, foster 
transparency and trust, as well as harness the value of data to spur scientific research, 
public debate, private and public wellbeing.
The issue of systematically allowing private individuals to volunteer their medi-
cal data for research purposes has not yet been addressed in academic or popular 
literature, where emphasis has been placed mostly on data sharing between research-
ers, or on donations by private corporations in the context of data philanthropy 
(Taddeo 2016). However, empirical studies suggest that there is great willingness to 
allow medical data re-use on certain conditions, although medical donation schemes 
remain to this day largely limited to physical donations, such as organs, tissue or 
blood (Steinsbekk et al. 2013). There is significant scope to learn from posthumous 
physical donation schemes (Richardson and Hurwitz 1995), but the ethical and gov-
ernance frameworks cannot be applied directly to data donation due to the specific 
characteristics of medical data. There is thus a need to develop a dedicated ethical 
code for posthumous data donation.
J. Krutzinna and L. Floridi
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1.2  Current Debates
Discussions on the ethics of using medical data tend to take a system-centric per-
spective and focus on what researchers and the health service may or may not do 
with data that are placed within their trust. Rarely, if ever, is the question of the data 
subjects’ preferences addressed beyond practical matters of obtaining valid consent. 
This constitutes an important omission in the ethical debate. The lack of compre-
hensive coverage of the topic of medical data donation has led the Digital Ethics 
Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute at the University of Oxford, to develop an ethi-
cal code for posthumous medical data donation (PMDD), in collaboration with 
Microsoft Research.
Two workshops were held in October 2017 and April 2018 to address the ethics 
of medical data donation. The aim of these workshops was to gather insight from 
academia, government, and industry in order to assess the risks and opportunities of 
PMDD. Participants came from diverse disciplines, and contributions covered top-
ics related to the ethics of data donation, the legal and regulatory challenges posed 
by the donation of personal medical data, and current and future projects and col-
laborations in medical data donation.
Some key challenges were identified: trust, data quality, social values affecting 
the willingness to share data, impediments to corporate data sharing, and concerns 
around justice and  inclusion. It was suggested to make health data sharing cases 
more tangible, by giving concrete examples of benefits for the stakeholders involved 
and practical information about the use and re-use of donated data. This was seen as 
potentially contributing to the removal of barriers to data donation by fostering a 
greater understanding of the process, including the risks involved. In addition, 
inclusion was mentioned as a key theme for further investigation, as current data 
donation projects such as the PGP UK are relatively exclusive, because they facili-
tate participation only by highly-educated, highly-engaged individuals (“Personal 
Genome Project: United Kingdom” 2018).
The ideas presented at the workshops and the discussions that ensued informed 
the development of the ethical code for PMDD presented in this volume. Many 
more ideas arose during the project and the workshops that could not be covered 
here. These included suggestions for next steps, including the extension of data 
donation to corporate data by means of data philanthropy schemes, and the addition 
of other data sources, such as health-related data collected by medical or lifestyle 
wearable devices. The latter raises important ethical issues beyond the scope of the 
present volume, such as the question of how to treat the digital remains of the dead 
(Öhman and Floridi 2018). Finally, the ethical code for PMDD proposed in this 
volume could eventually be extended to include donations made by living individu-
als, but for the reasons explained in the following chapters, we considered it ethi-
cally preferable to begin with deceased donations.
1 Ethical Medical Data Donation: A Pressing Issue
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1.3  This Volume and Its Chapters
The book contains the proceedings of the two workshops held in Oxford, and some 
additional highly relevant contributions. It seeks to provide a timely analysis of the 
ethical use of existing personal medical data. The volume comprises four parts.
Part I seeks to conceptualise the ethics of medical data donation, by attempting to 
define what donation means in the context of data, and by identifying the key 
opportunities and ethical challenges of medical data donation.
Barbara Prainsack in “Data Donation: How to resist the iLeviathan” ascribes the 
distinctive characteristics of relationality, indirect reciprocity and simultaneity to 
data donation, as a specific type of transaction. She suggests that consideration of 
these characteristics could make data donation a strategy to counterbalance the 
overarching power of multinational enterprises. They have become ‘a necessary 
monster’ to which people submit their freedoms to in order to obtain other goods 
they consider essential.
In “Data Donation as Excercises of Sovereignty”, Patrik Hummel, Matthias 
Braun and Peter Dabrock argue that data donations offer the potential to advance 
individual sovereignty, as they can generate social bonds, convey recognition and 
open up new options in social space. Articulating some of the difficulties associated 
with data donations, they call for thoughtful governance mechanisms and appropri-
ate technological infrastructure design in response.
Philip J. Nickel in “The Ethics of Uncertainty for Data Subjects” discusses the 
practical uncertainties of modern data practices. He argues that significant endemic 
uncertainties undermine data subjects’ interests in having grounds for trust in the 
institutions and organisations that control their data and proposes some possible 
ways of addressing this ethical problem.
Kerina H. Jones discusses the panoply of issues that may influence individuals’ 
decisions with regard to data donation. In “Incongruities and Dilemmas in Data 
Donation: Juggling our 1s and 0s”, she argues that although it would be unethical 
not to use donated medical data for the public good, it is crucial to acknowledge the 
conflicting beliefs and interests at play in data donation and which need to be care-
fully balanced.
In Part II, some of the key governance and regulatory challenges are discussed.
In her chapter, “Posthumous Medical Data Donation: The Case for a Regulatory 
Framework”, Edina Harbinja outlines the most significant legal issues potentially 
affecting the donation of medical data after death and proposes how such a scheme 
would fit within the exiting legal framework governing health data.
Annie Sorbie in “Medical Data Donation, Consent and the Public Interest: A 
Gateway to Posthumous Data Use” suggests that in posthumous data donation, con-
sent does not provide a ‘magic bullet’ and is only one aspect of a holistic gover-
nance regime. She argues that emphasis should be placed on the role of authorisation 
in this context.
J. Krutzinna and L. Floridi
5
Part III discusses the responsibility of all citizens to participate in medical data 
donation and provides some examples for implementation.
In “The Personal Data is Political”, Bastian Greshake Tzovaras and Athina 
Tzovara use the examples of genetics and neuroscience to support their argument 
that in order to achieve truly personalized medicine, datasets need to be sufficiently 
diverse. They argue that this requires all of us to share our data for medical research 
purposes.
Ernst Hafen, in his chapter “Personal-Data Cooperatives  – A New Data 
Governance Framework for Data Donations and Precision Health”, explains one 
way in which this may be achieved. Calling for a more active role of citizens in the 
collection and management of personal data, he argues that data cooperatives are 
the perfect match for the challenges associated with the use of personal data, as they 
give democratic control to the citizen-owners.
In “Defining Data Donation After Death: Metadata, Directives, Guardians and 
the Road to Big Consent”, David Shaw argues that given some ethical concerns, 
unconditional data donation may be premature and that a more cautious approach 
involving preference-setting through data advance directives and requiring family 
consent may be preferable as a first step.
Part IV concludes this volume with a discussion of the need for an ethical code for 
PMDD and the introduction of such a code.
In “Enabling Posthumous Medical Data Donation: A Plea for the Ethical 
Utilisation of Personal Health Data”, Jenny Krutzinna, Mariarosaria Taddeo and 
Luciano Floridi argue that personal medical data should be made available for sci-
entific research, by enabling and encouraging individuals to donate their medical 
records once deceased through PMDD. They stress the need to develop an ethical 
code for data donation to minimise the risks and conclude with the draft for such a 
code.
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Chapter 2
Data Donation: How to Resist 
the iLeviathan
Barbara Prainsack
Abstract Large corporations are attracting criticism for their quasi-monopolist 
role in the digital data domain. It has been argued that they are no longer regular 
market participants but have become de facto market regulators against whom pub-
lic and civil society actors are powerless even when faced with stark ethical miscon-
duct. Companies such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (GAFA) have 
become a new Leviathan: a monster for which people give up freedoms in exchange 
for other goods that they consider essential. Data donation is a strategy that could, 
if certain conditions are met, help tackle the overarching power of multinational 
enterprises. I will propose that data donation, understood as a specific type of trans-
action, has three distinctive characteristics: relationality, indirect reciprocity and 
multiplicity. I suggest ways in which ethical and regulatory frameworks for data 
donation should consider these characteristics to ensure that data donations respond 
to the institutional and power relationships that digital data use is embedded in, that 
data donations contribute to the public good, and that they and protect the personal 
needs and interests of people involved in it.
Keywords Data governance · Data donation · Relational autonomy · Reciprocity · 
Solidarity
2.1  Data Use in the Era of GAFA
The French theorist Jean-Francois Lyotard, whose 1979 diagnosis of the end of the 
grand narratives is probably the most famous attempt to capture the meaning of the 
postmodern, was uncannily provident about the role that data  would play in today’s 
societies. Lyotard saw knowledge as having become a key factor in capitalist 
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accumulation processes.1 The commercialisation of knowledge, he argued, results 
in shifts in how knowledge is valued, and how it shapes social and political institu-
tions. Lyotard foresaw not only the decline of the privileged position of the state in 
controlling the production and distribution of knowledge,2 but also, as political 
theorist Jeremy Gilbert put it,
a decline in the prestige and potency of ‘narrative’ forms of knowledge which legitimate 
truth by reference to an over-arching story about the world, in favour of a pragmatic 
approach to knowledge which values ‘truths’ or fragments of knowledge solely on the basis 
of what instrumental or commercial effects they can produce (Gilbert 2014: 6. Original 
emphasis).
Paraphrasing Lyotard, the fragmentation of thick, narrative, and contextual knowl-
edge into, quite literally, bits and pieces of data that are stripped of their social and 
political meaning is as one of the fundamental forms of the postmodern. Because 
not only information but also data are never ‘raw’, but they are embedded in rela-
tionships with the people and tools that created them (e.g. Gitelman 2013; Leonelli 
2016), the practice of divesting data of their context is a central dynamic in this 
process.3 The neutralising of data is done, for example, by tech companies, media 
outlets, and academics who treat data as a natural resource and compare it with 
water or with oil, that is, with something that nature gives us and that needs to be 
refined, filtered or bottled to be usable by humans (e.g. Puschmann and Burgess 
2014; Anonymous 2017). By such a portrayal of data as natural resources these 
actors achieve three things: First, they place those who ‘refine’ the data–such as IT 
1 In Lyotard’s own words:
We may thus expect a thorough exteriorisation of knowledge with respect to the ‘knower,’ 
at whatever point he or she may occupy in the knowledge process. The old principle that the 
acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of 
individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so. The relationships of the 
suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and 
will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity 
producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume – that is, the form 
of value. Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed 
in order to be valorised in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange (Lyotard 
2004 [1979]: 4–5).
2 Lyotard put it as follows: ‘The notion that learning falls within the purview of the State, as the 
brain or mind of society, will become more and more outdated with the increasing strength of the 
opposing principle, according to which society exists and progresses only if the messages circulat-
ing within it are rich in information and easy to decode’ (Lyotard 1979: 5).
3 The historian Daniel Rosenberg is particularly eloquent in his description of the ‘neutral’ mean-
ing of data in our societies: ‘Data has no truth. Even today, when we speak of data, we make no 
assumptions at all about veracity. Electronic data, like the data of the early modern period, is given. 
It may be that the data we collect and transmit has no relation to truth or reality whatsoever beyond 
the reality that data helps us to construct. This fact is essential to our current usage. It was no less 
so in the early modern period; but in our age of communication, it is this rhetorical aspect of the 
term ‘data’ that has made it indispensable’ (Rosenberg 2013: 37).
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and consumer tech companies, governments, and other corporations–in a position 
where they have a moral right to profit from data because they supposedly built the 
infrastructures and tools to make data usable, and who mined or refined or packaged 
them for consumption. At the same time, by implying that data are a natural resource, 
they are rendering invisible the contributions that the people make who the data 
come from; as patients, as citizens, or as users of online services. Third, the alleg-
edly de-politicised and de-contextualised nature of data portrays commercial corpo-
rations as fulfilling an important societal function, namely to create and analyse 
evidence about the world.
It is this allusion to the supposed public value of the data work they are doing that 
lets large multinational corporations who hold quasi-monopoly status get away with 
large-scale tax avoidance and questionable forms of data use. Some of the largest 
players in this landscape–including Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (GAFA)–
have ceased to be market participants but become de facto market regulators, due to 
their immense size and influence (Pasquale 2017). They create facts on the ground 
that regulators need to catch up with, and they ensure that public authorities created 
legal frameworks and policies that facilitate the accumulation of power of 
GAFA.  These policies include generous tax incentives, antitrust regulations that 
remain toothless against multinational tech corporations (e.g. Ip 2018), and data 
protection rules with unenforced sanctions or fines that remain below the pain 
threshold of multinational corporations (Golla 2017). The result is a profound power 
imbalance between those who use data and those from whom the data come, as well 
as the institutions that represent the interests of the latter (Pasquale 2017; see also 
van Dijck 2014; Zuboff 2015). GAFA have become a kind of new Leviathan – an 
iLeviathan (Prainsack 2018) – that people submit some of their natural freedoms to 
in order to receive something back that they consider essential; not physical security 
and the protection of their property, as was the case with the original, Hobbesian 
Leviathan, but the possibility to communicate across time and space, to buy goods 
in a faster and more convenient manner, and to use their time more effectively (for 
many, this is a necessary condition to be able to do all the other things they need to 
do to hold a job or two and run their families).
Responses to the profound power imbalances that data collection and use are 
embedded in the GAFA era have been manifold, in the public domain and within 
critical scholarship alike (e.g. Andrejevic 2014; Kaye et  al. 2015; Brunton and 
Nissenbaum 2015; Pasquale 2017; Birkinbine 2018; see also Hummel et al. 2018). 
Many authors and initiatives seek to give people more control over how their own 
data are being used (e.g. Hafen et al. 2014); others focus on strengthening control 
and responsibility also at the collective level (e.g. Prainsack and Buyx 2016). Data 
donation could be an instrument that helps both ends: It could serve as an expression 
of a person’s autonomy to decide what she wants to be done with her data, and as a 
commitment public value and collective control.
Before we proceed with the argument, there is one crucial question so solve: 
What does it mean to donate data?
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2.2  What Does It Mean to Donate Data?
2.2.1  Donation as a Relational Practice
What is a donation? Legal definitions of the term all focus on the following ele-
ments: The owner of a thing transfers it to another person or entity without consid-
eration of what she will receive in return. The latter aspect–that something is given 
without demanding something in return–tells us two things about donations: First, 
that they are outside of the commercial domain, meaning that no economic profit 
motive is attached to its transfer;4 and second, that donations are not reciprocal. At 
least not in a direct and linear manner. Some definitions of donations suggest the 
word ‘gift’ as a synonym for donation to emphasise that both are embedded in net-
works of mutual moral and social obligations and subject to complex sets of rules. 
The behaviours of both gift-givers and gift-receivers are regulated by expectations 
about how and what to give and to receive, and they are sometimes faced with seri-
ous social repercussions if givers and receivers do not adhere to these unwritten 
rules (e.g. Caplow 1984; Carrier 1991; Bergquist and Ljungberg 2001; Zeitlyn 
2003). In other words, gifts are indirectly reciprocal.
Why are these aspects important when thinking about data donations? First of 
all, they underscore the relational nature of donations. Their value, their conse-
quences, and the practices of giving and receiving donations cannot be understood 
or assessed outside of the personal, social, and economic relations that they are 
embedded in. Definitions of donation express the relational nature of donations also 
by emphasising that donations are complete only once they have been received. My 
intention to donate something to you is not sufficient for the donation to materialise; 
you also need to receive it. And whether you will, or can, receive my intended dona-
tion, in turn, depends on a range of factors, such as: your trust in me (do you suspect 
my donation to be driven by questionable motives? Will it make you dependent on 
me? Or might the donation be harmful to you in any way?), your trust in institutions 
(is there somebody to turn to if something goes wrong?), possibly also on whether 
you feel you ‘deserve’ the donation, and on the various factors in your life that can 
foster or impede your ability to practically receive a donation. In the case of dona-
tions of money, it will be relevant whether you have a bank account. For an organ 
donation, it will be relevant whether or not you are eligible, and physically well 
enough, to undergo surgery. In other words, despite donation not being a commer-
cial transaction, and despite their not being directly reciprocal in the sense that you 
do not need to give me something directly in return, my donation articulates, 
strengthens, or changes my relation to the person or entity that I donate something 
to, and vice versa.
4 This does not preclude that the thing that is being donated has exchange value. For an excellent 
discussion of the distinction between commodification and commercialisation see Radin 1996.
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2.2.2  Can We Donate Data?
Many of us will have something physical in mind when thinking of donations: 
books, organs, money. Money no longer sits in our pockets and wallets in the form 
of paper or coins, but, like books and organs, it is consumable and rivalrous: It can 
be ‘used up’, and the use of the good by one person affects the use of the good by 
others. If I donate money to an art school then I cannot give the same money to 
disaster relief. If I donate a kidney to one person, I cannot donate the same kidney 
to somebody else. Traditionally, donations have entailed that there is a consumable 
thing that is transferred from one entity to another. Can the same be said for data, 
and especially digital data?
I argued in another place that digital data are best described with the term multi-
plicity (Prainsack 2018). Multiplicity captures the characteristic of digital data of 
being able to be in more places than one at the same time, in leaving traces even 
when they are ‘deleted’, and of being able to be copied and used by several people 
at the same time, independent of what the others are doing.5
Returning to data donation, can we transfer something that is multiple? Can I 
‘donate’ my medical records to a research project, or my DNA information to a 
biobank? I cannot do this in the sense that I transfer to somebody else a material 
thing that I then no longer have. In the case of data, if I allow researchers access to 
my medical records then I can still access them myself. So why do we not stick with 
the term data ‘sharing’, as this is what I am doing in the case of such ‘donation’?
In the case of post-mortem use, there is a clear case to be made for the use of the 
term ‘donation’ over ‘sharing’ (Krutzinna et al. 2018), because ‘sharing’ implies 
joint use; if I share my car with you we can both use it, if we share a flat we both live 
in it. In the case of post-mortem data use, such a kind of sharing is not possible as 
the donor is no longer able to jointly use anything. But it is useful to use the term 
data donation also beyond the context of post-mortem donation: Whenever there is 
a non-commercial transfer of data from a living person to another, the term ‘data 
donation’ is arguably preferable to the very broad and unspecific ‘data sharing’. The 
latter has been used to describe anything from agreeing to make one’s medical 
information accessible to disease researchers to buying a DNA test online (Prainsack 
2015). This lack of specificity muddles, rather than aids, the development of regula-
tory and ethical instruments in this field.
But to do justice to the specificity of the term data donation, as well as to the 
values enshrined in them, we need to consider a number of dimensions. Relationality 
is a characteristic of donation that tells us to be attentive to the relationships of 
5 Other terms that are often used to describe the nature of digital data, namely non-rivalry and non-
depletability, assume that the value and integrity of data do not suffer from several people using 
them, and they cannot be ‘used up’. Both of these assumptions are problematic, because the value 
of data can be affected by several people using them; think of proprietary information such search 
algorithms, or information on commercial mergers that are likely to affect stock prices. 
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both the giver and receiver of donations to their human, natural and artefactual 
environments, and to the needs and capabilities that emerge out of these relations. 
Attention to indirect reciprocity tells us to work towards frameworks that ensure 
that the relationship between givers and receivers is not starkly unbalanced in 
terms of the overall distribution of costs and benefits, duties and entitlements. 
Finally, the multiplicity of data–i.e. the fact that data can be, and often are, in dif-
ferent places at the same time–means that we can, and arguably need to, ask the 
question under what circumstances data donation should entail a transfer of rights 
to exclusive use, if at all.
2.3  Considerations for Frameworks for Data Donation
2.3.1  Relationality
I have argued that donations are relational in the sense that givers and receivers are 
connected through social, institutional, political, and economic relations. Moreover, 
not only are donors and receivers connected in this way, but also data themselves are 
relational. Despite the aforementioned efforts by some actors in our society to por-
tray data as neutral evidence about the social and natural world that is out there 
independently of those who collect and analyse data (but that need to be made ‘leg-
ible’ through the valuable work of consumer tech companies), virtually all scholars 
and commentators who have been involved in, or studied, processes of data creation 
in practice agree that data in fact are inseparable and meaning-less if isolated from 
the humans and artefacts who created and sustained them (e.g. Leonelli 2016). As 
noted above, in contrast to what common comparisons of data with natural resources 
suggest, data are never ‘raw’ (Gitelman 2013).
Frameworks for data donations should take this relationality of people and data 
into consideration in at least two ways: first, by honouring the work that data 
donors–as patients, citizens, users of online services–have done to create the data-
sets in question; and second, by systematically considering the needs and interests 
of data donors and their significant others (family members, friends, and some-
times also non-human companions). Table 2.1 below summarises these concerns 
and includes questions that should be asked to ensure that these concerns are ade-
quately considered in the creation of specific ethical and regulatory frameworks 
and instruments. To be clear, such consideration of the needs and interests of data 
donors (or those of their significant others, especially in the case of post-mortem 
donation) does not imply that data donors need to retain individual control over 
their data after the point of donation. Retaining individual control of the donor 
over data after the donation has completed would undermine the spirit of the very 
idea of data donation. Instead, a meaningful way of consideration of the needs of 
data donors and their significant others, and one that does not undercut the spirit 
of data donation, would be to call upon everybody using the data–clinicians, 
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researchers, or even the receivers of the donation–to ask questions about the 
value, benefits, and risks of data for different people, including the data donors. 
This means, for example, that if findings emerge from the data that are likely to 
make a significant difference in the data donor’s or her family’s life–such as seri-
ous and treatable health problems–the data donor or her family could be informed 
of this.6 Another way to consider the needs of data donors would be to create pro-
cesses and instruments to ensure that data donors retain access to their own data as 
it will continue to be their own health information (except in the case of post-
mortem data donations, continued access by family members of the data donor 
could be considered). Given the fact that data can be used by several parties with-
out necessarily detracting from the use value, this is typically not difficult to orga-
nise on the technical level.
6 An important question, here, is under what conditions health information should be considered 
‘actionable’ for the data donor and her family. Paperwork accompanying data donations should 
include information on the data donors’ preferences in this request. Legislation should be in place 
to overrule the wishes of data donors who stated that they and their family members should not be 
contacted under any circumstances in cases where clinicians feel that not informing data donors (or 
their family members) of newly emerging information would put the donors or their family mem-
bers in serious danger.
Table 2.1 Considerations emerging from the relationality of data
Objective Typical questions to be asked
Examples for implementation in ethical 
and regulatory instruments
Honour the 
work of data 
donors
What investments (in terms of 
time, money, training, community 
and infrastructure creation and 
maintenance) have (a) data donors 
and (b) communities and public 
actors made to create the dataset?
For example, acknowledgments of data 
donors, by name (if they have agreed to 
this), wherever appropriate, e.g. on a 
website, in publications for which their 
data have been used, etc.a
What would a fair benefit for these 
actors to receive as an 
acknowledgement for their 
contributions?
Consider the 





Should data donors retain access 
to their own individual-level data 
by default?
For example, data donors and their 
significant others could be offered to see 
copies of individual-level data that are 
donated. And data donors and significant 
others could be invited to opt into 
receiving updates on information obtained 
from their data (individual-level, 
actionable updates, is possible and 
appropriate, or alerts to aggregate findings 
or publications)
Should significant others 
(biological relatives, or other 
named family members and 
friends) be told about findings 
stemming from the data donor’s 
data that are likely to be significant 
and actionable in their own lives?
aI am grateful to Jen Krutzinna for particularly helpful discussions on this point
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2.3.2  Indirect Reciprocity
I have noted that in contrast to other types of transactions that are characterised by 
direct reciprocity–that is, where one thing is exchanged for another in the same 
moment (a good or service for money, or goods for one another)–donations are not 
directly reciprocal. A transaction is not a donation if something is demanded in 
return. This does not mean, however, that donations take place in a social and politi-
cal vacuum: Not only are givers and receivers connected through social, public, and 
economic environments and institutions, but in order for data donations to become 
a societal institution in itself that people trust, they need to be part of a system of 
indirect reciprocity. Potential and actual data donors need to know that the group 
that they are donating to, or that will benefit from their data–typically, the collective 
of people living in a specific country–will do give them something as well. Not 
directly, and not in the same instance as they decide to donate their data, but they 
will eventually provide assistance to them when they need it.
Such assistance could manifest itself in solidarity-based health insurance, where 
access to healthcare is not dependent on the ability to pay; or in progressive taxation 
of high salaries and transfer payments to those who do not have enough money to 
lead dignified lives. In the best of all worlds, all data donation frameworks are 
embedded in systems of such ‘general’ indirect reciprocity that ensure that people’s 
fundamental needs and interests are met. But with regard to data donation specifi-
cally, indirect reciprocity–which is an inherently trust-building feature–should also 
manifest itself in institutions and instruments that ensure that data donors7 who are 
harmed as a result of their donation receive support. Existing legal instruments are 
not sufficient for this purpose: Legal redress typically requires that the person who 
claims compensation for harm can prove that a specific action or omission by a 
specific actor causally led to the harm (or even that they broke a rule). In the digital 
era, however, where data are simultaneous and where proprietary algorithms and 
machine learning can make it impossible to trace how exactly data move through 
systems, legal instruments are out of reach for many who were harmed by data use. 
For this reason, Aisling McMahon, Alena Buyx and I have suggested the introduc-
tion of Harm Mitigation Bodies which would not require people to proof that a 
specific action or omission by a specific data user caused the harm. People appeal-
ing to Harm Mitigation Bodies would only need to show that the harm they experi-
enced is plausibly connected to data use (McMahon et  al. Under review). Harm 
Mitigation Bodies would judge the plausibility of the case and take any or all of the 
following three types of action: (1) feed information back to data controllers about 
the experienced harm and provide suggestions as to how such harm could be avoided 
in the future; (2) inform the person(s) experiencing the harm about what will be 
done to avoid such harms from occurring in the future, and issuing an apology if 
appropriate; (3) provide financial support. The first serves the purpose of creating a 
7 In the case of deceased donors, this extends also to significant others whom they leave behind.
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record of the types of harms occurring from data use. Initiatives to create data harm 
records do thankfully exist already,8 but Harm Mitigation Bodies would be in a posi-
tion to create a systematic record of experienced harms. The importance of mea-
sures such as informing applicants about what will be done to avoid such harm in 
the future, and issuing apologies should not be underestimated. Empirical research 
in many contexts shows that people’s experiences being ‘seen’ and acknowledged is 
a necessary step in the process of reconciliation and recovery from harm (e.g. Long 
and Brecke 2003; Staub 2006; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Finally, regarding the third 
option of providing financial support, this would be an option of last resort if the 
person(s, or their family members) experienced significant and undue financial 
harm and there is no other source of financial support available. It should be empha-
sised here that the financial support function of Harm Mitigation Bodies are not 
meant to provide compensation or restitution, that is, these payments do not, and 
cannot, claim to be proportionate to the actual financial harm occurred. They are 
merely–but importantly–an instantiation of the societal commitment to support 
those who were harmed as a result of a prosocial practice, namely, donating their 
data. In another place we explain details as to how Harm Mitigation Bodies are 
governed, how they receive their funding, and on the basis of what criteria they 
make their decisions (McMahon et al. Under review) (Table 2.2).
We proposed that Harm Mitigation Bodies should be established at national lev-
els and be subsidiary to legal remedies. They would be applicable to any instance 
of corporate data use, not limited to any specific domain or format of data ‘sharing’. 
It would apply to harm resulting from deliberate and proactive data use (as in the 
case of data donation), or data use unbeknownst to the data subject (e.g. by using 
online services or when there is a legal basis for data use that does not require the 
person’s consent). Harm mitigation is thus not only a design feature of data dona-
tion frameworks specifically but a necessary instrument of indirect reciprocity, 
which is a systemic property of the society that data donation frameworks are 
embedded in. It will help to ensure, on a systemic level, that the conditions under 
which people donate data are fair, and that data donation frameworks are trusted 
and trustworthy.
8 E.g. https://datajusticelab.org/data-harm-record/
Table 2.2 Three functions of Harm Mitigation Bodies in the context of data donation (McMahon 
et al. Under review)
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3
Collect information on the 
types of harm that occur as a 
result of data donations and 
feed this information back to 
data users
Inform those who experienced 
harm about what will be done to 
prevent such harm from 
occurring in the future
Provide financial support
Issue apologies were appropriate
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2.3.3  Multiplicity
The multiplicity of digital data, as noted above, means that data can be in several 
places at the same time, and that they typically leave traces where on their journeys 
(Leonelli 2016) throughout systems. In contrast to the paradigmatic example for 
things to be donated–money, clothes, or even organs–which are no longer available 
to the donor once the donation has been completed, data could, in theory, still be 
used by the donor and/or her significant others after the time of donation. I dis-
cussed some aspects of this above under the label of relationality earlier in this sec-
tion, where I argued that the relationality of both people and data requires us to 
acknowledge the contributions of data donors and others to making the data avail-
able in the first place. I proposed that the most important way of acknowledging 
their ‘data work’ would be via considering the needs of data subjects and their sig-
nificant others beyond the point of the donation. Here I wish to emphasise a related 
but different point, namely that the multiplicity of data raises the question whether 
the exclusive transfer of all rights pertaining to data is possible, and if it is possible, 
whether it is something that data donation should entail.
Let us start with the first part of the question, namely whether the exclusive trans-
fer of all rights pertaining to data–including the right to use, destroy, and transfer 
ownership of the data–can be the subject of data donation. Again, if data were a 
clearly delineated material thing like a book or piece of clothing I could transfer all 
of these rights. This is the case because it is uncontested that property rights to 
books and clothes can be held and thus it is possible to transfer them. With regard to 
data, the situation is more complicated, because there is no consensus that property 
rights to data can be held. To put it very generally, in the United States and in areas 
influenced by U.S. law, there is the view that personal data can be governed by indi-
vidual property regimes, which are often described as bundles of rights including 
the right to use the thing, to use it exclusively if one wishes, to earn income from the 
it, to transfer it to others, or to destroy it. In Europe and in areas influenced by 
European legal traditions, personal data tend to be seen as inalienable possessions 
of a person that are protected by human rights–such as privacy–and not by property 
rights. What might sound like a petty technical point signifies a large ideological 
difference: The purpose of property rights is to enable–and, as some would argue, to 
encourage–the transfer of goods, and thus the introduction of goods into markets 
and economic value chains. The European-style human rights approach, in contrast, 
treats data as something that have no price; as something that should not be com-
modified and commercialised (see also Purtova 2009, 2015; see also Prainsack 
2018).
This means that if data donation takes place in a country that does not allow 
individual property rights to be held to personal data, the person owning (in a moral 
sense) her data cannot transfer property rights of data to another person because she 
does not hold them in the first place. We can allow others to use our data, but we 
cannot transfer the right to exclusive use, or the right to transfer legal ownership. In 
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other words, as a data donor I can allow others to use my data, but I cannot transfer 
the exclusive right to these data. The multiplicity of digital data is the techno- 
material expression of the legal view of the non-transferability of exclusive rights 
data: I can allow others to use all of the data and information that I uploaded onto 
my social media sites but these can still be accessed by myself as well (and when I 
am dead, they can still be accessed by those I leave behind with my password).
If data donation takes place in a country that does treat personal data as individ-
ual property then I could, in theory, transfer the whole bundle of my property rights–
and thus, exclusive control over my data–to others. Here, the multiplicity of digital 
data means that if I donate the data held in my digital home assistant, for example, 
to a university for their exclusive use, I would need to ensure that I no longer have 
access to the data in my home assistant myself (or my heirs and password holders 
after my death). The question here is whether such a scenario of transfer of right to 
exclusive use is practically enforceable, and if it is, if it is desirable.
2.4  Resisting the iLeviathan? Politicising the Ethics of Data 
Donation
In this paper, I explored the notion of data donation. I started by outlining the 
power relationships between citizens as data subjects on the one hand, and the 
corporations that use data on the other. I argued that both the political and, within 
it, the discursive economy that data use is embedded in, grants a number of moral 
and political rights to corporations that should belong to data subjects instead. I 
argued that data donation can be an instrument to change the political data econ-
omy for the better. Data donation, I argued, has three distinctive characteristics: 
relationality, indirect reciprocity, and multiplicity. For each of these characteristics 
I outlined what they mean for the design of ethical and regulatory instruments for 
data donation. With respect to relationality, I proposed that the consideration of the 
needs and interests of data donors (and their significant others) should remain an 
important concern also once a donation has been completed. The characteristic of 
indirect reciprocity mandates that we ensure that data donation frameworks are 
embedded in systems of structural mutual assistance and support. The characteris-
tic of multiplicity–which, as noted, is not a property of the type of transaction but 
a property of digital data, which have the capacity to be in more than one place at 
the same time–raises the question of whether the transfer of exclusive control over 
data is possible, and if it is, whether it should be. I concluded that the answer to 
this question depends on whether or not we see personal data as something that 
can be governed by individual property rights. In countries where personal data are 
treated as an inalienable possession rather than individual property in the legal 
sense, it is not possible to transfer exclusive control over data because one does not 
have it in the first place. In such countries, data donations would amount to data 
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donors consenting to some specific (but not unlimited) use rights by third parties. 
And even in countries where personal data are seen to be governed by individual 
property rights and the transfer of exclusive rights is legally possible, it is ques-
tionable whether the transfer of exclusive control is desirable, and practically 
feasible.
Last but not least, when designing ethical and legal frameworks for data dona-
tion, the consideration of the role that data donation should play in the political 
economy is of utmost importance. The notion of donation, as outlined aptly by 
Krutzinna, Taddeo and Floridi, treats the common good as a ‘foundational ethical 
principle’ (Krutzinna et al. 2018). The very idea of giving up control over one’s data 
and allowing others to use them can be a symbol of trust in others (also beyond 
somebody’s death), and an instance of solidarity. It can also be an expression of the 
data donor’s autonomy: If I decide to donate my data then I am not leaving it up to 
‘the system’ to decide, but I take an active decision that my data should create value 
for others too. This, however, will only work if the institutions that facilitate and 
govern data donation are trustworthy, and if they protect the needs and interests of 
data donors and data users both as individuals and as members of our society. If we 
want it to change our political economy for the better, then data donation could be a 
bridge between the individual and the public domain.
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Chapter 3
Data Donations as Exercises  
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Abstract We propose that the notion of individual sovereignty encompasses more 
than having the power to exclude others from one’s personal space. Instead, sover-
eignty is realized at least in part along outward-reaching, interactive and participa-
tory dimensions. On the basis of reflections from gift theory, we argue that donations 
can generate social bonds, convey recognition and open up new options in social 
space. By virtue of these features, donations offer the potential to advance individ-
ual sovereignty. We go on to highlight distinctive benefits of data donations, before 
articulating several difficulties and puzzles: data donors are bound to have a limited 
grip on future uses of their data and the people affected by their decision to share. 
Further characteristic traits of data donations come from the invasive and compre-
hensive character of state-of-the-art data gathering and processing tools, and the fact 
that the relevant sense of data ownership is far from straightforward. In order to 
minimize tensions with negative, protective aspects of sovereignty, we argue that 
thoughtful mechanisms at the level of consent procedures, the representation of data 
subjects in governance structures, and organizational-level constraints are neces-
sary. Along the way, we will devote particular attention to challenges and opportuni-
ties within big data contexts.
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3.1  Introduction
Donations are common in health contexts. Crowdfunding calls through websites 
like GoFundMe in which patients rely on private donors to pay for unexpected med-
ical expenses are familiar especially in the United States (Snyder 2016; Berliner and 
Kenworthy 2017). There are plenty of opportunities to help others not just by giving 
money, but also by giving parts of our bodies, such as organs or blood. We can give 
such parts or materials more or less directly to patients in need, or contribute sam-
ples to biobanks in which they feed into research, development, public health sur-
veillance and other beneficial activities.
In these kinds of donations, the potential donor is in a position to seek and 
understand information about the need for her donation. Although some degree of 
uncertainty is often inevitable, she can learn about the features of potential recipi-
ents, the way in which her donation addresses a problem, and how her donation 
will be distributed. It is also quite straightforward what she is donating, e.g., an 
organ, blood, or a specimen. Moreover, the donor herself is carrying any inconve-
niences in connection with her donation, and burdensome effects on others are 
typically minimal or absent.
Databases are growing at breath-taking speeds, while tools and algorithms to 
process and interpret data become more powerful and sophisticated (Mayer- 
Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Murdoch and Detsky 2013; Raghupathi and 
Raghupathi 2014). Still, information that can feed into evidence bases is not always 
readily available. It needs to be discovered, harvested, shared, and analysed. In 
recent years, the roles individuals can play in data gathering processes have received 
increased attention. The widespread rollout of electronic health records has made it 
easier than ever to handle personal health data and opens up opportunities for shar-
ing it in a variety of ways. By making their health data available, individuals can 
enable research and advance clinical progress (Nature Biotechnology 2015).
Two potential applications are the following. First, medical data can feed into 
research. By providing one’s data for such purposes, one ideally provides research-
ers with the raw materials for discovering unforeseen correlations and helps to pave 
the way for new hypotheses, preventive actions, diagnostics, and treatments. One 
possible source for such data is direct-to-consumer genetic testing. For example, in 
2014 the online networking service PatientsLikeMe launched its “Data For Good” 
campaign, which “underscores the power of donating health data to improve one’s 
own condition, help others and change medicine” (PatientsLikeMe 2014). The cam-
paign is motivated by survey data suggesting that “94 percent of American social 
media users agree with sharing their health data to help doctors improve care” 
(Grajales et  al. 2014), provided their anonymity is secured. Further examples 
include the non-profit platform DNA.Land which calls for users to upload their 
genomic data in order to “enable scientists to make new discoveries” and to learn 
more about their genome (DNA.Land 2018). The open source website openSNP 
allows users to upload genetic information, including full genomes, which are then 
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published under a Creative Commons Zero licence. The data can be freely copied, 
modified, distributed, and analysed for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
Second, an increasing number of clinical deep-learning-driven diagnostics and 
treatments rely on large amounts of patient data, cases, and background informa-
tion. Data that is fed into such systems can guide a vast range of useful applications, 
e.g., the delineation of tumours in radiological images (Microsoft 2018) or thera-
peutic decision-making regarding metastatic breast cancer (Yang et al. 2016, 2017). 
Sharing one’s personal health data for such purposes directly affects treatment 
options and prospects of present and future patients.
The question arises under which conditions applications like these can legiti-
mately be based on donations of personal health data from individuals. The present 
paper argues that some of the most pressing challenges surrounding data donations 
are challenges about the data sovereignty of the donor. We begin by introducing the 
concept of data sovereignty (2.) and propose that it encompasses more than having 
the power to exclude others from one’s personal space. Instead, it has a positive 
dimension as well. On the basis of reflections from gift theory, we propose that data 
donations can be exercises of positive data sovereignty. We go on to highlight poten-
tials (3.) of data donations, before articulating several difficulties and puzzles that 
arise from the idea of donating personal health data (4.). We close with some sug-
gestions on how sovereign data donations could be made possible in practice (5.). 
Along the way, we will devote particular attention to complications and opportuni-
ties within big data contexts.
Before we begin, a conceptual remark on the idea of donating one’s personal 
health data is in order. While the concept of data sharing has received a lot of atten-
tion throughout the literature (e.g., Borgman 2012), the notion of data donation is 
relatively new and less widespread (e.g., Prainsack and Buyx 2017, ch. 5). Data 
sharing and data donation both involve the provision of access to data. In our view, 
they differ along at least two dimensions.
The first difference relates to exclusivity: if I share a good, I can still use at least 
a portion of it myself. If I donate something, typically the respective portion of the 
good is gone. Relative to ordinary language, it is thus somewhat surprising to speak 
of data donations insofar as the putative donor typically does not lose even a portion 
of her data when granting others access (see also Barbara Prainsack’s contribution 
to this volume).
The second difference is motivational, and in our view provides an important 
reason to focus on data donations. Relative to ordinary language, the notion of 
donating more than the notion of mere sharing highlights the possibility of a par-
ticular kind of motivation for why we might give others access to our goods. When 
I exchange or trade something or a portion thereof, I expect a return. When I gift 
something, do I expect a return, too? As we will see in the following, this question 
is discussed controversially. What does seem to distinguish gifting from exchanging 
is that the former involves a symbolic dimension that the latter lacks. For this rea-
son, the following discussion is driven by the suspicion that when reflecting upon 
data donations, we should be mindful of such symbolic aspects of granting others 
access to one’s data.
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3.2  Donations and Sovereignty
Many areas in the health sector anticipate progress and efficiency gains from 
increasingly powerful data gathering and processing tools. The hope is that such 
innovations will advance a range of activities such as public health surveillance, 
research and development, the provision of medical care and the design of health 
systems. While these prospects are intriguing, novel and ever more penetrative data- 
processing tools can leave individuals susceptible to risks of harm and prompt us to 
consider at what point disproportionate intrusions into the personal sphere begin—
especially if highly intimate and sensitive information is being processed. Big data 
applications thus bring a number of ethical questions to the forefront (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2015; Vayena et  al. 2015; Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016; 
German Ethics Council 2017a, b), including how individuals can make autonomous 
choices about where their data goes and what is being done with it, while they shall 
be both beneficiaries and objects of investigation of data- and computation- intensive 
tools that promise to speed up and to enhance knowledge generation processes.
One up-and-coming concept in these discussions is the notion of data sover-
eignty. Although not used uniformly throughout the literature, the concept relates to 
issues of control about who can access and process data (Friedrichsen and Bisa 
2016; De Mooy 2017; German Ethics Council 2017a, b). For example, data sover-
eignty is being discussed with regards to cloud computing, and refers to what is 
being undermined by uncertainty about which law applies to information stored in 
the cloud (De Filippi and McCarthy 2012). Commentators worry that governments 
which use cloud computing run the risk of compromising national sovereignty by 
conceding control over their data (Irion 2013). Some identify data sovereignty with 
the ability to geolocate data and to place it within the borders of a particular nation- 
state (Peterson et al. 2011). Only then is it possible for users to determine which 
privacy protections, intellectual property protections, and regulations apply, and 
which risks of legal and illegal access to data exist.
In the German media discourse, data sovereignty is occasionally being perceived 
as a threat to privacy and a “lobby notion” introduced by the data-processing indus-
try to hollow out data protection standards (Krempl 2018). But quite the opposite is 
true. While data sovereignty does indeed rest on the conviction that traditional 
input-oriented data protection principles like data minimisation and purpose limita-
tion are unsuitable in big data contexts (German Ethics Council 2017a, b), two 
important clarifications are in order. First, proponents of data sovereignty highlight 
its orientation towards informational self-determination, which involves the protec-
tion of a personal sphere of privacy that sets the stage for participation in the public 
sphere (Hornung and Schnabel 2009). Second, the notion of data sovereignty is 
driven by the conviction that claims and rights like those related to informational 
self-determination can only be realized against the backdrop of social contexts and 
structures in which they are articulated, recognized, and respected. Proponents of 
data sovereignty highlight that digitization has the potential to transform the social 
core in which articulations of these claims are always embedded. This is why it is 
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inadequate to insist upon rigid, input-oriented data protection principles (Dabrock 
2018). Instead, the focus must shift to the social transformations and tensions of 
digitization in which individuals should be put in a position to claim their right to 
informational self-determination reliably and robustly.
In the following, we shall not deny that sovereignty motivates negative and pro-
tective claims and rights related to the data subject’s privacy (although cf. Goodman 
2016, pp. 153–155). Instead, we will focus on the question whether the picture of 
sovereignty encompasses more than just the exclusion of others from one’s personal 
information, and instead motivates claims of individuals to share rather than hold 
back their data.
In early modern political theory, sovereignty denotes absolute and unconditional 
power that is neither constrained by nor accountable to other powers. The notion 
became prominent after Bodin (1576) applied it to absolutist rulers in order to char-
acterize their supreme authority. For Hobbes (1651), this authority is the result of a 
transfer of sovereignty from the people to the ruler. Other authors attributed sover-
eignty to nations, countries, or peoples. Sovereignty is typically indexed to a spatial 
or a substantive domain. The spatial domain is the territorial region which is subject 
to the sovereign’s will. The substantive domain comprises the matters on which the 
sovereign is authoritative. Nevertheless, the claim to absolute power is one reason 
why the notion of sovereignty is sometimes being looked upon with uneasiness, and 
has led to controversies about whether the political sphere is framed fruitfully in 
terms of it. For example, Maritain (1951, ch. 2) worries that once the people transfer 
their power to the sovereign in Bodin’s or Hobbes’ model, their sovereignty is irre-
trievably lost. After having become the sovereign, the leader is free to determine the 
nature and boundaries of its power. Against this, one can invoke notions of legiti-
macy, and argue that sovereignty properly understood is undercut by certain claims 
to power and ways of ruling. The apparent sovereign becomes a despot if she is 
guided by arbitrariness and self-interest or proceeds without appropriate forms of 
recognition from the people she governs. Sovereignty, although prima facie a prop-
erty of the authoritative individual, is not something which can simply be claimed 
and possessed independently of social or political embeddedness. It is something 
that is conferred upon the sovereign, a property that arises from its relation to those 
who are eventually subject to the sovereign power and recognize the sovereign as 
authoritative and legitimate.
The power of the sovereign goes hand in hand with the ability to constrain the 
power of others. Prior to early modern times, the historic function of the concept 
was not to entitle rulers to power, but to delimit the authority of worldly leaders. 
Sovereignty as unconstrained and absolute power was attributed to God in order to 
distinguish divine authority from claims of kings and emperors, and to constrain the 
claims to power of the latter. Modern ascriptions of sovereignty also have implica-
tions about negative freedom. For example, Mill argues that with regards to things 
which concern only the subject herself, she is entitled to absolute independence 
from interference by society: “[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign” (Mill 1859, p. 224).
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Nevertheless, sovereignty is not exhausted by negative claims. It can have posi-
tive implications about the space it determines as the domain of the sovereign. The 
sovereignty of a state is not exhausted by external sovereignty against outside inter-
ference. Instead, sovereignty has an internal dimension as well: within its territory 
the sovereign has the authority to govern according to her will. Similarly, Mill’s 
individual who is the sovereign over her personal sphere is not merely entitled to the 
right and power to exclude others from her domain of sovereignty, but also to oper-
ate within this sphere—in Mill’s case: to pursue her idea of the good life.
For either dimension, one important realizer of sovereignty is power. Sovereignty 
is being realized through the power to keep outsiders out of one’s domain of sover-
eignty and to operate within this domain. This carries with it the constraint, criti-
cism, and repudiation of claims to power of outsiders as well as those insiders who 
are subject to the sovereign. Again, this isn’t crude and arbitrary power or force. 
Whether a claim to sovereign power is appropriate and legitimate depends on its 
content and the relationship between the putative sovereign and her claim’s address-
ees. Negotiating sovereignty and its scope is a discoursive process to be carried out 
in dialogue with others and society.
When individuals pursue their idea of the good life, we should take note of the 
fact that this pursuit need not be exhausted by an atomistic sense of one’s personal 
good. As Taylor (1985, p. 190) maintains: “Man is a social animal, indeed a political 
animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self- 
sufficient outside a polis.” The sovereign individual’s pursuit of the good life plau-
sibly unfolds through social relations, embeddedness, and interactions. Crucial 
realizers of positive aspects of her sovereignty transcend the boundaries of her per-
sonal sphere, and rest on how this personal sphere is connected and related to 
others.
Consider now what this could mean for data sovereignty. In the case of data 
sovereignty, the relevant kind of power is control over one’s data: where it goes, 
who has access, and what is being done with it. The foregoing suggests that the 
individual need not always exercise sovereignty in ways that close off her personal 
data from others, e.g., by categorically prioritizing her right to privacy. As propo-
nents of relational autonomy highlight, persons are not just independent, isolated, 
and self-interested beings (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Dabrock et al. 2004; Baylis 
et al. 2008; Dabrock 2012; Steinfath and Wiesemann 2016; Braun 2017). Their self-
hood and well-being depend on rich and complex relations to others, their commu-
nity, and society as a whole. Importantly, this can mean that the data sovereign 
individual does not just close off her data, but shares it with others. In fact, practices 
of sharing one’s personal data can constitute meaningful advances and reinforce-
ments of the social structures in which the individual seeks to realize positive 
aspects of her sovereignty (see also Barbara Prainsack’s contribution to this volume 
for a discussion of the relational nature of donations). This is a particularly fruitful 
option if these acts of sharing take the form of donating and endowing.
In his seminal discussion, Mauss (1950) describes a range of features which he 
claims are distinctive of the notion of a gift. When someone gives goods in the con-
text of a trade, she expects a return. In contrast, while a gift might be tied to 
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 reciprocal obligations between donor and recipient, it always points to something 
beyond these. A gift is tied to the donor’s generosity as well as some form of obliga-
tion on the side of the recipient. In this sense, there is a similarity with economic 
exchange because the relationship that is being constituted through the act of giving 
is two- ways, mutual, or symmetrical. Still, the character of the gift cannot be cap-
tured in terms of the logic of exchange: the reciprocal obligations in question are 
incommensurable and cannot be set off against each other in an economic calculus. 
Gifts might not be incompatible with trade and exchange, but they involve much 
more. They provide systematic means for individuals and groups to articulate and 
reciprocate recognition, and thereby determine and shape identities. “[B]y giving 
one is giving oneself, and if one gives oneself, it is because one ‘owes’ oneself—
one’s person and one’s goods—to others” (Mauss 1950, p. 59).
Other authors insist that gifts need to be distinguished more sharply from 
exchange. For example, Derrida argues that a genuine gift cannot involve expecta-
tions of reciprocation of any kind. The gift “interrupts economy”, “suspends eco-
nomic calculation”, “def[ies] reciprocity or symmetry”, remains outside the “circle” 
of economic exchange, and is thus distinctively “aneconomic” (Derrida 1992, p. 7). 
One important consequence is that once the recipient perceives and recognizes the 
gift as a gift, it is “annulled” or “destroyed” as the act of giving becomes situated 
within a logic of exchange. Mere recognition of the gift as a gift already “gives 
back” (Derrida 1992, p. 13). In fact, not even the donor may be aware of the gift; 
otherwise the donor threatens “to pay himself with a symbolic recognition, to praise 
himself, to approve of himself, to gratify himself, to congratulate himself, to give 
back to himself symbolically” (Derrida 1992, p. 14). Because awareness and recog-
nition annul the gift, the notion is inherently aporetic, and genuine gifts are impos-
sible. Nevertheless, Derrida argues that it is out of the question to refrain from 
giving. He suggests that the gift is actually fundamental to exchange; giving is what 
“puts the economy in motion”. We need to
“engage in the effort of thinking or rethinking a sort of transcendental illusion of the gift. 
[…] Know still what giving wants to say, know how to give, know what you want and want 
to say when you give, know what you intend to give, know how the gift annuls itself, com-
mit yourself [engage-toi] even if commitment is the destruction of the gift by the gift, give 
economy its chance” (Derrida 1992, p. 30; his italics).
Hénaff too insists that the gift has certain unique features. He distinguishes sym-
bolic from economic exchange. Drawing on Mauss, he agrees that gifts figure in 
symbolic exchanges whose purpose is to establish and foster social bonds through 
relations of recognition, honour, and esteem amongst parties. It also prompts and 
articulates attitudes of generosity, benevolence, and gratefulness. Such symbolic 
exchange is “entirely outside the circuit of what is useful and profitable” (Hénaff 
2010, p. 18). He criticizes that Mauss’ discussion is not always consistent about the 
non-economic and non-commodifiable aspects of the gift as symbolic exchange 
(Hénaff 2010, p. 110). Hénaff further provides a threefold typology of the gift: cer-
emonial gifts which are public and reciprocal, gracious ones which are private and 
unilateral, and mutual aid which pertains to solidaric or philanthropic activity 
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(Hénaff 2013, pp. 15–6). The mutual and public character of the ceremonial gift ties 
it to practices of recognition and attributions of equality in public space; it accounts 
for its central role in “identifying, accepting, and finally honoring others” (Hénaff 
2013, p. 19; his italics). He proposes that these characteristic features of ceremonial 
token gifts ultimately culminate in political and legal institutions that protect and 
guarantee recognition (Hénaff 2013, pp. 21–2) and, amongst others, open up room 
for gracious gifts and mutual aid.
Ricœur is convinced that appreciating a gift need not take the form of a restitution 
that annuls it. What matters is the way in which the gift is received. If the gift suc-
ceeds in bringing about a kind of gratefulness that acknowledges the donor’s gener-
osity without forcing or pressuring the recipient to reciprocate, then appearances of 
aporia and impossibility can be circumvented. “Gratitude lightens the weight of 
obligation to give in return and reorients this toward a generosity equal to the one 
that led to the first gift” (Ricœur 2005, p. 244). One important consequence is that 
ex ante, it must remain open whether this orientation towards the donor’s generosity 
actually occurs. If the recipient reciprocates, she does so freely and without duty. A 
genuine gift involves openness and contingency. It cannot be forced or guided.
As Mauss and Hénaff highlight, the gift can function as a source and catalyst for 
recognition. It does so by reflecting an endowment of the donor, a symbolic dimen-
sion through which the donor dedicates her gift and conveys a meaning beyond the 
commodifiable aspects of the good being given. In Mauss’ view, the donor blends 
herself with the good being given. “Souls are mixed with things; things with souls. 
Lives are mingled together, and this is how, among persons and things so intermin-
gled, each emerges from their own sphere and mixes together” (Mauss 1950, 
pp. 25–6). If through dedications of this kind, the donor manages to establish social 
bonds or even—in Derrida’s words—to interrupt patterns of economic exchange, 
then the gift extends the individual’s room for manoeuvre in social space. It opens 
up options for shaping and enhancing interactions and deepening modes of integra-
tion among individuals.
The mentioned authors disagree whether gifts should be understood as being 
diametrally opposed to economic exchange, or whether they, too, can involve 
mutual expectations, obligations, and relations of reciprocity. The latter seems plau-
sible in view of the fact that through making a gift, the donor exposes herself to 
others and thereby engages in a potentially precarious gamble (Braun 2017, 
pp. 206–7). With regards to potlach ceremonies, Mauss notes that “to lose one’s 
prestige is to lose one’s soul. It is in fact the ‘face’, the dancing mask, the right to 
incarnate a spirit, to wear a coat of arms, a totem, it is really the persona—that are 
all called into question in this way, and that are lost at the potlach, at the game of 
gifts, just as they can be lost in war, or through a mistake in ritual” (Mauss 1950, 
p. 50). Gifts are attempts at giving and seeking recognition. Such attempts can fail 
in various ways. They can be confirmed and reciprocated, but also disappoint, over-
burden, be perceived as coercive, or simply not be met with gratefulness. Thus, 
there is no need to romanticize gifts. They can open up opportunities, but they can 
also generate burdens or injustices. Moreover, the donor can face reactions and 
structures that reject her attempts to give. By making, enabling, or accepting gifts, 
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we have not established fairness, not even ruled out violence. Gifts can only set the 
stage for negotiating these aspects.
In the acts of giving discussed by Mauss, Derrida, Hénaff, Ricœur and others, 
two dimensions can be distinguished: first, there is an aspect of exchange insofar as 
these acts of giving involve transfers of goods and expectations of some form of 
return or reciprocation, assessed against the backdrop of an economic rationale or 
logic. Second, there is a distinctive gift aspect which expresses recognition and 
valuation of the recipient and thus yields community-sustaining potentials. The 
appropriateness and success of such expressive acts is assessed relative to a logic of 
recognition. For the sake of speaking in a theory-neutral fashion and not beg any 
questions against authors like Derrida who think the former aspect actually under-
mines the latter, we suggest the term ‘donation’ as denoting acts of giving for which 
it is conceptually open whether they encompass exchange and/or gift aspects. 
Considering only one of those dimensions would fall short of capturing the com-
plexity of the target phenomenon. In the resulting picture, donations need not be 
entirely distinct from exchange, yet they are something over and above it. In the 
words of Waldenfels (2012), donations exceed relations of mere exchange.
Practices of organ and blood donation impact recipients in an immediate, inti-
mate, and bodily way and are sometimes characterized as instantiating central fea-
tures highlighted by Mauss’ analysis: the presence and reinforcement of institutions 
that enable donations, expectations and even subtle pressures that motivate indi-
viduals to give, obligations on the side of the recipient to accept the gift, and recipi-
ents who are expected and feel the need to reciprocate (Fox and Swazey 1978; 
Vernale and Packard 1990; Sque and Payne 1994; Gill and Lowes 2008). In line 
with the insight that donations are risky and their effects contingent, organ and 
blood donations can impose undue burdens on recipients and effectively establish a 
“tyranny of the gift” (Fox and Swazey 1978, p. 383). Gift-theoretic insights on the 
entanglement between giving, gratuity, and gratification further resonate with recent 
work inspired by the conceptions of relational autonomy just mentioned. One of the 
consequences of the complex interplay between selfhood and orientation towards 
others is that motivations for acts of giving often cannot be straightforwardly clas-
sified as either altruistic or self-interested. Apparently altruistic donations carry 
aspects of self-interest and vice versa. In particular, empirical work suggests a 
“simultaneity of self-interested and other-regarding practice in the field of organ 
donation “(Prainsack 2018; cf. also Simpson 2018).
Technological innovations and their impact on research and clinical care prompt 
us to focus on the provision of personal health data as a new and promising way to 
affect others. We shall discuss some opportunities below (3.). Importantly, most 
people who make health-related donations do not give in these ways in order to 
generate a return. This suggests that a logic of exchange cannot fully explain what 
is happening, and the gift paradigm might be able to go some way towards explain-
ing core features of these practices.
If we buy into the idea that sovereignty means more than the right and power to 
keep others from interfering with one’s personal sphere and is realized at least in 
part along outward-reaching, interactive and participatory dimensions, then dona-
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tions could advance these positive aspects of sovereignty. Donations are surely just 
one amongst many ways to enter into relations with others, but their aneconomic 
aspects promise some distinctive community- and recognition-sustaining opportu-
nities. Insofar as data sovereignty, and especially its positive dimension, is a worth-
while normative target notion, individuals should be enabled to donate personal 
health data. As we will argue, this is compatible with insisting on a range of mecha-
nisms and safeguards to ensure that tensions between positive sovereignty and the 
protective aspects of its negative counterpart are minimized.
3.3  Reasons in Favour of Data Donations
In the following, we highlight three ways in which data donations could advance 
positive data sovereignty.
3.3.1  Solidarity
Data donations can express solidarity. Although not used uniformly throughout the 
literature, Prainsack and Buyx propose that the concept of solidarity involves 
“shared practices reflecting a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’ (financial, 
social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others” (2012, p. 346; italics removed). 
Data donations fall under this definition insofar as they reflect the willingness to 
share efforts that are essential for advancing research and thereby helping those who 
are in need of findings and innovations. Prainsack and Buyx add the further condi-
tion that this willingness is based on the donor “recogniz[ing] sameness or similar-
ity in at least one relevant respect” (2012, p. 346; italics removed)—a condition that 
distinguishes solidarity from altruism and charity, which do not necessarily rest on 
an understanding of symmetry between the agent and the recipient. Data donations 
meet this recognition-of-similarity constraint, too. This is obvious if—as on 
PatientsLikeMe—the donor is providing her data for the benefit of individuals who 
share her risk profile or illness. But even if motivations differ and/or it is not clear 
who exactly will benefit from the data, we can suppose that the donor’s contribution 
is at least partly based on the insight that she herself could one day find herself in a 
situation where she benefits from donations of this kind, and so recognizes similar-
ity with the beneficiary in a relevant respect.
Two examples illustrate how the gathering and sharing of data can relate to soli-
darity. First, generating data about oneself, whether through genetic testing or by 
means of self-tracking devices like wearables and other new technologies, might 
appear egoistic, solipsistic, or self-centred. However, it can have an inherently social 
and communicative dimension (cf. Sharon 2017, pp. 111–2; Ajana 2018, p. 128). 
Such data gathering is being carried out not only to further one’s own ends, but also 
to share, report, discuss, and compare one’s data with others.
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Second, consider the importance of data gatherers and contributors for personal-
ized medicine. Personalization of health services might appear individualistic inso-
far as it focuses on specific traits of a given patient, and increasingly shifts 
responsibility for health towards the individual. But alternatively, personalized 
medicine can be seen as a context in which individual and collective good are inher-
ently intertwined. Individual health tracking, testing, and data-sharing are key 
towards building up the databases that enable tailor-made health services. Through 
this “bottom-up” process from self-tracking to the generation of common knowl-
edge bases, there is a sense in which personalization of services rests on “the idea 
that the overall health […] of the population can only be improved if individuals 
take on more personal responsibility for their own health”; we arrive at an “inter-
twining of the personal and collective good” (Sharon 2017, p. 100).
3.3.2  Beneficence
Donating data promises “New Opportunities to Enrich Understanding of Individual 
and Population Health” (Health Data Exploration Project 2014). Research attains 
public goods such as knowledge, technology, and health. Data is one essential 
ingredient in research success. In the age of wearables, smartphones, and other self- 
tracking devices, plenty of personal health data is being generated. However, most 
of it remains inaccessible to medical and public health research. Data donations 
could allow the research community to utilize generated data and to convert it into 
predictions, treatments, and other innovations that potentially benefit a great num-
ber of patients, health systems, and populations. In the ideal case, these benefits 
come at minimal costs for the donors. Unlike organ donation, data donation doesn’t 
hurt. It is convenient and effortless. And unlike donations to charities, there is no 
financial burden for the donor.
Data donations can also lead to self-interested benefits. The PatientsLikeMe 
campaign claims that donating one’s data also helps “to improve one’s own condi-
tion” (2014), and DNA.land (2018) promises to reveal new insights about the 
donor’s genome. At the very least, contributing to a common practice of data dona-
tions adds to improved evidence bases, understanding of diseases, and treatments 
that ameliorate clinical practice. It is also possible that the provision and analysis of 
data leads to the discovery of actionable incidental findings that would have other-
wise remained unnoticed. Only upon receiving this information can the donor take 
preventive and curative steps.
There are many potential beneficiaries of data donations. Data helps founda-
tional science, doctors, patients, healthy individuals, society as a whole, insurers, 
and others (German Ethics Council 2017a, sect. 4.4). Moreover, there is a plurality 
of services that can be ameliorated: knowledge generation and supply, diagnosis, 
prediction, treatment. Improvements can be achieved along several dimensions: in 
terms of the hedonic benefits they provide, the costs they save, and/or the contribu-
tions they make to social integration.
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3.3.3  Participation
The significance and normative dimension of scientific research need not be 
exhausted by the benefits it generates. Focusing on genomic research, Knoppers 
et al. argue that a human right to benefit from science includes the right “to have 
access to and share in both the development and fruits of science across the transla-
tion continuum, from basic research through practical, material application” (2014, 
p. 899). In a similar vein, Vayena and Tasioulas (2015, 2016) argue that science is a 
central component of the kind of communal and cultural life to which all humans 
are entitled. The authors highlight an underappreciated participatory dimension of 
the right to science: human rights frameworks like the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948, art. 27) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966, art. 15) entitle individuals to take part in scientific 
endeavours. Encouraging and enabling data donations would certainly be an impor-
tant step towards respecting this right and including broader populations in scien-
tific endeavours. Proponents of a participatory right to science could even insist that 
mere data gathering and sharing falls short of respecting the right to science in all 
its facets. Understood more comprehensively, it also entitles individuals to partici-
pation in financing, agenda setting, governance, and even lead roles in initiating, 
designing, and carrying out studies. The human right to science imposes duties
“to equip people with the basic scientific knowledge needed to participate in science or to 
provide citizen scientists with various forms of support and recognition, e.g. sources of 
research funding, access to oversight mechanisms and the opportunity to publish in scien-
tific journals” (Vayena and Tasioulas 2015, p. 482).
According to such positions, strong reasons in favour of enabling data donations 
actually imply that we shouldn’t stop there, but enable much more.
3.4  Challenges with Data Donations
Data donations can provide great benefits, express and foster solidarity, and enable 
individuals to participate in scientific research. But they also raise some difficulties 
and puzzles.
3.4.1  Trust
One aspect that well-established practices of giving like financial, organ, or blood 
donations share with data donations is their reliance on trust. They function only if 
the donor can expect that her willingness to give will not be exploited by collectors 
and facilitators, that her donation is being handled responsibly and put to work 
effectively, and that no third-party interests interfere with the equitable distribution 
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of her donation. The donor also expects that her contributions are being made 
against the backdrop of appropriate safeguards that protect her from harm, and that 
burdens arising from the donation process are minimized. Important questions arise 
about which institutional designs best promote that such expectations are met, trust 
does not erode, and the practice remains stable. Data donations presuppose trust in 
similar ways. One case in point is the backlash against the NHS care.data scheme in 
the United Kingdom, which was intended to enable the sharing of personal health 
data for research, but was met with distrust due to shortcomings in communication 
and transparency (Sterckx et al. 2016).
3.4.2  Future Use
The scope and timing of financial, organ, or blood donations is clearly defined. 
Donations of biological specimen can be sought with a reasonably well-defined 
purpose in mind, but already here questions loom about admissible future uses of 
such samples beyond the initially intended purpose. For example, after plenty of 
samples were collected to speed up research and development efforts during the 
2014 outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, question arose about how 
to use these biobanks responsibly in a way that provides long-term benefits for the 
health systems and scientific infrastructures of affected countries (Hayden 2015; 
World Health Organization 2015). Unlike organ and blood donations, biological 
specimen are not exhausted once they reach a beneficiary. They can be analysed 
repeatedly in a variety of study designs. To harness these potentials, regulators and 
researchers need to think carefully about consent mechanisms, the provision of 
appropriate information to sample donors, and mechanisms to govern access to the 
biobanks in which samples are stored.
One distinctive feature of data donations is that the possibility of future uses 
familiar from biobank donations is driven to the extreme. Consider the de- and 
recontextualization processes which datasets tend to undergo in the age of big data. 
Donated health data is likely to be processed and analysed by means of algorithms 
and applications that are designed to discover and examine unforeseen correlation 
hypotheses (cf. Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016, p. 312). From a normative perspective, 
this raises at least three issues.
First, the protective value of anonymization is limited. Some data, such as 
genomic information, is essentially personalized and cannot be anonymized. But 
even for other kinds of information, the possibility of de- and recontextualization 
entails that deanonymization cannot be ruled out. Giving data might be relatively 
convenient and effortless, but depending on the kind of data and context, such link-
ages can have quite significant consequences. Surprising inferences can be drawn 
from personal information especially once it is combined with and set in relation to 
other data sets. The problem is that individuals are less and less in a position to 
foresee and take into account potential harms and/or disadvantages that can accrue 
on the individual or the collective level.
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Second, because future uses and possible inferences about the data subject are to 
some extent unclear at the point of data collection, it is challenging to design con-
sent mechanisms that inform individuals appropriately. The problem is not just that 
non-experts lack the competence to foresee the possibilities of recontextualization 
and linkage with other data sets, and that this leads to deep asymmetries of informa-
tion between data donor and users who have the expertise and technology to process 
it. At the point of donation, the range of possible recontextualizations, linkages, and 
inferences can remain inaccessible even to experts. In other words, the exact quality 
and character of the donation is in constant flux. The question arises how under 
these conditions, an individual can meaningfully deliberate upon whether or not to 
donate her health data. There is a tension between the very idea of making such a 
donation, and the fact that it must remain somewhat opaque to both donors and col-
lectors what exactly is being donated.
Third, the availability of greater sets of data by itself does not guarantee improve-
ments in the quality of data and/or the inferences drawn from it. The complexity of 
big data sets and the tools used to analyse them poses a range of epistemic chal-
lenges for data collectors and researchers that complicate the evaluation of big-data- 
driven hypotheses (cf. Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016, p. 327). The beneficent potential 
of data donations is directly tied to the scientific soundness of their analysis, pro-
cessing, and conversion into research and development. Providing her data entitles 
the donor to reasonable expectations towards the scientific institutions whom she 
authorizes to use and leverage her donation, for example the expectation that her 
data is being used responsibly and effectively in a way that reflects her philanthropic 
intentions. These expectations will get frustrated if scientific virtues like rigour, 
care, and modesty are not enacted consistently throughout data collection, analysis, 
and interpretation.
3.4.3  Invasiveness
The implications about asymmetries of information become even more significant 
once we consider how invasive data can be in the age of big data, genomics, and 
continuous and holistic tracking. When we speak of data that can be donated, we are 
referring to a vast number of biological markers such as an individual’s complete 
and unique set of genetic information, physical parameters such as location and 
movements, lifestyle data, and even data about emotions, moods, and states of mind. 
Moreover, linkages amongst datasets lead to cumulative effects (Braun and Dabrock 
2016a, pp. 316–7). First, the combination of clinical records with data from medical 
research, self-tracking technologies like fitness apps, lifestyle data, financial data, 
etc. results in levels of invasiveness which individual datasets do not achieve. 
Second, distinctions between seemingly discrete data kinds and spheres begin to 
vanish. The fact that companies like Apple, Google, and Microsoft are already 
active in all these domains underlines that linkages between them are only a matter 
of time.
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The penetrative character of data and devices means that what they extract from 
us transcends concepts like parthood or possession. The German philosopher 
Helmuth Plessner (1980) has drawn a distinction between physical body (Körper) 
and living body (Leib). According to Plessner, one distinctive feature of human life 
is eccentric positionality, i.e. a particular mode of relating to its own positionality in 
space: humans can conceive of themselves as both physical bodies existing in the 
corporeal, outer world of things and as experiencing selves occupying the centre of 
a spatially delineated physical body, the locus of perceptions, actions, and experi-
ences (cf. also de Mul 2014). Qua physical body, humans live, but qua living bodies, 
humans are subjects of experienced life. This double aspect is reflected by the two 
simultaneously instantiated modes of being a living body (Leibsein) and having a 
physical body (Körperhaben). In view of these concepts and distinctions introduced 
by Plessner, we might wonder whether, once individuals and their experiences are 
seen as complex conglomerates of algorithmic processes (for example Harari 2016 
chs. 2, 10, 11), captured in their entirety by holistic, rich datasets and invasive 
devices, the difference between what we are and the features we have has collapsed. 
In this case, some kinds of data donations—the ones paradigmatically enabled by 
novel big data technologies—would involve much more than donating merely a 
part of me, or merely something about me. The question arises what about me is not 
being captured by data. As long as it remains unanswered, we are left with a sense 
in which the data donor can give all of her, all she is. The scope of the potential 
donation is unprecedented.
3.4.4  Ownership
In order to donate something, it must be mine. I cannot donate things that belong to 
you, such as your blood or organs. My personal health data is certainly about me, 
but is it also mine? Much seems to depend on the sense of ownership in question. 
For example, it is contentious whether personal health data can be seen as private 
property. Montgomery offers several reasons to reject the suggestion. He notes that 
in the context of health data, intuitions about privacy “sit uneasily with property 
ideas”: even if we commodify personal health data, “information ‘about me’ does 
not cease to be connected to my privacy when I give (or sell) it to others” 
(Montgomery 2017, p.  82). This suggests that ownership in the sense of private 
property is not primarily what motivates the regulation of health data.
Moreover, according to a broadly Lockean account, private property results from 
mixing labour with resources. This idea undercuts rather than supports the view that 
my health data is mine. While I might have “invest[ed] bodily samples” (Montgomery 
2017, p. 83), it is the medical service provider who analyses specimen and data, 
compiles it into evidence bases, and generates value based on the raw materials I am 
providing. If labour is any indication, then “[i]f anyone may claim proprietary rights 
over the information on the labour theory of property, it would seem to be the health 
professionals or service for which they work” (Montgomery 2017, p. 84).
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Montgomery suggests that if we really want to regard data like genomic informa-
tion as property, it should not be considered private. One alternative is to regard 
such data as common property, i.e. property shared by a group of people (such as 
families) and outsiders being excluded. But Montgomery himself prefers the para-
digm of public property: genomic data is like the air we breathe in the sense that 
everybody is entitled to it, the resource is not exhausted by universal access, and the 
benefits connected to its usage motivate obligations of stewardship and 
preservation.
We might have to complement such an account with the additional thesis that 
privacy- rather than property-related claims could still exclude access to personal 
health data, especially given the degree of invasiveness and comprehensiveness 
described above. What matters for our purposes is that data donations are disanalo-
gous to other ways of giving in that they do not involve a transfer of something the 
donor owns in a straightforward way (on this issue, see also Barbara Prainsack’s 
contribution to this volume). In fact, as Montgomery also notes, data donations need 
not even involve a transfer: the data donor need not lose anything. Instead, her dona-
tion might be best understood as a suspension of certain privacy claims.
Considerations about ownership become highly relevant once calls for data 
donations are addressed not only at individuals, but also at data-processing organi-
zations and institutions. In this context, data philanthropy refers to the provision of 
data from private sector silos for the public benefit, e.g., development aid, disaster 
relief efforts, and public health surveillance. Social media data can be key in the 
detection and monitoring of disease outbreaks. Organizations could share data of 
this kind not only on the basis of corporate social responsibility, but because they 
recognize the need for a “real-time data commons” (Kirkpatrick 2013). One neces-
sary condition is that the privacy of individuals can be protected through measures 
like anonymization and aggregation. Even in cases where this is not possible, the 
hope is that “more sensitive data […] is nevertheless analysed by companies behind 
their firewalls for specific smoke signals” (Kirkpatrick 2011). Since such data is 
generated by the private entity, typically on the basis of some form of consent, there 
is a sense in which this entity is the owner. However, the owner and envisioned data 
philanthropist is not the data subject. It must be ensured that the interests of the lat-
ter are not compromised when data is being made available.
3.4.5  Affected People
In organ or blood donations, the identity of the beneficiary is often somewhat 
unclear: unless I am donating to a relative or friend, the recipient will be some inde-
terminate or unfamiliar other who is in need of the materials I am providing. Still, I 
have at least a vague idea about certain features and needs of the recipient, e.g., that 
she is in need of an organ. Something similar applies if I disclose personal health 
data for the benefit of people who share my illness or risk profile, e.g., on 
PatientsLikeMe. But note that once data is either decontextualized as described 
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above or not being donated with such a specific purpose in mind, e.g., when upload-
ing one’s genome on openSNP, the potential beneficiary and the way in which she 
benefits from the contribution become increasingly abstract.
Not only does the range of beneficiaries of the data donation broaden—it is also 
less clear who is carrying the burdens and consequences connected with the act of 
sharing. The donation of my kidney is a sacrifice which I make myself. Setting aside 
the beneficiary, the effects of my donation on others are minimal. In particular, any 
burdens related to the donation are carried almost exclusively by myself. In contrast, 
consider how submitting my genome to a public database could reveal information 
not only about myself, but also about my children or relatives, e.g., on hereditary 
risk factors. The range of people being affected as well as the precise consequences 
of the donation are much less transparent to the donor than in other health-related 
donations.
3.4.6  Voluntariness
Donations are conscious, deliberate, uncoerced acts of giving, informed by beliefs 
about a need that is being addressed through the donation. Data donations can be 
made by means explicit provision of information towards research projects and plat-
forms, or by accepting terms and conditions of platforms that gather, evaluate, and 
maybe even publish data of its users (Kostkova et al. 2016). In any case, the informed 
will of the donor cannot be bypassed. In this context, at least two challenges arise.
First, there is a risk of opacity or even deception about the purpose of data gath-
ering, especially if the sharing of data offers significant benefits to private sector 
service providers. The question arises how societies and individual donors choose 
to evaluate the activities of commercial entities who convert philanthropic data 
donations into products that might improve lives to some extent, but in the first 
place generate non-altruistic, self-serving revenues. For example, the biotechnology 
company 23andMe (2018) motivates customers to become “part of something big-
ger” and make contributions that “help drive scientific discoveries” by allowing the 
company to use data from its direct-to-consumer genetic testing services for research 
purposes. At the same time, 23andMe is generating intellectual property from its 
biobank, such as the patent of a gene sequence which it found to contribute to the 
risk of developing Alzheimer disease (Hayden 2012), and a method for gamete 
donor selection that allows prospective parents to select for desired traits in their 
future child (Sterckx et al. 2013).
Calls for data donations may allude to philanthropy, altruism, solidarity, and the 
good a donation can do, but in fact they might at least partly be driven by the self- 
interest of the data collector. The question of whether to share data in view of private 
sector benefits becomes particularly pressing in contexts where the latter conflict 
with the donor’s beneficent aims. For example, consider a situation in which data 
provision that is intended as philanthropic advances medical research while enhanc-
ing and stratifying insurers’ knowledge about risk profiles of donors and customers. 
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Such prospects can ultimately deter individuals from sharing. If not, it provides 
opportunities for private sector entities to freeride upon philanthropic dispositions.
Second, the informed will of the potential donor can be challenged by apparent 
moral pressures. Understood charitably, headlines like “Our Health Data Can Save 
Lives, But We Have to Be Willing to Share” (Gent 2017) can be seen as raising 
awareness for so far unrecognized, readily available, and effort-efficient means for 
the individual to improve the lives of others. But there is a somewhat questionable 
flipside to such statements. They might be taken to suggest that an individual acts 
wrongly if she ultimately prioritizes her privacy over the presumed benefits of a data 
donation, and/or if she judges the privacy risks to be disproportionate relative to the 
utility that would be generated by her donation. In other words, a perceived duty to 
participate might result (Bialobrzeski et al. 2012). In view of rhetoric that declares 
data a common good and public asset, Ajana sees a risk of pitting data philanthro-
pists against privacy advocates when
“in the name of altruism and public good, individuals and organisations are subtly being 
encouraged to prioritise sharing and contributing over maintaining privacy. […] First, it 
reinforces […] the misleading assumption that individuals wishing to keep their data pri-
vate are either selfish and desire privacy because they are not interested in helping others, 
or bad and desire privacy to hide negative acts and information. Second, this binary thinking 
also underlies the misconception that privacy is a purely individual right and does not 
extend to society at large” (Ajana 2018, pp. 133–4).
A parallel can be drawn to worries regarding self-imposed surveillance and disci-
plining mechanisms (Foucault 1977) through self-tracking devices (Sharon 2017, 
pp. 98–99). Voluntary tracking and provision of personal health data can turn into 
liberty-constraining expectations that data is not only shared, but also that individu-
als take measures to improve their health markers (Braun and Dabrock 2016a, 
p. 323). The prospect of doing good with one’s data can similarly be turned into a 
disciplining narrative that conveys implicit expectations that data should not be 
withheld. What initially appears to open up options for the individual ends up delim-
iting them.
These dynamics would be unfortunate from a normative perspective. Data dona-
tions might be beneficial and morally commendable, and these features provide 
some reason to donate. But they hardly provide an all-things-considered reason—let 
alone a strict duty—to do so. Consider two examples: first, for the Kantian, the duty 
to help others is an imperfect one, i.e. it remains entirely up to the agent to what 
extent she helps others (Kant 1785, p.  423). Second, consider effective altruism 
according to which there are strong moral reasons to give, e.g., donating money to 
charity, organs to patients in need, or time and labour to good causes (Singer 2009, 
2015; MacAskill 2015), but also to ensure that the good your efforts bring about is 
being maximized. To our knowledge, effective altruists have not yet explored data 
donations, but they could be intrigued by the benefits that can be realized through 
such acts of giving. Still, effective altruists agree that although once you donate, you 
should donate as effectively as possible, there can be optionality about whether to 
donate at all. Strong normative reasons to give money to charity can be outweighed 
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by the costs such donations incur to the donor. In such cases, “it would not be wrong 
of you to do nothing” (Pummer 2016, p. 81). According to these positions, it is far 
from unreasonable or immoral if an individual decides to be restrictive about her 
data. It is a fine line between holding her contributions in esteem and implicitly 
sanctioning or generating a burden of proof for the individual who decides to keep 
her information restricted.
To sum up, donating personal health data offers alluring opportunities (3.), but a 
number of challenges lurk along the way. Genuine donors typically have some idea 
about what they are donating, what the donation will be used for, whom it benefits, 
and who carries burdens related to the donation. However, in big data contexts, 
potential data donors are bound to have a limited grip on the nature of their dona-
tion, the future use of their data, and the people affected by their decision to share. 
Further disanalogies come from the invasive and comprehensive character of state- 
of- the-art data gathering and processing, and the fact that the relevant sense of own-
ership is far from straightforward. Finally, the voluntariness of data donations can 
be undercut by opaque or deceptive information and/or moral pressures that appear 
to deflate individual privacy claims.
Earlier, we suggested that donations can advance positive data sovereignty as 
they foster social bonds and open up room for manoeuvre in social space. 
Specifically, we suggested that through data donations, individuals can enact benefi-
cence, solidarity, and play an active role in scientific processes. The challenges just 
characterized aggravate the uncertainties that are inherent to any act of giving. 
Important aspects of the good being given are in constant flux—what it will be used 
for, whom it benefits, and who carries burdens. If the donor decides to give never-
theless, she embarks on a venture into the unknown that can become precarious. Not 
only might the donation be in vain, fail to accord with the donor’s intentions, and 
remain unsuccessful in advancing positive sovereignty. Even worse, the donation 
could backfire and end up compromising negative aspects of the donor’s sover-
eignty that relate to protective claims and rights, for example against untoward 
interferences from others, disadvantages, discrimination, or exploitation.
3.5  Donations, Consent and Control
As mentioned earlier (2.), one important realizer of sovereignty is power. In the case 
of data sovereignty, the relevant power is control over one’s data. The question 
arises how data donations can be facilitated and regulated in a way that guards and 
strengthens the data sovereignty of potential donors. We now suggest three gover-
nance areas that are crucial towards this goal. Ideally, mechanisms in these areas 
enable potential donors to contribute their health data for the benefit of others and 
scientific progress as a whole without leaving them susceptible to undue harms aris-
ing from the aforementioned challenges.
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3.5.1  Consent
Several initiatives highlight a considerable degree of willingness on the side of indi-
viduals to share their data (Wellcome Trust 2013; Health Data Exploration Project 
2014; PatientsLikeMe 2014). However, it has also been recognized the willingness 
to share data, and especially preferences about what kind of data may be shared, is 
expected to vary amongst user groups (Weitzman et al. 2010). The example of the 
care.data scheme shows that sharing and connecting health data can prompt scepti-
cism as soon as insufficient attention is being devoted to the consent of data sub-
jects. It is thus necessary to focus on the conditions and mechanisms for meaningful, 
informed decision-making. As mentioned, many uncertainties surround the future 
use of one’s data. In big data contexts, the informedness of one-time consent to data 
gathering and processing inevitably remains incomplete (Mittelstadt and Floridi 
2016, p. 312). Given the prospective benefits of data donations outlined earlier, and 
the potentials of big data methods more generally, it stands to reason to not simply 
refrain from useful activities in the absence of fully informed consent, but to rethink 
and redesign informed consent in a way that makes these activities possible and 
honours the data subject’s self-determination. Even if data is already collected and 
in principle available for analysis, it is highly questionable whether informed con-
sent can legitimately be bypassed (Ioannidis 2013). And needless to say, for our 
context it matters that data crawling and processing without consent undermines the 
very idea of a data donation.
A range of new consent forms are under discussion in the literature. Reliance on 
opt-out mechanisms in biobanks and online data gathering (CIOMS 2016, chs. 11, 
22) is already widespread. Blanket consent poses little to no constraints on future 
uses. Broad consent allows a wide range of future uses (Petrini 2010). Tiered con-
sent can take several forms, from the specification of a range of approved uses, to 
the exclusion of certain uses, to requiring re-consent if usage for a new purpose is 
intended (Eiseman et al. 2003, pp. 134–7; Master et al. 2015).
Each of these options can enable valuable research, but also compromises the 
ideal of informed consent to some extent. For example, they do not satisfy the 
 standards of informedness laid out in the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical 
Association 1964). Some thus argue, e.g., that “blanket consents cannot be consid-
ered true consent” (Caulfield et al. 2003) since it is provided on the basis of infor-
mation that is way too vague and does not allow the individual to act on her 
continuing interest in her health information. Others even conclude that informed 
consent is inapplicable to contexts like biobanking where uncertainty about future 
use is unavoidable (Cargill 2016).
In fact, we must highlight a further problem. Inherent to alternative consent mod-
els is typically a more or less explicit distinction between sectors. Information and 
samples are being given for a certain range of future uses or certain tiers of research. 
Oversight mechanisms and committees are thus needed to determine whether a par-
ticular usage request of a researcher accords with the consent provided at enrol-
ment. But note how given our earlier remarks about future use and de- and 
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recontextualization, these sectorial distinctions are in jeopardy in big data contexts. 
For example, consider the consent to the processing of one’s social media data, 
given through acceptance of terms and conditions (Kostkova et al. 2016, p. 2). Once 
analysed by suitable algorithms and linked with other data sets, certain social media 
data (or metadata) effectively becomes health data. Of course, this can be seen as a 
challenge already for single-instance consent, given that it becomes increasingly 
less transparent to the individual what can and will be done with her data. But novel 
consent forms become even more tricky once the sectorial distinctions inherent to 
broad or tiered consent forms fade.
Problems like these motivate consent forms that are dynamic. Different individu-
als possess different preferences depending on the kind and context of data in ques-
tion. Moreover, preferences can be expected to change over time, for example if 
technological advances open up new possibilities for drawing inferences from a 
given dataset. This calls for refined and dynamic control mechanisms that allow 
individuals to provide and withdraw data in accordance with their evolving prefer-
ences—a demand which has found its way into legislation on data portability, e.g., 
in Article 20 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Once indi-
viduals become equipped with effective means to access and transfer their data, they 
turn from mere data subjects to active data distributors (Vayena and Blasimme 
2017, pp. 507–8).
One example for what this could mean for data donations is provided by 
Schapranow et al. (2017). While organ donation passes are common, similar mecha-
nisms are lacking for data donations. The authors thus introduce a data donation 
pass, which can be maintained through a smartphone app in which individuals can 
choose in real-time whether and for how long they would like to provide their data 
to research projects, what kind of projects they would like to support, what kind of 
data is being shared, and when it shall be withdrawn. Besides highlighting potential 
benefits, the authors explicitly construe the data donation pass as a means for the 
individual to exercise data sovereignty.
3.5.2  Representation
Innovative consent forms can be complemented by representatives who express or 
represent the donor’s will in governance processes. For example, trustee or honest 
broker models authorize a neutral and unbiased individual, committee, or system to 
manage access requests by researchers and function as a firewall between the data-
base and potential data processors (Vaught and Lockhart 2012). The purpose of 
honest brokers is typically to secure the privacy and anonymity of individuals. We 
can easily imagine extending its scope to representing further interests of the donor. 
In this context, we might also invoke the concept of custodianship, which aims at 
ensuring accountability to the data donor across the full spectrum from data collec-
tion to database maintenance and access permission.
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“Custodianship does not entail the right to ownership but acknowledges that a biospecimen 
is provided to research as a ‘gift’ to be used only with consent to advance science for the 
benefit of society” (Yassin et al. 2010).
Going one step further, one can take on board some of the ideas from citizen science 
indicated earlier. For example, Shirk et  al. (2012) distinguish several models of 
public involvement in scientific research. Such models could also be applied when 
including data subjects in governance processes: on one end of the spectrum, indi-
viduals are merely contributing data or specimen to research projects. In collabora-
tive projects, donors or members of the refine research project designs together with 
investigators. In co-created projects, researchers and donors work as equals. And in 
collegial contributions, non-credentialed individuals even carry out research 
independently.
3.5.3  Organizations
Data sovereignty appears as a feature of individuals, but consent structures, partici-
patory designs, and organizational self-control set the stage for it. Shaping these 
structures in a way conducive to data sovereignty is indispensable. This requires 
organization-level commitments and rules prompted by a thoughtful mix of incen-
tives and frameworks along at least two dimensions. First, mechanisms of voluntary 
self-control, either on the level of corporate social responsibility, or by setting up 
industry-wide, impartial licensing and control agencies should be considered. 
Second, the state can intervene by reshaping legislation for the operation of data- 
processing institutions, e.g., through the mentioned EU GDPR. Either way, data 
sharing requirements need to be designed with care. For example, there is a poten-
tial tension between mandatory publication of publicly funded data and the willing-
ness of individuals to donate. The former can speed up research, but also—especially 
in the case of genomic data—increase privacy risks and thus deter potential donors.
3.5.4  Observation I
In the literature, it is sometimes noted that data donations solve problems with 
research in which standard informed consent is impracticable. The idea is that in 
view of looming deanonymization, de- and recontextualization, and future uses, 
research is bound to rely on “information altruists” (Kohane and Altman 2005) who 
are aware of these risks, but share their data nevertheless. On the far end of the 
spectrum is probably the OpenSNP case where whole genomes are freely accessi-
ble. The upshot is that people who are willing to take risks facilitate research that 
would otherwise be impossible or very hard to carry out, while the consent require-
ments for the general, less risk-seeking public remain uncompromised.
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We saw earlier that sovereignty can indeed be transferred and delegated to others. 
But we also saw that considerations about the legitimacy of the sovereign indicate 
that obligations of representation and accountability are tied to such transfers. 
Sovereigns who fail to represent their people are despots. Moreover, on reflection we 
might become convinced that certain fundamental aspects of individual sovereignty 
resist transfer to others. As Judith Butler puts it, when people vote, “[s]omething of 
popular sovereignty remains untranslatable, non-transferable, and even unsubstitut-
able, which is why it can both elect and dissolve regimes” (2015, p. 162). The impli-
cation for our purposes is that even if data sovereigns delegate power and authority 
to representatives and trustees, suspend their own authority through novel consent 
mechanisms, or renounce authority through blanket consent, some ethical con-
straints still remain in place. For example, individuals who upload their genome on 
OpenSNP do not thereby become fair game. Despite their broad consent, we can still 
raise questions about which use of their data is legitimate. Such questions arise from 
an ethical, but also from a legal perspective, e.g., when we debate which ways of 
discriminating against data subjects are unlawful. And in cases where consent pro-
cedures are tied to mechanisms of representation, Butler’s remark suggests that rep-
resentatives might be authorized to speak on behalf of data subjects, but can fail to 
articulate their voice. In some instances, the authority of representatives might “dis-
solve”. These points illustrate that it remains an open and pressing question what 
researchers and data collectors owe to ‘information altruists’ and others who sus-
pend their claims to full-fledged control over future use. The mere broadening of 
consent forms is not a surrogate for reflecting upon responsible institutional designs.
3.5.5  Observation II
There is considerable variation across the mentioned consent and representation 
models with regards to how well they cohere with the idea of a data donation. For 
example, in the above-mentioned picture of collegial research by Shirk et al., there 
is a sense in which data subjects are not donating any data at all. Their data does not 
go anywhere. It is merely channelled into a research process which the subjects 
themselves are designing and carrying out.
Broad consent might secure a link between self-determination and the process of 
sharing and subsequent analysis of personal health data. But here, some of the ear-
lier challenges strike back. Precisely because the consent is broad, questions arise 
about how the apparent donor can meaningfully endow her data. After all, crucial 
aspects of her donation must remain open, including what exactly it is for, who 
benefits from it, and whether only she carries burdens related to the donation.
Tiered consent to data sharing, i.e. donating data towards specific purposes and/
or with re-consent conditions in place, need not be strictly incompatible with the 
idea of a donation. But notice how when being provided by means of tiered consent, 
data is not simply given to others—researchers, developers, or the general public. 
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Instead, claims to power remain attached to it, and are not renounced by the appar-
ent donor. Similar points apply to trustee or honest broker models. One of their 
purposes seems to be the extension of the donor’s will to future situations and appli-
cations she cannot foresee in the present. These mechanisms allow the apparent 
donor to remain in command, if only indirectly and through representation, to 
ensure that use fits intended purpose. To put it bluntly: it is a little odd to make a 
donation or gift, but to tell recipients what to do with it. This request is driven to the 
maximum with dynamic consent, where the subject never actually ceases to be in 
control. All these mechanisms and models certainly hold alluring promises with 
regards to the protection and autonomy of individuals. But the question arises 
whether the apparent donor is actually put into a position where she clings onto 
what she has promised to let go off when entertaining and committing to the idea of 
a genuine data donation.
Taken together, the foregoing results lead to a puzzle. If I am giving some broad 
form of consent to use my personal health data, I lose my grip on the sense of 
endowment which authors like Mauss, Derrida, Ricœur, and Hénaff highlight as a 
distinctive feature of gifts. If I cling onto my data through various models of extend-
ing my control, I am not actually letting go.
Part of the puzzle might depend on the extent to which we regard donations as 
being more than exchange. It appears that all the aforementioned conditions are 
suitable means for the individual to retain power and control over her data and to 
constrain access and use it when this process is thought of as an exchange whose 
conditions the individual seeks to govern. But earlier (2.), we were suspecting that 
when being considered through the lens of gift theory, donations can be seen to 
exceed this logic, to point to something beyond economic exchange, and involve the 
acceptance of risks and uncertainties about the consequences of their endowment. If 
so, there is a tension between conditions to facilitate data donations as exercise of 
data sovereignty—in particular the resulting claims to power and control—and the 
idea of what it means to donate, gift, and endow something to others.
At this juncture, several strands of the foregoing discussion flow together. Data 
donations can reinforce the social structures in which individuals live their lives 
(2.). Specifically, data donations allow the individual to enact solidarity, benefi-
cence, and participation (3.). Exercises of data sovereignty will thus not  categorically 
result in restrictions to data access. Privacy must be ensured by default, but respect-
ing individuals as data sovereigns further involves implementing responsible gover-
nance mechanisms to enable data donations. As we have seen, sovereignty is being 
realized through power and control. Data sovereignty in particular involves control 
over one’s data: where it goes, who has access, and what is being done with it. Such 
control matters especially in view of the challenges and puzzles surrounding data 
donations (4.). Hence the three governance areas proposed above. However, on the 
one hand, gifting involves endowing and donating means letting go of what one 
gives. On the other hand, sovereignty involves power and control. The latter might 
undermine the former.
In view of this tension, should we not refrain from applying the sovereignty and 
gift paradigms, which we have claimed are inherently related, when trying to better 
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understand the practice of data donations? Not necessarily. One intriguing way to 
resolve the tension just described is to regard data donations as data loans. When 
deciding whether or not to give an item, asset, or commodity, my options certainly 
include keeping all my claims to the object in place, i.e. not giving at all, or renounc-
ing the entirety of my claims and giving without any remaining strings attached. But 
in between, a continuum of acts of giving is conceivable where only some kinds of 
claims to the object are renounced or suspended. Loans are instances where certain 
claims are being suspended and can be reclaimed at the conclusion of the loan (on 
the significance of this picture for understanding public attitudes towards scientific 
research, cf. Starkbaum et al. 2015; Braun and Dabrock 2016b). Other claims can 
remain in place throughout, e.g., when there are expectations about the purpose of 
the loan. As this illustrates, it is not inconsistent to give while keeping certain claims 
to the item, asset, or commodity in place. Loans as well as donations are something 
the lender gives, and her aims can include conveying recognition, fostering bonds of 
solidarity, and reinforcing social structures.
In our context, providing one’s data to researchers need not be seen as a donation 
of the data itself. What is being given, potentially with all the aspects of endowment 
aspects described earlier (2., 3.), is a loan of this data. Individuals might want to 
retain certain powers, for example the ability to cancel or modify access if the chal-
lenges and evolving circumstances described earlier (4.) increase precarity or shift 
the nature of their data loan. If the motivation is genuinely non-self-interested, the 
loan carries no economic interest or benefit, no expected return in the light of which 
the lender’s action pays off for her, other than putting her in a position to offer sym-
bolic appreciation and contributions to others, her community, the scientific enter-
prise, and society as a whole. As an exercise of sovereignty, the loan comes with 
only one condition: that it may be retracted or at least the consent be modified if and 
when the individual requests it.
The picture of data donations as data loans does not resolve all challenges. Loans 
emphasize the precarious aspects of donations as they carry risks of exploitation and 
default. Lenders might strive in vain for control and security. Moreover, the question 
remains how individuals can lend something that they do not own in a straightfor-
ward way, and give a loan that in view of penetrative data processing is incredibly 
invasive. Nevertheless, the appeal of the picture is that it reflects both the ability to 
grant access to data and the implementation and justification of control mechanisms 
such as those outlined above. The latter might remain imperfect, but still be promis-
ing enough to set the wheel of giving in motion.
3.6  Conclusion
We have defended the thesis that donations of personal health data can advance 
individual sovereignty. The elements of gift theory have been used as a descriptive 
heuristic to gain a better understanding of donations. Gift theorists maintain that 
there are cases in which an analysis that focuses solely on exchange aspects elides 
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important features of the target phenomenon. Instead, they invite us to look for what 
Derrida calls aneconomic aspects in order to grasp acts of giving in all their com-
plexity: whether or not these acts involve a sense of endowment, are being carried 
out without the intention to prompt a return, transcend the individual’s self-interest, 
and/or convey a symbolic, non-commodifiable aspect that encodes the donor’s dedi-
cation and investment of a part of herself into what she is giving. Note that these 
suggestions are descriptive. It does not follow that it is normatively desirable to 
make gifts, just that considering these aspects ameliorates our understanding of acts 
of giving.
Once donations are examined through the lens of gift theory, it becomes apparent 
that they can generate social bonds, convey recognition and open up new options in 
social space, for example by interrupting patterns of economic exchange and 
enabling activities and interactions that would have otherwise remained unlikely or 
impossible. If these potentials are realized, donations can be fruitful advances of 
individual sovereignty. Sovereignty is sometimes being reduced to negative and 
protective rights and powers, but we suggested that it also encompasses positive 
entitlements to pursue one’s notion of the good life through connecting and interact-
ing with others. Our claim was not that donations are the only way to advance sov-
ereignty. However, if data subjects are to be sovereigns about their health data, the 
positive dimension of sovereignty calls for ways to facilitate the sharing of data as 
an expression of the individual’s informational self-determination. Such donations 
can enact solidarity and beneficence and enable donors to participate in scientific 
processes.
The foregoing neither motivates a duty to donate nor deflates the importance of 
protections. Even though donations can advance positive sovereignty, we must not 
lose sight of potential conflicts with the negative, protective aspects of sovereignty. 
Data donations in particular have a range of features that exacerbate risks and uncer-
tainties. In big data contexts, data donations become more invasive than other kinds 
of donations. Potential data donors are bound to have a limited grip on what they are 
giving, the future use of their data, and the people affected by their decision to share.
We thus proposed that tensions between data donations and the negative, protec-
tive aspects of sovereignty shall be minimized through consent procedures, the rep-
resentation of data subjects, and organization-level constraints and commitments. 
These mechanisms complement one another and apply to a plurality of agents on 
different levels (Braun and Dabrock 2016a, pp.  324–5; German Ethics Council 
2017a, sect. 5.3): individuals who become empowered to share and withdraw their 
data, representatives and brokers who mediate between individuals and data proces-
sors, data networks which provide means for data subjects to govern the flow of 
their information, and regulators who set formal and enforceable frameworks. These 
mechanisms seek to ensure the controllability of data donations for individuals as 
well as the accountability of data gatherers and processors. Ideally, the intentions of 
data donors, including those related to gifting and endowing, can then be introduced 
and unfold within the governance of the institution.
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Special attention should be paid to technological infrastructures. First, data 
interoperability (Nature Biotechnology 2015) is necessary to transfer data, e.g., 
from electronic health records or direct-to-consumer genetic testing to data net-
works. Second, our call for dynamic consent mechanisms requires user-friendly 
interfaces in order to make users aware of new developments and allow them to 
control, submit, and withdraw data in real-time. Third, developing such interfaces 
and/or setting up representatives, typically software data agents, to serve as data 
trustees presupposes a sufficient degree of standardization of programmatic data 
interfaces.
Nevertheless, in the end all these measures might fall short. Recall Derrida’s 
claim that gifts set the circle of the economy in motion. We can set up efficient 
infrastructures and implement controllability for donors as well as accountability of 
data-processing institutions. Still, Derrida’s claim can be taken to remind us that 
institutions of giving will be set in motion only if individuals are ready to engage in 
this risky enterprise—an enterprise that opens up opportunities, but in which frus-
trations and harms can never be ruled out. That is, a particular kind of endowment 
is required: individuals need to trust and engage in the act of giving despite the risk 
that it will not have its intended effects. This is not a normative demand that poten-
tial donors shall trust the system that seeks their contribution. The claim is, again, 
descriptive: trust is what sets the system in motion, and if trust is lost, everything 
comes to a halt. This insight is perfectly compatible with the further claim that once 
donors trust and decide to give, mechanisms that implement accountability, control-
lability as well as norms of transparency remain indispensable to keep the process 
functional and sustainable. The necessity of such momentums of endowment high-
lights a strength of gift theory: it helps us to discern certain aneconomic working 
principles of our institutions that might have otherwise escaped our attention.
If the donor transfers authority over her data by means of broad consent, it 
becomes hard to get a grip on future uses and beneficiaries, which appears to be in 
tension with the idea of meaningfully endowing such data. If consent is dynamic or 
tiered, one is not actually letting go of what one appears to donate, and thus deflates 
the sense in which one makes a genuine donation. These observations could be seen 
as reasons to refrain from applying the gift paradigm to data donations. However, 
we have argued for a different approach. Data donations—at least those that are 
cognizant of the claims of sovereign individuals—come in a particular form: unlike 
other forms of donation, they are most plausibly understood as loans rather than 
transfers.
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Chapter 4
The Ethics of Uncertainty for Data 
Subjects
Philip J. Nickel
Abstract Modern health data practices come with many practical uncertainties. In 
this paper, I argue that data subjects’ trust in the institutions and organizations that 
control their data, and their ability to know their own moral obligations in relation 
to their data, are undermined by significant uncertainties regarding the what, how, 
and who of mass data collection and analysis. I conclude by considering how pro-
posals for managing situations of high uncertainty might be applied to this problem. 
These emphasize increasing organizational flexibility, knowledge, and capacity, and 
reducing hazard.
Keywords Ethics of data donation · Practical uncertainty · Opacity of algorithms · 
Profiling · Trust · Value-based health care · Systemic oversight · Privacy-by-design 
· Data professionalism
4.1  Uncertainty and Data Ethics
Modern mass data collection and analysis promise great innovation in the health 
domain, as well as significant uncertainty. The CEO of one of the world’s largest 
technology companies has said that “fear of data-mining” leads to 100,000 prevent-
able deaths per year (Hern 2014). One plausible explanation for such fear is that 
health data subjects feel uncertain about the implications of data innovation.
In this chapter the uncertainty surrounding emerging technologies is analyzed as 
a practical problem for data subjects. The style of ethical analysis employed here is 
somewhat new. Brey writes that “the main problem for the ethics of emerging 
technology is the problem of uncertainty”; however, in contrast to the present 
approach, he proposes “anticipatory technology ethics that tries to forecast various 
possible future developments” (Brey 2017, 175, 178). The analysis in this chapter is 
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complementary to such an “anticipatory ethics” but does not aim to forecast future 
 developments. Instead, it looks at the causes and practical consequences of uncer-
tainty for data subjects in the present tense.1
Some rough definitions of key concepts are needed for this analysis. Practical 
uncertainties are defined as things we do not know and have an interest in knowing 
(Goldman 1999; Fallis 2006). Their ethical significance therefore has two dimen-
sions: (a) the features of data practices that create unknowns; and (b) the interests of 
data subjects that are impeded by these unknowns.
Data subjects refers to those people whose data is collected and processed, 
whether they provide this data voluntarily or not. For example, a person who gives 
access to genetic test results or uses ‘wearable’ or in-home medical data-collecting 
devices, or consumer smartphones with built-in health services is a data subject. In 
cases where people provide highly explicit and voluntary consent to the transfer of 
data, we can speak of donation. However, in what follows it will be argued that 
within the context of current data practices it is often unclear whether a data transfer 
can really count as a donation, because whether it is truly a donation is itself a morally 
significant uncertainty.
The argument here concerns health data but is also relevant for many other 
domains where personal data is shared and collected on a mass scale, such as social 
media, financial planning, workplaces, and urban spaces. The boundaries between 
health data and other kinds of personal data are blurring to some extent: “The 
traditional boundaries of primary and tertiary care environments are breaking 
down and health information is increasingly collected through mobile devices, in 
personal domains … and from sensors attached on or in the human body …. At 
the same time, the detail and diversity of information collected in the context of 
healthcare and biomedical research is increasing at an unprecedented rate” (Malin 
et  al. 2013, 2). An extension of this point is that a great deal of not-seemingly-
health-related data can be used for medical and health purposes (Prainsack 2017).
In accordance with the definition of practical uncertainty above, the argument to 
be pursued here can be expressed in the following way:
 1. Fundamental features of our data practices, including the open-endedness of data 
to new insights and applications, the opacity of data analysis (here referring to 
the inaccessibility and/or incomprehensibility of how algorithms analyze data), 
and the persistence of data, imply uncertainty regarding the what, how, and who 
of data practices.
 2. Two important epistemic interests of data subjects are threatened by this uncer-
tainty: (i) having trust in the institutions that manage data, and (ii) knowing one’s 
ethical obligations with respect to data sharing.
 3. Therefore, other things equal, we should take feasible policy measures to 
mitigate uncertainty.
1 In this sense, my approach is what Brey would label a “generic approach” to the ethics of emerg-
ing technology that considers “inherent features of the technology” rather than an “anticipatory 




In line with this argument, Sect. 4.2 discusses some endemic aspects of our data 
practices that create uncertainties, and Sect. 4.3 addresses our interests in having 
knowledge in the domain of health data. Section 4.4 concerns possible strategies for 
mitigating uncertainty. Such strategies, if effective, could make it less ethically 
problematic to obtain the many benefits associated with mass data collection and 
analysis, and could help people overcome the “fear of data mining” mentioned at 
the beginning of this section.
4.2  What Features of Data Practices Create Unknowns?
Three features of data and data practices—open-endedness, opacity, and persis-
tence—together give rise to significant uncertainties for data subjects. These uncer-
tainties are distinctive because they cannot easily be avoided by engaging in best 
practices for risk reduction (for example, through better data security). To some 
extent they are part and parcel of any scenario for mass collection and processing of 
data. They are not futuristic. They are implied by many practitioners’ statements 
about current practices, both routine and avant-garde, as well as in current interpre-
tation of these practices. Those familiar with data ethics might find the features of 
data practices discussed in what follows unsurprising. What is new here is how they 
are conceptualized and deployed in relation to uncertainty. The focus is on uncer-
tainties that arise, not only when something goes wrong with the management of 
data, but also when it is being used as its controllers intend: uncertainties due to the 
very nature of digital data as a form of information and our practices of using it.2
Before exploring these three uncertainty-creating characteristics of modern data 
practices, a brief remark is needed about what uncertainty means here. In practical 
ethics we are often concerned with risky uncertainties: possible, unwanted future 
states of affairs (e.g., possible data thefts). Risk and uncertainty are often defined so 
that they refer to distinct phenomena: ‘risk proper’ is probabilistic uncertainty about 
future unwanted events where both the probabilities and the possible outcomes of 
these events are known and quantifiable, whereas ‘uncertainty proper’ is a lack of 
knowledge about which outcomes are possible and/or their probabilities (Knight 
1921; cf. Altham 1983). Some authors draw a further distinction between uncertainty 
and ignorance, where ignorance involves inability to predict outcomes or plausible 
scenarios (Wynne 1992, cited in Dereli et al. 2014). The kind of uncertainty to be 
discussed in what follows lies in between the categories of uncertainty proper and 
ignorance: we can identify some plausible horizons of possibility, but not exhaus-
tively or quantifiably.3
2 Collingridge (1980) is famous for arguing that we can only control the risks of technological 
innovation early in its development, but we can only know what risks to try to prevent after it is 
well underway. The uncertainties I focus on here cannot easily be prevented for another reason, 
which is that they are almost inseparable from the underlying data practices, strongly linked with 
the transformative potential of those practices, and therefore not likely to be eliminated.
3 Consequences known to be harmful for some individuals are likely to be directly caused by the 
further development of big data practices, such as the ability to reidentify unidentified (“anony-
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4.2.1  Open-Endedness
Open-endedness—the potential for creating and applying data-based knowledge in 
new ways—creates significant uncertainties for data subjects at the time when their 
data is collected and afterwards. Data is multiply interpretable, especially when 
combined and used for new purposes. Different algorithms and analytical lenses, 
such as different strategies of classifying, combining, and finding patterns in data, 
allow for new predictions and correlative generalizations. This is essential to the 
promises of data collection and analysis: “the value of big data lies in the unexpect-
edness of the insights that it can reveal” (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014, 60). Since 
we cannot form expectations about these important insights, open-endedness cre-
ates significant uncertainties.
There are at least two dimensions of open-endedness. The first is the fecundity of 
inferences that can be drawn when a dataset is larger or better organized, or where 
more powerful analytical tools are used. The second is recontextualization of data 
across contexts. We can think of the first dimension as the depth or power of the 
inferences we can make from a set of data, and the second dimension as the practi-
cal applicability of these inferences in a diverse range of contexts in real time.4
A real-life example of open-endedness from the health domain is the vision of 
the ‘value-based health care’ movement. This movement proposes to align payment 
for health services closely with actual health outcomes, creating a transformation of 
health care. Its founders have maintained from the beginning that data collection 
and analysis are necessary instruments for this transition because they make it pos-
sible to develop and apply a nuanced health-improvement metric for reimbursing 
health costs across the board. One early proponent, focusing on the inefficiencies of 
the American health care system, devotes several paragraphs to the importance of 
data as a means toward value-based care:
Measurement and dissemination of health outcomes should become mandatory for every 
provider and every medical condition … We need to measure true health outcomes rather 
than relying solely on process measures, such as compliance with practice guidelines, 
which are incomplete and slow to change. … Among our highest near-term priorities is to 
finalize and then continuously update health information technology (HIT) standards that 
include precise data definitions (for diagnoses and treatments, for example), an architecture 
mous”) data subjects using new and more powerful analytical techniques. This could in some cases 
lead to loss of insurance or other harms for re-identified individuals. For example, in Lippert et al.’s 
(2017) controversial study, recognizable images of the faces of individuals were said to be recon-
structable using data from gene sequences. There is dispute about whether the results really prove 
what the authors say (Erlich 2017). Irrespective of this dispute, my point here is that the looming 
possibility of such techniques creates horizons of uncertainty that exist long before any future 
harms that result. These uncertainties are ethically significant in their own right.
4 Some commentators have raised epistemological concerns that big data is overhyped as a scien-
tific field and may not withstand scientific scrutiny of its knowledge claims (Mittelstadt and Floridi 
2016; Lipworth et al. 2017). My argument does not depend on the validity of the relevant knowl-
edge claims as a whole, but rather their plausibility.
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for aggregating data for each patient over time and across providers, and protocols for 
seamless communication among systems (Porter 2009).
This underlying idea has persisted both in value-based health care and in other simi-
lar movements such as the Institute of Medicine’s ‘learning health care system’: 
with new sources of data and analytical tools, we can explore new ways of modeling 
and addressing the causes of inefficiency and suboptimal health outcomes 
(Committee 2013; Mulley et al. 2017). Both fecundity of insight and recontextual-
ization of real-time decision-making are needed for the envisioned 
transformations.
Other examples emphasize recontextualization to a greater degree: cases in 
which an integrated situational awareness is stitched together from data originating 
in multiple contexts, creating a single ‘dashboard’ or ‘visualization’ for decision- 
making. Suppose two large sets of data on treatments, costs, and patient outcomes, 
one collected by hospitals, and a second collected by general practitioners, are being 
combined for the first time. If health care is managed through substantially separate 
structures, then mutual access to this information holds the prospect of bringing 
about better integration and continuity of health care for both hospitals and GPs 
(e.g., Sheaff et al. 2015, 57). Similar contextual awareness is anticipated elsewhere 
in health care: for example, in the integration of “informal health and fitness data 
collected by the user together with official health records collected by health profes-
sionals” (Gay and Leijdekkers 2015). These cases stress the recontextualization of 
information, but also promise insight when complementary data is combined.
Profiling people in multiple and unpredictable ways is an ethically relevant 
aspect of open-endedness in data analysis. Profiling has been defined as “the pro-
cess of ‘discovering’ patterns in data … that can be used to identify or represent a 
human or nonhuman subject (individual or group) and/or the application of profiles 
(sets of correlated data) to individuate and represent an individual subject or to 
identify a subject as a member of a group (which can be an existing community or 
a discovered category)” (Hildebrandt 2009, 275). This and other definitions explic-
itly relate to both dimensions of open-endedness: fecundity (“discovering”) and 
recontextualization (“application”, “identification”). Profiling is particularly rele-
vant to data subjects in a health context because it has the potential to classify them 
for diagnosis, treatment, and reimbursement in unpredictable ways. For example, it 
might be used as a reason to choose a particular diagnostic, or to deny treatment 
altogether.
4.2.2  Opacity
A second source of endemic uncertainty in our data practices is the use of 
opaque algorithms and ‘deep learning’ to analyze data (Kennedy et  al. 2015; 
Rieder and Simon 2017). Consider a widely discussed recent example in which 
a deep learning algorithm was trained to identify profile photos from a 
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prominent social media site as being gay/lesbian or straight (Wang and Kosinski 
2018). The algorithm was able to determine this with considerable accuracy, 
better than that of human raters. However, because the training was automatic 
and data-driven, it is not known what features the machine correlated with sex-
ual orientation identity.
This example shows that one possible reason why data analytics is opaque is 
that deep learning techniques do not disclose the underlying pattern of their 
learning (Mittelstadt et al. 2016). Some algorithms are highly complex, and some 
are modified frequently (Rieder and Simon 2017, 6). However, not all algorithms 
are complex or difficult to understand; there are also other reasons why data ana-
lytics is opaque. One is secrecy: algorithms are often not shared due to intellec-
tual property issues, competitiveness, inertia, or concerns that they will not 
withstand scrutiny (Burrell 2016; Christophersen et al. 2015; Gillingham 2016; 
Stodden 2010).
A complicating issue is that data subjects rarely have the concepts needed to 
understand the actual algorithms and deep learning techniques themselves. 
However, that is not in itself an epistemological barrier to knowledge. On many 
views of knowledge in a social world, it is socially constituted. Laypeople can 
have knowledge that is partly constituted by the knowledge and understanding of 
others, including experts (Faulkner 2011; Goldberg 2010). A serious problem 
arises principally when experts do not have this knowledge themselves, or when 
they do not carry out their functions in a way that confers socially constituted 
knowledge upon data subjects. For example, a plausible condition on socially con-
stituted knowledge is that there is some person or collective of persons that has 
understanding and is willing and able to provide an articulate explanation when 
asked or challenged.5 When trained scientists working with opaque algorithms do 
not understand or show willingness to articulate how conclusions are being derived 
through data analysis, this condition fails. This creates significant uncertainty 
about how data analysis is applied to health data now, and especially about how it 
could be applied in the future.
4.2.3  Persistence
Data is long-lived and duplicable; here I call the combination of these two features 
persistence. Unlike most collections of physical biological materials used for scien-
tific and therapeutic purposes, once a collection of health data is gathered it is fea-
sible to preserve it indefinitely and give access to it prolifically. For physical 
biological materials, this necessitates storage and, in cases of cell cultures, in vitro 
5 Here my analysis differs from Burrell’s (2016) in that I do not regard widespread “technical illit-
eracy” about data analysis as a basic form of opacity. Ordinary people can unproblematically 




reproductive techniques. For health data on a large scale, this necessitates computer 
storage and various means of sharing or giving access to large amounts of data.6 
Because it is quite feasible to store, copy, and access data at a “medium” scale (i.e., 
well below the limits of Moore’s law), this leads to a potential for reproductive 
profligacy of health data that extends indefinitely into the future.
Persistence is a relevant source of ignorance for the data subject because many 
different institutions and organizations with different interests and motivations 
store, share, and analyze data. Vayena & Blasimme describe a “data ecosystem” 
with an “increasing number of stakeholders” including “the data analytics industry 
… [and] social media giants … [that] enter the domain of health bringing corpo-
rate cultures that are not necessarily aligned with existing regulations in health 
research” (2018, 121). Commercial organizations and governmental and academic 
institutions often cooperate in data-intensive projects, and the boundaries of data 
(access) are often not limited by institutional, regional, or national boundaries. 
Data about a person from one context or jurisdiction can be copied multiple times 
and shared with many different kinds of entities in different contexts or jurisdic-
tions, with different motives (profit, surveillance, efficiency). Moreover, the results 
of data analysis, such as the results of profiling, become data entities of their own, 
which also share these features of longevity and shareability and can be distributed 
and reused for new purposes. In combination, these factors imply that multiple 
entities and types of entities (e.g., commercial entities, research entities) are likely 
to control one’s personal health data in the long term, and that data profiles con-
cerning data subjects are likely be generated which endure and are shared across 
contexts and jurisdictions.7
A figure (Fig. 4.1) helps to visualize this as a source of uncertainty. The lines, 
starting at T0, represent the lifespan of the data. The solid lines are those parts of the 
lifespan under the intentional control of the original recipient or collector of data. 
The dashed lines represent the parts of the lifespan that are not under the intentional 
control of the original recipient or controller of data. These dashed lines are 
particularly uncertainty-inducing because they are no longer governed by the same 
 assumptions that the data subject might have reasonably made at T0 about the 
motives and interests of the entities possessing the data. The lines (both solid and 
dashed) can branch, of course, because parts of the data can be given away or dupli-
cated. In addition, new branches, consisting of analyzed data or profiling data based 
on the original data but not identical to it, can start independently. These are represented 
as solid or dashed lines starting at times after T0.
6 Collections of biomedical samples or ‘biobanks’ are always associated with data, and especially 
where population-level biobanks are concerned this data component is just as important as the 
‘wet’ biological component (as in the definition of the Council of Europe 2006).
7 Deidentification of original data shared by data subjects does not prevent those subjects from 
being targeted in a way that resembles profiling. For example, data from patients at a particular 
medical practice can be deidentified and used to make generalizations about the practice, which are 
then used to target those very patients.
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4.2.4  Endemic Uncertainties Combined
The open-endedness, opacity, and persistence of data and data practices together 
create a host of unknowns for data subjects. Such unknowns include: how collected 
data about the subject will be combined in the future, how the combined data will 
be used to measure, classify, and profile the subject, and what implications new 
metrics and regimes of access to information will have for the subject. We can think 
of these as unknown knowns: they are forms of knowledge and knowledge-based 
power that will come into being in the future but are currently unpredictable and 
unknown.8
4.3  Two Epistemic Interests of Data Subjects
In Sect. 4.1, practical uncertainty is defined as matters that we do not know and have 
an interest in knowing. We have so far been focusing on those aspects of our data 
practices which create unknowns. Now let us turn our attention to the second part of 
the definition, which refers to the interests we have in understanding and knowing.9 
8 Slavoj Žižek introduced this term in relation to former U.S.  Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s infamous speech about ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’, in order to refer 
to things one does know, but does not realize or admit that they know (2004). It was later used as 
the title of a film about Rumsfeld by director Errol Morris. My use of the term departs from these 
earlier uses.
9 Two main senses of ‘interest’ are operating here in a way that is mutually reinforcing: something 
can be in my interest to know, or it can be interesting, or both. I use the term ‘interests,’ rather than 
Fig. 4.1 The persistence of personal data
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In what follows I focus on two high-priority interests that are particularly impacted 
by the unknowns discussed in the previous section: one’s ability as a potential data 
subject to trust others with one’s data, and one’s ability to determine one’s own 
moral obligations in relation to oneself and others where data issues are concerned. 
For each of these interests, I begin by presenting a case in which the relevant interest 
is intuitively present.
4.3.1  Interests in Trust
Can Shara trust the hospital and other relevant institutions with her data? 
Considering the uncertainties associated with institutional data practices, it might 
be rational for Shara to make a strategic assessment of whether the risk of HIV 
infection makes it worth visiting the hospital under these circumstances. She does 
not know who will come to possess her data in the future, how they will analyze it, 
and for what purposes. For all she knows, she could be profiled as being high-risk 
and denied service or offered different care in the future. From the perspective of 
individual rational choice, if not from the perspective of public health (Ford et al. 
2015), such uncertainty could tip the balance in favor of not seeking treatment. This 
is an urgent epistemic and practical problem for Shara.
As this example illustrates, one weighty epistemic interest of data subjects is to 
have sufficient reason to trust entities such as governments, corporations, research 
institutions, and hospitals with data. Data practitioners and scholars have remarked 
upon this interest in trust, particularly in the health (care) domain, where trust is a 
bedrock value (Larson 2013; Lipworth et al. 2017). Our attitudes about the social, 
political, and technological world depend on trust. Trust frames how we think of our 
prospects for cooperation, and the responsibilities of others.
Trust involves a complex of predictive and normative expectations based on the 
interests, motives, and past performance of the trusted entity (Voerman and Nickel 
2017). With a few notable exceptions (Hardin 2006), many scholars, including some 
‘rights’ or ‘needs,’ because the latter terms presuppose that epistemic concerns are so strong as to 
be ethically overriding (i.e., to serve as ‘trumps’ over other values). I think it will be clear that the 
interests in question are sometimes sufficiently weighty to override other values or interests, but 
this need not always be the case.
Shara
Shara is considering going to a hospital because she believes she may have 
been exposed to HIV in a sexual encounter (although she believes the risk is 
very low). She believes she could obtain a prescription for post-exposure HIV 
prophylaxis. However, she is not sure of the implications of trusting the hos-
pital or the pharmacy with these ‘data points’.
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philosophers, take for granted that one can trust institutions (Hawley 2017). We can 
hold this kind of trust towards specific organizations (such as Harvard University or 
the NHS) and various functional human roles within them (e.g., the role of data 
scientist or clinical researcher). Trust in institutions is based on our ideas of the 
norms and functional aims that govern and define organizations and the roles within 
them, in addition to individual characteristics such as goodwill or moral character 
that ground person-to-person trust (Baier 1986; Holton 1994). Trust in institutions 
is distinctive in that it does not normally involve the expectation that the trusted 
entities will be specifically responsive to the trust one places in them. In this respect, 
it differs from trust between intimates (Faulkner 2011).
People’s interest in trust is not merely to have trust, but to have it in the right 
circumstances and for the right reasons. Normally, this aspect of trust is backed by 
having a reliable grasp of the interests, functions, and norms that motivate and 
explain the trusted entity’s behavior. This idea of a reliable grasp can be cashed 
out in more ‘internalist’ or ‘externalist’ ways. Internalism means that one’s war-
rant for trust consists primarily of items to which one has “direct and unproblem-
atic access” (Bonjour and Sosa 2003); externalism means that it can also 
substantially consist of items in one’s social or physical environment to which one 
does not have access. Manson and O’Neill (2007) put forward an ideal of ‘intel-
ligent trust’ that emphasizes the virtues or talents of an individual truster in mak-
ing good choices about whom to trust. Others advance a notion of ‘healthy trust’ 
or ‘sound trust’ that emphasizes the importance of the environment as well as the 
individual in creating the conditions for epistemically grounded and non-exploit-
ative trust (Boenink 2003; Voerman and Nickel 2017). Loosely speaking, the first 
account emphasizes the internal aspects of warranted trust, and the second account 
emphasizes the external aspects. (However, the notion of “intelligent trust” could 
also be given an externalist interpretation, as Sosa does for the idea of intellectual 
virtues more generally (Bonjour and Sosa 2003).) Either way, intelligent or 
healthy trust depends on a stable, reliable ascription of norms and functional aims 
to the institutions we rely on.
The endemic uncertainties of our data practices, explicated in the previous sec-
tion, threaten this epistemic basis for trust. They make it very difficult to have a 
stable, reliable grasp of norms and functions of the entities we rely on, or even to 
determine which entities are actually involved. Uncertainties about what kinds of 
organizations and institutions will come to possess one’s data in the future, and 
about how data might be used for profiling, make it difficult to trust because such 
uncertainties threaten the warrant for trust. A data subject may reasonably wonder 
whether the new metrics of value-based health care might in the future be used to 
profile her (perhaps using an opaque algorithm) as being a poor prospect for health 
outcomes, or whether her data will be transferred to new entities whose motives and 
interests oppose her own. When such scenarios cannot be defined, the epistemic 
grounding for trust in health care institutions is missing. The ‘what’, ‘how’, and 
‘who’ of trust cannot be specified.
Brown and Calnan (2012) have analyzed situations like Shara’s in which there is 
a high degree of uncertainty and institutional complexity in clinical contexts, in 
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terms of trust. They argue that trust becomes an explicit problem in such contexts 
because its rational basis is threatened (ibid., 4). However, trust remains salient as a 
possible way of “bridging” uncertainty (ibid., 53ff.). I follow their analysis when 
looking at data practices. Trust remains a possible strategy for navigating situations 
that arise in the midst of those practices, even when the uncertainties surrounding 
our data practices threaten and undermine its familiar epistemic foundation. 
However, such a strategy is like the Biblical house built on sand, whose foundation 
is unstable. It can be occupied, but existential threats to it cannot be rationally put 
out of one’s mind.
4.3.2  Interests in Knowing Our Own Obligations
Is Carla failing to act in good faith? Is she unfairly advantaging herself over oth-
ers in order to gain access to health care, by leaving out something that is relevant 
to clinical decision-making? Or is she simply protecting her privacy from exploita-
tion by commercial and research organizations she does not endorse? Knowing 
one’s obligations determinately means being able to answer these questions. Being 
morally responsible as a citizen and a member of the moral community seems to 
require such knowledge. Intuitively, knowing one’s own obligations determinately 
is an important human interest.
In order to know our obligations in relation to data practices we must know who 
will have access to our data, what the data means for us, and how it will be used. If 
a patient’s data will be used to profile her for unspecified purposes that extend far 
beyond the provision of medical care or for unrelated commercial purposes, then it 
seems intuitively that an act of concealment by the patient does not violate any 
moral duty of honesty or fairness to others but is rather a matter of protecting her 
own privacy. On the other hand, if the data is to be protected rigorously and used 
only in research that could benefit others similar to her, and her choice to conceal 
data actually hinders this goal, then arguably she can be seen as acting dishonestly 
and unfairly by not disclosing important facts from her medical history. This creates 
uncertainty about the duties and responsibilities conferred on different parties by a 
data transfer. The status of a patient’s data transfer could be seen as a kind of dona-
tion, as the price of a service, or as a shared burden—a sort of tax—imposed for the 
sake of fairness and solidarity. Which of these ways of thinking about data transfers 
and their associated “deontic consequences” is the correct one is unclear and inde-
Carla
Carla has recently moved to a new area. She has a serious health problem. 
When she arrives at the hospital to get medical treatment for her problem, she 
chooses to conceal a past pregnancy and a past depression, preventing both 
events from becoming data points.
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terminate in many cases.10 Intuitively, this kind of moral uncertainty frustrates 
important interests of data subjects.
The linkage between uncertainty about our data practices and uncertainty about 
what obligations result from transfers of health data is implicit in Cohen’s (2017) 
argument that people have a duty to share health data as a matter of solidarity. The 
argument starts with the crucial assumption that the possessor of shared health data 
will be either a government agency or a hospital system “committed to improving 
healthcare … for the people it serves,” not a for-profit commercial entity (ibid., 
210). When this assumption is reliably satisfied, we can think of health data sharing 
as having the status of a reciprocal shared burden or a tax, where everybody has an 
obligation to contribute, and gratitude and specific goods and services are not 
expected in return. Conversely, though, if there is significant uncertainty about 
whether data will be used for purposes unrelated to health, for commercial pur-
poses, or by new organizations and institutions, then there will also be uncertainty 
about the conclusion that people have a solidaristic obligation to share health data.
An important corollary of the linkage between data practices and uncertainty is 
that uncertainties about data transfers challenge the very idea of data donation. 
Making a donation (i.e., gift-giving) is an act associated with other morally-laden 
acts and attitudes such as gratitude, and is not easy to combine with other moral 
regimes such as that of communitarianism and solidarity, or that of a commercial 
exchange (Herman 2012). In real practice, giving away data is often thought of as 
the price of using web-based services. Data is a kind of bartering chip that one uses 
to pay for these services. The idea of “Web 2.0” has been coined for a business 
model in which users are prosumers, who both produce content and data for Internet 
sites and applications and also consume—often “for free”—the valuable services 
that websites and apps deliver (Toffler 1980; Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010). 
Prosumption is a business model for many health data companies (Prainsack 2017). 
So long as we remain confused about whether a given data transfer is our contribu-
tion toward carrying a shared burden, as Cohen argues, or a bartering transaction, as 
the business model of prosumption implies, then it will not possible to consider that 
very transfer of data to be a pure donation at the same time.
In the remainder of this section, I address a philosophical objection to the idea 
that uncertainty really threatens our epistemic interests. (Those who are not worried 
about such an objection may choose to skip to the next section.) So far I have relied 
on the intuition that knowing our moral obligations determinately makes one better 
off. However, according to some philosophers, even if we do not know the outcomes 
of our actions determinately, or even the various possible ways of valuing possible 
outcomes, we can still calculate our moral meta-obligations (Lockhart 2000; 
Zimmerman 2008, 38; Barry and Tomlin 2016; Lazar 2018). The underlying strat-
egy for determining our meta-obligations is to consider every plausible valuation of 
different possible actions (the possible obligations about which we are uncertain), 
and then use a meta-principle to calculate one’s unique meta-obligation given these 




possible valuations. For example, suppose our imaginary patient Carla does not 
know whether her data transfer would count as a donation of data, a price that she 
pays in exchange for medical service, or a tax associated with the shared burden of 
the medical system. By taking each of these deontic statuses as members of a set of 
possible valuations V, she can apply a suitable meta-principle to calculate her unique 
actual obligation. An example of such a meta-principle might be, “If any of the valu-
ations in V implies an obligation not to do x, then there is a meta-obligation not to 
do x.”
This objection maintains that one’s unique obligation can be specified just as 
well for situations of significant uncertainty as it can be for situations in which the 
outcomes and valuations are certain. If our knowledge of our meta-obligations 
under conditions of uncertainty is just as satisfactory, ethically and practically, as 
our knowledge of our determinate obligations, then our epistemic interest in know-
ing our obligations can be satisfied perfectly well even under conditions of uncer-
tainty. This would undermine the claim that our epistemic interest in knowing our 
obligations is threatened by uncertainty about data practices.
This is a deep objection deserving a thorough philosophical treatment. Here I 
offer three preliminary replies. The first is that there is nothing that prevents us from 
holding that situations in which it is rational to act on a meta-principle under moral 
uncertainty are situations in which we are worse off, other things equal, compared 
to situations in which it is rational to act on a determinate principle. The second is 
that, empirically, people have a strong aversion to uncertainty (sometimes called 
“ambiguity” in the relevant empirical literature), at least in contexts where quantifi-
able options are directly compared to ambiguous, uncertain ones (Fox and Tversky 
1995). The third is that getting the outcome wrong will normally be more likely if 
an agent does not know her own obligations determinately, than if she does. This is 
true even if she acts blamelessly because she acted according to an appropriate 
meta-principle. Being more likely to get the outcome wrong makes her worse off 
even if it does not reflect directly on whether she is to blame. In sum, we can accept 
meta-principles for situations of moral uncertainty without giving up the empirically- 
supported intuition that moral uncertainty threatens our interests in an important 
respect.
4.4  Strategies for Mitigating Uncertainty
Risk scholars have proposed structured guidelines for mitigating situations of high 
uncertainty, focusing on two main strategies: increasing systemic resilience and 
reducing hazard (Renn 2008). Since these strategies are well-established, it is useful 
to consider how they could be applied to the uncertainties surrounding data prac-
tices. Systemic resilience refers to flexibility and organizational capacity in moni-
toring and responding to ongoing hazards. Hazard reduction, by contrast, is a matter 
of limiting what is at stake in uncertainty. Below I attempt to identify instances of 
each strategy from the literature on data governance and consider whether they are 
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likely to mitigate harms to data subjects’ epistemic interests. Doing so highlights 
the need for further research about the feasibility of such strategies, as well as the 
feasibility of supplementary strategies that more directly address the problem of 
practical uncertainty about health data.
4.4.1  Systemic Resilience Through Flexible Systemic 
Oversight
First, I consider a strategy to increase systemic resilience. The General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), taking effect in the European Union in 2018, may 
appear to be such a strategy. It places new governance requirements on data control-
lers and takes steps to harmonize governance across member countries. It requires 
that people be informed when they are being profiled (Regulation 2016, §60), and 
that people can find out the “logic involved in any personal data processing” (§63).
Despite these measures, one recent study finds that there is significant uncer-
tainty about how the GDPR will be implemented in practice, and that there is likely 
to be a tradeoff between disruptive innovation and strict regulatory compliance (van 
den Broek and van Veenstra 2018). There are also other reasons why the GDPR 
does not solve the problem of uncertainty for data subjects. First, it only directly 
protects citizens of the EU. Second, many data subjects in the EU do not care about 
or understand the rights to know and to respond to data processing articulated in the 
GDPR, and consequently those rights do not protect them from uncertainty. Thirdly, 
even those who do care about their rights often give legal consent to data collection 
and processing because doing so is instrumental to obtaining services. Such acts of 
consent do not generally have the function of reducing uncertainty, as anyone who 
has clicked through an online consent form can ascertain.
Vayena and Blasimme (2018) have put forward the idea of flexible “systemic 
oversight” to avoid tradeoffs between innovation and regulatory compliance, while 
countering the impact of uncertainty. The idea is to create a comprehensive frame-
work for governance that is reflexive, inclusive, and responsive. Systemic oversight 
is meant to allow for innovation while providing “adaptive and flexible mecha-
nisms” for oversight, in which there is “deliberative democracy” through “collective 
engagement of research participants in decisions about data governance” (ibid., 
124–125). In relation to uncertainty, “oversight mechanisms should not be seen as 
procedures for prospective risk assessment, but rather as adaptive instruments that 
respond to change” (ibid., 124).
As applied to the problems discussed here, the idea is that regulatory processes 
resulting from collective, democratic processes will protect data subjects’ interests 
and thereby make the act of sharing health data more rational. Mechanisms of 
deliberation and collective engagement would also increase well-grounded trust 
(in line with the account of trust offered above in Sect. 4.3.1), so long as an align-




Flexible systemic oversight might be taken to mean that relative to a given juris-
diction and use of data, individuals could be given explicit guidance about their 
obligations and protected from the unexpected consequences of their choices. This 
could help to mitigate the effects of uncertainty about one’s data-relative obliga-
tions. For example, within a given health care administrative region, the choice 
could be made to impose a solidaristic model of shared burden, in which everybody 
transfers data for the sake of common benefit. In cases where there were data leaks 
or unforeseen effects of profiling, a compensation scheme could be introduced to 
remedy the impacts, as proposed by Prainsack (2017). Such a regional choice could 
relieve people of the burden of uncertainty about their data-relative obligations.
Flexibility and systematicity are potentially at odds with one another, however. 
Flexibility implies that there is temporal and local adaptation to particular institu-
tional situations and innovation regimes. However, this flexibility may actually pre-
vent the formation of stable expectations that simplify trust decisions and make 
one’s obligations as a data subject clear across different boundaries and jurisdic-
tions. Regulation must address data that crosses the clinical/non-clinical boundary, 
data that crosses institutional and national borders, and data that is commercialized 
or exploited within public-private partnerships. Flexibility and adaptability seem to 
imply variability. In that case, flexible and adaptable regulatory processes may be 
less effective at conveying to people that their interests are being consistently pro-
tected, and less effective at establishing a simple and clear set of obligations in 
respect of health data, compared with truly systematic (hence inflexible) regulation 
with clear-cut restrictions extending to all uses and jurisdictions. More research is 
needed to clarify how flexibility might be balanced with systematicity, and what the 
impact will be on the expectations and obligations of data subjects.
4.4.2  Hazard Reduction Through Privacy-by-Design
Now I turn to a hazard reduction strategy. To begin with, it is important to note that 
it is somewhat unclear how to think about hazard reduction as applied to the data 
domain. In the domain of system safety, hazard reduction denotes the removal of 
hazardous substances and processes from a system, or their replacement with less 
hazardous substances and processes (Leveson et al. 2009). There is no direct ana-
logue in the domain of privacy.
However, there are some crude parallels. We could, for example, encourage data 
obsolescence by default, or disallow “hypercollection” (Prainsack’s (2017) term). 
Data obsolescence implies that after a certain time period, data is always deleted by 
default (it “obsolesces”), unless it has been specifically saved because of its demon-
strable significance. Limiting hypercollection, by contrast, means that the default is 
not to collect or combine data in the first place unless there is a specific research 
motivation for doing so, such as a specific, powerful research question to be answered.
Although these measures could substantially protect privacy, they would carry an 
unacceptable cost in the health domain. They would block innovation and cost lives. 
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Strictly limiting data collection or encouraging data obsolescence is difficult or 
impossible to combine with transformative initiatives such as the value-based health 
care movement considered above, in which massive and persistent data collection 
and analysis is built into the paradigm. Obsolescence would severely limit the value 
of the careful work that goes into creating a dataset.
It might be possible to think of the analogue of hazard reduction strategies in the 
domain of privacy as a broader set of measures that limit the degree to which per-
sonal data is threatened in the first place. Privacy-by-design is the name applied to 
strategies in which privacy safeguards are built in to a technology and attended to in 
the primary process of technology development and implementation, incorporating 
physical, technical, and procedural safeguards along the way.
Understood in this way, privacy-by-design may be too broad and vague to cap-
ture the simple and obvious logic of hazard reduction, but is nonetheless promising 
as a strategy of mitigating uncertainty. Its effectiveness will depend upon the specif-
ics of the situation and the way it is carried out. An important point to keep in mind 
is that some health data innovation appears inseparably to depend on information 
that can indirectly lead back to the subject (e.g., as a member of a relevant class or 
group) or can reidentify the subject when combined with other data (Mittelstadt 
et al. 2016).
4.4.3  Concluding Reflections
Health care faces major challenges such as the difficulty of efficiently caring for an 
aging population, and the increasing incidence of chronic diseases that are expen-
sive to treat. Data-based innovations are one of the main ways that technology can 
help meet these challenges. Lives can be saved and improved by the insights gained 
through health data collection and analysis. At the same time, however, these inno-
vations create many uncertainties for ordinary people. In this paper, I have argued 
that these uncertainties are an ethical problem for data subjects.
An important consequence for the present chapter is that in order to see a given 
data transfer as a donation, undertaken as an act of generosity, it is not possible to 
see it at the same time as a bartering chip that one exchanges for a service, or as a 
shared burden that one undertakes out of solidarity. Resolving the uncertainties 
around our health data may therefore mean making a choice between seeing par-
ticular data transfers in one of these ways or another. This may limit the applicabil-
ity of the idea of data donation.
An important task of future research is to further develop the kinds of gover-
nance strategies discussed above so that they better address the specific epistemic 
problems for data donors and data subjects explored in this paper. Another is to seek 
complementary approaches that directly shore up trust and reduce the costs of not 
knowing one’s own obligations.
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Focusing on trust, for example, we might consider whether a greater emphasis on 
data professionalism could shore up trust in the face of uncertainty. Professionalism 
arises in situations where experts in some field of activity, such as doctors, engi-
neers, and pharmacists, adopt formal standards for having the privilege of labeling 
themselves a certain way, and enjoy an exclusive right to evaluate the work of others 
who use the label. Professionalism is often linked to trust and trustworthiness 
(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993; Manson and O’Neill 2007). The underlying idea 
is that the development of professions functions to signal trustworthiness to those 
with a practical need for the relevant form of expertise. Data science professional-
ism is relatively undeveloped compared with professionalism in other areas of sci-
ence, engineering, and medicine. By developing it in the realm of health care data, 
and clearly signaling what standards go along with the relevant professional iden-
tity, we could create (and communicate) trustworthiness in this area.
As for our interest in knowing our own obligations in the domain of data prac-
tices, a plausible first step is for health care authorities to acknowledge openly that 
there is significant uncertainty about practices of data collection and analysis. This 
is a matter of showing respect for the real difficulties that data subjects and potential 
data donors face when trying to make well supported and ethically responsible deci-
sions to accept or resist sharing data, and may be a way to begin addressing these 
difficulties.
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Chapter 5
Incongruities and Dilemmas in Data 
Donation: Juggling Our 1s and 0s
Kerina H. Jones
Abstract The creation of vast, complex datasets made possible by technological 
advances over recent decades, has resulted in data becoming big business across 
many sectors and disciplines world-wide. Everyday life is increasingly networked 
via a growing array of digital devices to which individuals provide data, passively 
and actively. The pace of development has led to questions about the role of such 
‘data donors’ and how individuals can be safeguarded when they might not be fully 
cognisant of the extent or destinations of data provided. We show that the many 
ways in which individuals provide data about themselves can result in incongruities 
and dilemmas in apparent decision making. We argue that it is not ethical for the 
vast swathes of data provided by individuals not to be used for public good. We explore 
whether we can make truly informed choices with the panoply of issues that may 
influence our decisions. We conclude without a straightforward yes or no, but pro-
pose that if we provide the best available information and engage with information 
presented, we stand a more reasonable chance. Do that, there is a need for demon-
strable trustworthiness and clarity, greater awareness so that trust can be placed 
wisely, and for us to hone our juggling skills.
Keywords Data donation · Incongruities · Dilemmas · Big data · Tissue/organ 
donation
5.1  Introduction
The etymology of the word ‘donation’ is from the latin ‘donum’ meaning ‘gift’, 
with the French ‘donner’, to give, being a familiar derivative. It has been proposed 
that it can be easier to donate blood and even organs than to donate our data. This 
appears incongruous, and raises questions about the contexts and rationales for 
these positions. Using the donation of general personal data and health data in 
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example scenarios, this discursive chapter explores areas such as: alternative con-
sent models; the unknown element in data content; trust and trustworthiness in data 
custodians; and meaningful public engagement, to consider the bioethical balance 
between individual autonomy, personal exploitation and social responsibility. 
Ultimately, the question is whether we, as individuals and society, can make truly 
informed choices with the panoply of issues that may influence our decisions, creat-
ing dilemmas as we juggle our 1s and 0s.
5.2  Hast Thou Which Art but Data, a Touch, a Feeling?1
Digital data at the most fundamental level is represented as a combination of 1s and 
0s. Over recent decades, major technological advances have enabled the creation of 
vast, complex datasets commonly referred to as ‘big data’. Big data is big business: 
it has been estimated that its worth to the UK will exceed £320 billion by 2020, and 
that in the US, the m-health app market alone will reach almost $60 billion in the 
same timescale (Greenbaum 2018; City a.m. 2017). There is a global profusion of 
enterprises seeking to make the best use of person-based data to inform policy, 
health and other public services, business, marketing and an array of other commer-
cial and non-commercial developments for public good and/or profit. There has 
never been such a high demand for our personal data to be donated, such that it is 
often said that individuals are the product, not just the client (Wu 2017). But before 
we begin considering data donation, it’s worth highlighting that data ownership is a 
tricky concept in law. It’s something we often refer to informally e.g. my data, your 
data, but laws of ownership mainly relate to people owning tangible items, such as 
objects or property, and data does not fit neatly into these categories. The question 
arises as to how someone can be said to own data, since in order to be meaningful, 
ownership should confer a concept of possession. Furthermore, tangible items are 
generally exhaustible whereas data are not, but can be used repeatedly by multiple 
parties for multiple purposes ad infinitum. With this in mind, it is indeed difficult to 
see how someone can be said to own their data since once the data are known to 
others, the person no longer has real control over their fate.
Rather than ownership, data protection legislation and regulations relate to safe-
guarding the privacy of data subjects and the confidentiality of the information in 
question. Within the EU, we have seen the recent introduction of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR, EU GDPR portal 2018), with concomitant national 
legislation, marking an overhaul in the way personal data are governed. The GDPR 
enhances the rights of individuals as data subjects, and it places a greater onus on 
data controllers and processors to justify proactively their lawful basis for using 
personal data, including providing suitable privacy notices for data subjects. But it 
doesn’t ultimately change the fundamental focus on data protection rather than data 
ownership.
1 Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling. (Shakespeare, The Tempest).
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Article 4 (1) of the GDPR (Intersoft consulting 2017) defines personal data as: 
‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’, and ‘an 
identifiable natural person’ as ‘one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person’. Article 6 (1) sets out the six lawful bases for general data processing, and 
Article 9 sets the provisions for processing special category data, which is defined 
as: ‘personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic 
data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data 
concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orienta-
tion ’ (Intersoft consulting 2017). Even so, it can be argued that we haven’t yet 
uncovered all the types of data that could be seen as personal, and which could yet 
necessitate a further update in legislation. We are seeing a rapid increase in con-
nectedness via urban monitoring, the internet of things and smart objects, some 
within our own homes or even as our clothing (Engineering & Technology 2017). 
Interestingly, the Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection already broadens the 
scope of health data, accepting that lifestyle data may constitute health data if they 
are inherently related to a person’s health status (Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party 2013). We engage in in-depth (sometimes rather personal) conversations on 
social media, accept store loyalty cards which track our purchases, and use a variety 
of lifestyle apps on our devices. The genomic revolution is opening up untold oppor-
tunities for research and medicine, that were not available just a few years ago. 
There is a myriad of occasions where we donate our data, either actively or pas-
sively, as we go about our daily business or take part in dedicated activities. 
Altogether we are creating a rich data footprint, sometimes without knowing which 
types of data have been collected, by whom, or even having no awareness of them 
at all.
5.3  What We Might Be Donating
For the purpose of this chapter, we will stick with the concept of donation as gifting 
something to another party or parties, even though it is not as straightforward in the 
donation of data as it is for more tangible objects. Our data subject, let’s call him 
Schrödinger’s Pat2, might passively or actively donate personal data from many 
sources to various parties, over the course of his life or after his death. This may 
include data from his: health and administrative records, DNA, social media posts, 
mobile phone call detail records, apps, and store loyalty cards. He might also donate 
blood, stem cells, tissue samples and paired organs during his life, then vital organs 
2 Schrödinger’s cat: a quantum physics thought experiment where a cat may be simultaneously 
alive and dead.
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or his whole body after his death. Importantly to remember is that whatever is 
donated, data are being generated.
Pat might donate general and special category data to different parties for differ-
ent purposes, with or without his full awareness. It can be easy, possibly too easy, to 
donate data in some instances. For example, we readily sign up for store loyalty 
cards on the promise of discounts or rewards, but it is important to remember that 
the data collected as we shop is of more value to the store than any benefits to the 
customer. Similarly with social media platforms; we gain the benefits of social con-
tact, but our data may be used to target us for marketing and sometimes for other 
reasons. The recent Facebook debacle over psychological profiling by Cambridge 
Analytica is a case in point, where it has been alleged that personal data from a 
personality quiz on Facebook was used to try and manipulate voting intentions. 
People engaging in the quiz were unwittingly providing detailed information about 
themselves to be used for illicit purposes (Solon and Graham-Harrison 2018).
Pat might also choose to use health or fitness apps which collect special category 
data, such as diagnoses, medications and medical symptoms. Or he may choose to 
engage with a Direct to Consumer (DTC) DNA sequencing company to find out 
about his genetic susceptibility to certain conditions. DTCs provide information to 
customers for a fee, but generally use the data for business development, research 
and to sell to third parties in anonymised or aggregated form. Questions have been 
raised about the rectitude of DTC services, since individuals might be ill-equipped 
to deal with the results, and the actual predictive value of the information provided 
might not live up to company marketing promises (Cussins 2018). Some countries 
have banned DTCs and others are considering their legislation in this regard 
(Kalokairinou et al. 2017).
As well as donating data (in the form of data) Pat might donate blood, tissue or 
organs during the course of his life, or after his death. This, of course, also generates 
data. Within Wales, and soon to be implemented in England, there is an opt-out 
consent mechanism whereby a person donates their organs after death, unless they 
had previously opted out. It is an interesting incongruity that we have an opt out 
system for organ donation after death, but we do not have a similar arrangement in 
place for data donation after death. Yet, organs can be used to generate rich data, 
including full genome sequences of living relatives of the deceased, and thus may 
uncover highly-sensitive familial information compared to health record data that, 
paradoxically, cannot be shared in this way. However, it could be argued that it is the 
opt out consent system for posthumous organ donation that is ethically at fault, 
since a forced or presumed gift loses the spirit of being a gift (McCartney 2017). 
The question arises as to whether we can be sure the public genuinely feel they were 
informed about the process, or if a significant proportion just haven’t engaged, and 
simple inertia has prevented them from going on-line to opt out. We will explore this 
concept in more detail.
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5.4  Are We at Least with Socrates?
Whether or not Socrates actually said he was the wisest man because he was aware 
he knew nothing, it is an apt sentiment in gauging our own perspectives, and one we 
can apply in relation to data donation. For the many ways in which Pat might donate 
data in one form or another, the level to which he is informed and the nature of 
consent may vary widely. Medical research is generally well-regulated but, across 
other domains, Pat may give his permission to donate data via everything from 
properly informed consent to ‘agreeing’ to lengthy terms & conditions. This is a 
common problem and one for which there has been a number of social experiments. 
In a survey completed by 550 DTC customers, most respondents considered them-
selves aware of privacy issues, and the risk of troubling repercussions of data dona-
tion to be negligible. But over 50% men and almost 30% women also said they had 
not read the terms & conditions (Haeusermann et al. 2017). Among a group of over 
500 students signing up to a fictitious social media channel, none of them read the 
terms & conditions well enough to notice that they had agreed to hand over their 
first-born child (Technica UK 2016). These studies warrant an exclamation mark(!) 
and leave us in doubt about the adequacy of consent processes in some spheres. 
They highlight the dilemma of where the responsibility lies in engaging properly 
with the public, as to whether the onus should be more on the individual or the data 
collector. In answer to our own Socratic question, it appears that no, we often don’t 
know that we don’t know.
5.5  Legal Position – Data vs Tissue
The EU GDPR, and related new national legislation, might be the hero to save us 
from some of these difficulties. Under the GDPR, the requirements for valid 
informed consent have been tightened, such that Recital 32 states that ‘consent 
should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, 
informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the pro-
cessing of personal data relating to him or her’ (Intersoft consulting 2017). This 
places new limits on the use of opt-out consent mechanisms and on the use of 
lengthy, tiny wordy, scrolly downy, nobody readsy, terms & conditions. This move, 
together with the requirement for greater clarity on data processing in privacy 
notices, the right of individuals to request a copy of data pertaining to them, and the 
right of data erasure, serves to empower individuals on the use of their personal 
data. As soon as the GDPR came into force, complaints were brought against 
Facebook, Google and others, alleging that companies are forcing users to accept 
targeted advertising, or to delete their accounts (Foxx 2018). If these complaints are 
upheld, and as more users become aware of their rights, this could result in serious 
financial and reputational damage for these companies. Hopefully, it will bring 
about a change in practice to respect data donors and comply properly with the 
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regulations. Other social media giants, notably Twitter, have introduced clear, gran-
ular controls that allow users more choice, including opting out of targeted advertis-
ing which relies on user profiling (Foxx 2018).
We have already mentioned posthumous organ donation, but there is also tissue 
and organ donation from living individuals to consider, with the corresponding 
implications for the individuals and their kin. The UK, in common with many coun-
tries, has specific legislation governing the donation of human tissue from living 
individuals (UK Human Tissue Act 2004). Organisations processing human tissue 
must be licensed, abide by strict protocols and are subject to inspections by regula-
tory authorities. However, with the advancing genomic revolution, tissue donated 
by one consented individual can generate increasingly rich information about the 
donor and their kin, as the secrets of DNA are being uncovered. Yet, it would not be 
practicable or ethical to seek consent from all the possibly relevant individuals. For 
bone fide organisations we rely on good governance regimes for data management 
and access; but with the explosion of interest in genomic data, and huge multina-
tional companies such as Apple, Google and Amazon entering the health market, it 
is not known what the future holds or whether the ensuing power-play will yet 
trump bioethical factors one way or another (Scott 2018).
5.6  No Man Is an Island Entire of Itself3
When Pat chooses whether to donate any kind of personal data about himself, he 
needs to remember that his decision will have implications for others. On the basis 
of Western philosophy, we lean on the side of individual autonomy in our bioethical 
principles. The four main principles we commonly rely on being: (i) the rights of 
individuals to make decisions and to be provided with truthful, complete informa-
tion to be able to make a properly informed choice, free from coercion (autonomy); 
(ii) not intentionally harming individuals through acts of commission or omission, 
and providing standards of care meeting the law and commonly held moral convic-
tions (non-maleficence); (iii) a duty to benefit individuals, and actively preventing 
harm (beneficence); and (iv) equality and fairness in the provision of care and dis-
tribution of resources by seeking to overcome disadvantages (justice) (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2013). But, if we are to give due consideration to data donation, 
individuals also have to face the concept of social responsibility, with the added 
dilemma of whether in the act of donating we are potentially benefitting or harming 
others associated with us. This can be the case in many contexts, and it not limited 
to the obvious genomic data example. It has been observed that some apps used on 
social media platforms seek access to the user’s contact list and photographs, and it 
is worth carefully reviewing privacy settings to be sure we are aware of the data 
donation ‘choices’ we are making (Denholm 2016).
3 No man is an island (John Donne).
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Although we have referred to bioethical principles, it is interesting to consider 
the extent to which our data donation decisions are based on bioethics or on other 
considerations altogether. When we donate personal data to a research project hav-
ing a defined protocol, clear aims and anticipated outcomes, with potential risks and 
benefits for participants, we could reasonably say we choose our position based on 
our moral perspectives. We might hope for benefits for ourselves, or we might be 
acting altruistically in undergoing an intrusive process purely for the future benefit 
of others, based on a sense of social responsibility. But when we donate data in other 
contexts, such as social media, it is doubtful that we base our decisions on ethics. 
Similarly with choosing to use an app, a DTC company, or a mobile phone contract. 
A key difference seems to be in the purpose of the transaction. Participating in a 
research project carries the concept of ‘giving something back’ and thus contribut-
ing to the good of society. Signing up to use a service or product, however, is rather 
different, as it is directly associated with obtaining something based on need or 
desire. As we’ve observed, we are often presented with a potentially coercive situa-
tion where we can only obtain the item if we enter into the agreement. Ironically, we 
are often taken stepwise through a process to donate data to research for public 
good, with much less attention paid as we rush to complete the transaction to gain 
the prize in the latter scenarios. Furthermore, the extent to which the companies 
with whom we engage are acting on the four ethical principles might be highly vari-
able when profit is their primary purpose. In some cases, this might be more akin to 
personal exploitation by platforms of largely unaccountable power.
5.7  Data, Data Everywhere, nor any Chance to Think4
So if it’s only partly about bioethics, it will be valuable to consider what else shapes 
Pat’s choices and the norms of society concerning data donation. We have noted that 
data might be provided passively or actively and in multiple contexts as we go about 
our daily lives. In general, we are all subject to vast amounts of potentially influen-
tial information from many sources. Unlike in the past, our challenge is not in find-
ing information, but in knowing how to be judicious in selecting what is reliable 
enough to guide our decisions. Depending how we view the commonly-referred to 
‘information society’, we might see ourselves as the most privileged generation yet, 
or the one most subject to the attention merchants (Wu 2017). Estimates vary, but 
reviews indicate that about 2.5 million academic articles are published every year, 
challenging professionals to keep abreast of cutting edge knowledge to inform their 
practice (Ware and Mabe 2015). As members of the public with our respective areas 
of expertise and ignorance, we are bombarded with information on any number of 
topics from multiple angles and media outlets. It is difficult to ignore information 
once it is known to us: it is assessed for its value or resides in our subconscious 
4 Water, water everywhere, nor any drop to drink (The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge).
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waiting to become relevant. Altogether, we are subject to a vast, shifting body of 
knowledge that floats around shaping our social realities.
We might sometimes be relatively disengaged, and perhaps we need to be, from 
much of the information that comes our way. If we were to ask people travelling on 
a train, or in another common social setting, whether they have donated any data 
today, we are likely to receive puzzled looks or responses in the negative. Yet, unless 
we are disconnected from the digital realm, it is highly unlikely that we have not 
donated data in some form to someone over the course of a day. But, at times, we 
may find ourselves in a position where we need to make important decisions about 
data donation. It is on these days where we hit the personal threshold, that our 
worldview and bioethical principles come to the fore, and we find ourselves needing 
to draw upon the information available to us to navigate a moral maze. This might 
relate to decisions about our own (or a loved one’s) health, finances, education or 
any of an array of issues that may impact on our personal lives, taking us beyond our 
public personas and into the domain we consider private. At times like this, we are 
likely to become more concerned that we can trust the recipients of our data and 
their motives, as we have to move out of our, sometimes, blasé bubbles. But by this 
time, we are already likely to have a substantial data footprint, which may not have 
been donated so thoughtfully. Perhaps it is time to re-evaluate.
5.8  Up in the Air
All things considered, we propose that there are indeed incongruities in data dona-
tion, and that we find ourselves juggling our 1s and 0s between different parties and 
purposes. Taking Pat as our data subject, he might donate different types of data via 
the same basic decision-making process, or the same data via very different pro-
cesses. For example, if he uses a variety of apps, he is able to donate general per-
sonal data such as his location via a fitness monitoring app, or his medical data via 
a health-monitoring app reminding him when to take his medication or recording 
self-reported symptoms to monitor a chronic condition. Alternatively, and more 
starkly, he might donate health (including genomic) data to a company by remote 
agreement to terms & conditions via a web-based agreement form. Or he might 
donate the very same data to a medical researcher as part of a clinical trial, via one- 
to- one consultation carried out on a face-to-face basis. As mentioned above, the 
legitimacy of DTC companies is in question in some domains (Kalokairinou et al. 
2017), but perhaps we should also be more cognisant about health-monitoring apps 
that are not controlled solely by our care provider, but are run by third parties pri-
marily for gain arising from the data harvested. It is possible that when our deci-
sions are made remotely, in the ‘privacy’ of our own homes, our attention is 
cocooned by the sense of security created by our familiar environment. But of 
course, this is irrelevant for digitally-connected transactions even if we may feel 
‘safe’ when signing up on our own device. In some scenarios, Pat could be in the 
position of not knowing the recipients of his data, exactly what data items have been 
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collected, or what will be done with them by whom. The original recipient may 
further process the data and pass it on, or sell it, to other parties albeit in anonymised 
format.
5.9  Through a Glass Darkly5
In these respects, it can be too easy to donate personal data, as even if data have been 
through a process of anonymisation, it might not be impossible to derive some iden-
tifiable information from within them by attribution. This is commonly referred to 
as ‘jigsaw’ or ‘mosaic’ attack and in some cases can lead re-identification (UK 
Anonymisation Network 2018). Many studies have shown that the removal of com-
monly recognised identifiers (such as name and address) is insufficient to render a 
dataset truly anonymous. This is because of residual risks due to the presence of 
unique records. As a possibly surprising example, 87% of people in the US have 
been shown to have a unique combination of birth date, sex and zip code. Such 
information provides a fast-track to uncovering individual identity and has led some 
authors to lament the broken promises of anonymisation (Ohm 2010). Uncovering 
individual identity is a sufficient problem in itself, but it doesn’t stop there. By using 
information from public sources and anonymised health data, it has been shown that 
the confidential health records of specific individuals can be uncovered. Famously, 
this occurred to a Governor of Massachusetts, where a researcher deduced and sent 
his health records to his office with ‘theatrical flourish’ (Ohm 2010)! This problem 
further extends to genomic data, with its implications for kin as well as for the data 
donor. Researchers used an open-access genetic database detailing short tandem 
repeats on the Y-chromosome, and used genetic similarity to infer familiality in the 
paternal line. By combining these similarities with information on a publically- 
accessible genealogy database containing surnames, they were able to reveal cases 
where recorded paternity and genetics did not correspond. This could obviously 
have serious implications for the personal lives and familial relationships of the data 
donors (Gymrek et al. 2013). Clearly, there needs to be something more than pur-
ported anonymisation if Pat’s privacy is to be secured.
All is certainly not lost as there are many bone fide enterprises across the world 
where privacy-by-design is an integral concept with a strong emphasis on good data 
governance6. Privacy-by-design is an important whole system concept where a suite 
of controls is built in at all stages in working with person-based data (Intersoft con-
sulting 2017). The environment surrounding the data is designed to be conducive to 
safe data storage and use, providing stronger data governance regimes than relying 
5 1 Corinthians 13:12 (The Holy Bible).
6 International examples  – Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank https://saildata-
bank.com/; Institute for Clinical and Evaluative Sciences https://www.ices.on.ca/; Population Data 
BC https://www.popdata.bc.ca/; Population Health Research Network http://www.phrn.org.au/; 
and Scottish Informatics and Linkage Collaboration http://www.datalinkagescotland.co.uk/
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on data curtailment alone. It can be a challenge to strike the optimum balance 
between data privacy and utility, as controls applied to datasets to limit the risk of 
disclosure may compromise research utility. Some examples could be aggregating 
age into 10-year bands, or suppressing outlying variables, depending on the research 
question of interest. It can be easy to be drawn into what has been termed ‘privacy 
perfectionism’, where superfluous controls are applied to datasets diminishing data 
utility but without providing additional safeguards (Allen et al. 2013). This is where 
privacy-by-design comes in as it combines physical, technical and procedural con-
trols to provide more robust and flexible data protection (Jones et al. 2014; Pencarrick 
Hertzman et al. 2013).
As well as addressing the safe use of health data in general, there is considerable 
debate in the literature over whether genetic data need to be treated as a special case 
for data protection. This has been termed ‘genetic exceptionalism’ (Chin and 
Campbell 2013). As a concept, it flies in the face of some current initiatives, which 
aim to make genetic data open and publically-accessible. This is the established pat-
tern with platforms for genome referencing and genome-wide association studies 
(GWAS) (GeneCards 2018), but more recently, there are initiatives where genetic 
data together with general health data (sometimes plus demographics) are being 
shared openly. An example of this is the Personal Genome Project (PGP) (Personal 
Genome Project 2018) where individuals engaging with the project can choose to 
make their linked health and genetic data publically accessible via a website. The 
PGP is clear in the information it provides to participants, including the possible 
risks to their privacy, such that individuals engage with their eyes open (providing 
they read the information properly!). Sharing data in this way can be seen as an 
impressive altruistic gesture, but it does also raise risks for the individual and their 
kin, as we have alluded to earlier. Relatives of a data donor may unwittingly be 
exposed to others knowing their estimated likelihood of developing a genetic condi-
tion, or of the information falling into the hands of parties who might use it to deny 
them employment or insurance. It is noteworthy that the GDPR does not especially 
single out genetic data, but classifies them along with general health data under 
Article 9 (Intersoft consulting 2017). Research has shown that among the general 
public there is almost an even split among those who think genetic data is different 
to other health data and those that either do not, or who are unsure (52% yes; 48% 
no/unsure) (Global Alliance for Genomics and Health 2017). The bioethical debate 
continues and is likely to do so for some time with new revelations being made 
about the genome. Without wishing to raise concerns unnecessarily, as individuals 
considering our options in donating data, we need to move away from the naïve 
concept that data are anonymised just because we are told this is the case. Again we 
come back to the judicious use of information from the plethora available to us, and 
the challenges this presents.
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5.10  Life Through a Lens (Or Several)
By the time the information on which we base our data donation choices reaches us, 
it is likely to have passed through a number of filters affecting its interpretation and 
presentation to us, as well as to decision makers who may be acting on our behalf. 
Concepts can be magnified, diminished or fragmented as information passes via a 
series of intermediaries, with their interpretations acting as lenses, variously refract-
ing the information and influencing the next steps. A decision maker has to be judi-
cious in use of the information available in making choices affecting the use of their, 
or another’s data, but information provenance might not be fully known.
This is a universal problem, not limited to the information sources already con-
sidered. Importantly, this also highlights challenges in the interpretation and imple-
mentation of privacy legislation and information governance frameworks, which 
may influence our decisions, and those who provide us with guidance. In a review 
of harms arising from the use of health and biomedical data, it was shown that the 
most prevalent cause of data misuse was the maladministration of data governance, 
rather than wilful data abuse (Laurie et al. 2015; Stevens et al. 2017). This included 
failures to follow correct procedures, despite guidance and the existence of standard 
procedures and protocols, and failures to take action to avoid data misuse taking 
place. The report included recommendations for improved staff training amongst 
other measures to strengthen information governance practice (Laurie et al. 2015; 
Stevens et al. 2017). However, as well as protecting proper individual privacy and 
safeguarding professionals, it can sometimes be the case that rules are over- stringent 
or their true essence is lost in translation.
The review also covered harm due to the non-use of health data. This is seen as a 
distinct issue and not merely the reverse of gaining the benefits of data used prop-
erly. This aspect of the work showed that there are instances where poor information 
governance can result in serious repercussions for individuals and society. Some 
pertinent causes of this problem were: lengthy and duplicative approval processes, 
conflicting advice, and excessive disclosure controls applied to de-identified data, 
limiting its utility. The apparent reasons were often quite straightforward but prob-
lematic nonetheless. They included: unclear lines of responsibility, fear of making 
the wrong decisions, and alterations to organisational data governance frameworks 
in the absence of legislative or regulatory changes. As a result, there can be a skew 
or deficit in the information available to data donors, like Pat, and the professionals 
who provide his care (Jones et al. 2017). We will return to the issue of data non-use 
later in this chapter. As a general rule whether we’re acting as individuals or profes-
sionals, we should always seek the most definitive information, as close to the pri-
mary source as possible, when we make decisions on donating data. But, of course, 
we may not know the derivation of the information that reaches us, and this may 
leave us with a dilemma we can’t really quantify, whilst needing to proceed one way 
or the other.
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5.11  Minding Our Ps and Qs
So, with all this in mind, let’s look at what we can do to raise realistic awareness. 
One major action is to stop asking questions that cannot be answered. In engaging 
with the public, there is little point in simply asking whether people think their per-
sonal data should be used or not. Sometimes data have to be used for various essen-
tial purposes, and at other times data are being used with negligible regard for social 
acceptability. Public engagement researchers have mostly moved on to asking more 
focused and answerable questions, such as how data should be used and by whom. 
In seeking to make public engagement meaningful, there is a need to be upfront 
about what we know and what we do not know. Keeping with tradition, we can use 
some alliteration in elaborating this point. These are at least some of the unknown 
Ps we need to grapple with: the package (the data content); the parties (the data 
users); the purpose (the data uses); and the places (the data environment).
Unless Pat obtains a copy, he would not be alone in not knowing the full details 
of data held about him by a given data controller. As an aside, with the introduction 
of the GDPR, he is now in a position where he may request this is if he wishes to do 
so (Intersoft consulting 2017). Two key areas where the unknown package is likely 
to be most pronounced, but for different reasons, are on major social media, search 
and retail platforms and in genomic data. It is well-known that companies such as 
Facebook, Google and Amazon use advanced data-scraping algorithms to source as 
much online information as possible about their users. This puts Pat in a position, 
whether he’s aware of it or not, that he really doesn’t know the scope or extent of 
data held about him and his online activities. On the contrary, with genomic data, it 
is the full meaning of the dataset itself that is unknown. Even with a copy of the 
data, Pat would not know what it all means, since that knowledge is just not avail-
able. In these scenarios, when we donate data we do so without fully knowing what 
they contain.
When the public are asked, they generally express differing levels of willingness 
to donate data to different parties. Unsurprisingly, the trend is usually in favour of 
non-commercial organisations and less so for the commercial sector. This is true for 
general health data, administrative data arising from other public services and, 
unsurprisingly, for genomic data (Global Alliance for Genomics and Health 2017; 
Cameron et al. 2014; Ipsos MORI 2016). But across all sectors, we might not have 
full knowledge of the parties themselves or others to whom they may pass the data; 
and in the act of giving the matter more thought we might even skew our own per-
spectives. The extent to which this may occur depends on many factors, including 
the body of information that shapes our personal views and the most pervasive cur-
rent events in the media. It can be easy to demonise certain sectors wholescale, 
disregarding that they are not all one entity. This can be seen in public views on the 
pharmaceutical industry, towards whom distrust is often expressed. Although there 
have been some high-profile cases where pharma companies have behaved inap-
propriately with data (Cohen 2014; Goldacre 2013), poor research integrity is not 
necessarily limited to the private sector. It’s also worth remembering that pharma 
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companies create the majority of our medicines, and the cost of bringing a new drug 
to market can stretch to $billions (Herper 2017). This requires a major commitment 
and is one unlikely to be embarked on frivolously; although they profit, they also 
produce public good. When we engage with the public, or we are the individuals 
being engaged with, we need to take broader issues into account, beyond the imme-
diate. For example, by remembering that we donate our data to other major organ-
isations, such as via social media, with far less consideration and knowledge than 
participating in a research study, whether commercial or non-commercial. In this 
way, we can hope to gain a fuller picture before we make our decisions.
This leads nicely to the purposes for which our donated data are used, of which 
there will be far too many to consider here. But we can take a basic division between 
primarily for-profit and not-for-profit. Again, we are likely to be more permissive 
towards not-for-profit uses of our data. But even so, it is sometimes difficult to know 
exactly how data will be used. This is less likely to be an issue with data we provide 
as part of our receipt of healthcare. However, this is not failsafe, as there have been 
rare cases where large volumes of National Health Service data have been passed to 
third parties without due governance and leading to an outcry in the media (Hern 
2017). Properly-governed research from any sector should ideally include a research 
protocol with defined questions and data requirements. Clinical trials of medicinal 
products tend to have tightly-controlled specifications from the outset. But in other 
research designs, it is not always desirable or even possible to be completely defini-
tive at the start. Often research studies need to build in a degree of flexibility whilst 
operating within the bounds of regulatory approvals, including having a relevant 
lawful basis for processing the donated data. Where participant consent is relied 
upon, it must be properly informed and freely given. Thus we may have a conun-
drum in some research scenarios: unknown elements vs the need to inform. When 
this occurs, it is the duty of researchers to be upfront in the recruitment process so 
that participants have the best information available on which to base their deci-
sions. Across other for-profit domains where Pat may donate his data, the purposes 
of data use could be vaguer and more exploitative, as we’ve noted earlier.
As well as a measure of unknowns in the package, parties and purposes, we may 
also be faced with uncertainties in the places: that is, in the data environment. Data 
could be stored and managed in a myriad of ways, just some of which are outlined 
briefly since this is a vast subject beyond the scope of this chapter. They might 
reside in anything from a simple, locally-held database under the control of a single 
individual to a large-scale platform with privacy-by-design. The data could be 
stored on a single PC, on a local server, or on a cloud-based storage system operat-
ing across jurisdictions. They could be publically accessible, or subject to access 
restrictions, and they could be released externally or retained within a data safe 
haven. How and where the data are to be held is an essential data governance issue 
for the safe, secure use of data. It calls for assurance that security measures have 
been applied to mitigate risks, and that the data custodians can be considered trust-
worthy. This is needful, not just to satisfy regulatory authorities, but also in com-
municating with, and respecting, individuals donating their data. It is part of 
conveying transparent information to promote informed choice. Of course, it might 
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not be appropriate to describe the security model and control measures in technical 
detail, but it is important to do so in a way that enables individuals to understand the 
principles of how their data will be handled and protected. Again, it’s about clarity 
and the limits thereof. To complete our consideration of Ps and Qs, we ask what we 
can best do, and we propose that: as professionals we should be honest about uncer-
tainty to the best of our knowledge; and as individuals, we should recognise that 
there are sometimes limits in knowledge when working with data. Even so, all must 
be conducted with integrity and trustworthiness on all sides.
5.12  The Need for Innovation in Data Governance
Having established some of the many complexities and uncertainties to be taken 
into account in data donation, we propose that there is a strong need for innovation 
in data governance so that the best use of data can be made in safe, socially- 
acceptable ways. Pat’s data are subject to a range of factors influencing their trans-
formation into information, not limited to the specifications of legislation and 
regulations. There is a complex interplay between legislation and regulations, how 
they are interpreted and the body of knowledge that influences this process, such 
that the realisation of information from Pat’s data, in all its manifestations, is depen-
dent on a variety of factors. These instruments give rise to broader ethical, legal and 
societal issues (ELSI), implementation frameworks and due diligence processes. In 
line with the famous adage that ‘in theory there is no difference between theory and 
practice: in practice there is’, implementation is dependent on interpretation. 
Different individuals and organisations will have their own perceptions, risk appe-
tites and motivations in coming to an opinion on a data governance issue. As well as 
that, these perceptions are coloured by the body of opinion coming from stakehold-
ers and the wider media. In these respects, this is a prime example of our life through 
a lens illustration. As we’ve noted, the ‘big data’ landscape is one that is expanding 
rapidly, with increases not just in data volumes but also in data types being donated. 
These emerging types, such as genomic, imaging, free-text, social media and smart 
object data can stretch current data governance regimes. They call for innovative 
solutions to avoid undue bureaucracy and support the safe, socially-acceptable use 
of donated data. It is a positive step that the GDPR has introduced measures to 
strengthen individual rights over their personal data, and to limit exploitative activi-
ties such as automated profiling (Intersoft consulting 2017). But even so, data ana-
lytics often run in advance of ELSI-based solutions, particularly in areas where data 
are seen as a lucrative commodity. Thus, there is a need for innovation to enable 
safe, effective data use without undue bureaucracy.
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5.13  Who Are You, Who, Who, Who, Who?7
By now, we might really want to know what our role as individuals and profession-
als can be or should be in relation to the complex issue of data donation. This, of 
course, will depend on a multiplicity of factors, and is really only a question we can 
answer for ourselves in relation to each data donation instance. But it is worth con-
sidering some of the factors that may dictate our role. Firstly, our views are likely to 
be strongly influenced depending whether we ourselves are the data donor, whether 
they relate to our close kin, and the perceived sensitivity of the likely data content. 
Whether we realise it fully or not, our thinking is shaped by our worldview and the 
vast, shifting body of knowledge that floats around shaping our social realities that 
we mentioned earlier. We also have the urgency of the issue versus the distance from 
the issue, and whatever defines that concept in a given instance. Furthermore, as we 
have shown, we are often likely to be dealing with incomplete information on which 
to base our choices. Altogether, it’s not surprising that Pat may find himself in a 
quandary when he has to come out of his comfort zone and make important deci-
sions about his data. Though painful, this can actually be a good thing, on the basis 
that at least he can question his position and the information being presented to him 
in making his choices. For Pat, and any of us, there are likely to be occasions where 
we need to take on different roles to fulfil our familial and social responsibilities. 
We might be leading, shaping a situation, or basically a follower guided by others. 
The key, in all cases is to seek and provide the best available information to inform 
decisions. There are various versions of the phrase: ‘without data, all decisions are 
guesswork’, and ultimately, our aim is the safe, socially-acceptable, increasing use 
of data for public good. The alternative is unthinkable.
5.14  Finding the Black Cat in the Dark Room
There is no doubt that data saves lives, and this phrase itself is the rallying cry of a 
major public engagement campaign to highlight the value of health data, and to 
encourage people to pledge their support for their safe re-use in research for the 
benefit of individuals and society (Farr Institute of Health Informatics Research 
2018). Earlier, we looked briefly at the influence of poor information governance 
practice on the non-use of health data. Let’s look at the implications of data non-use 
in a little more detail. The aforementioned international case study covered the non- 
use of health data across clinical records and research domains, as well as in relation 
to governance regimes (Jones et al. 2017). From this study, it became evident that 
there are multiple reasons for data non-use, compounding each other and resulting 
in serious harm to individuals and society. As a result, health data non-use has been 
strongly implicated in hundreds of thousands of deaths and £billions in financial 
7 Who are you? (Pete Townsend, The Who).
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burdens to societies (Jones et al. 2017). It is a challenging issue to study, as harm 
due to data non-use is difficult to attribute unequivocally, but there is no doubt that 
this black cat certainly is there. The study concluded that, although there are many 
initiatives seeking to address this problem, much more needs to be done. The most 
effective moves are likely to be those that that: (i) uncover the sources, types and 
reasons for data non-use in a given domain; and (ii) recognise the multiple aspects 
to this complex issue across other domains in seeking solutions to move steadily 
towards socially responsible reuse of data becoming the norm. Pat’s life is at stake 
here, and it has even been argued that harm due to data non-use is a greater risk than 
data misuse (St. Clair 2008). Unlike Schrodinger’s pet, it is most certainly alive and 
manifests itself globally as a large, agile, polymorphic, lethal, black cat that must be 
captured and tamed.
5.15  Conclusion
Having considered some of the incongruities, dilemmas, risks and benefits in data 
donation, we argue that on balance it is not ethical for the vast, increasing swathes 
of data donated in good faith by individuals not to be used for public good. 
Determining what constitutes public good is another issue in itself and one that has 
not been explored here. It appears that, in common with other aspects of life, indi-
viduals might simultaneously hold conflicting beliefs with regards to data donation. 
The challenge lies in finding a bioethical balance between individual autonomy, 
personal exploitation and social responsibility, when our knowledge is incomplete 
and powerful actors have their own agendas. But to use one more analogy, let’s not 
throw out the baby with the bathwater, but endeavour to pursue the best information 
we can obtain.
The demand for personal data is massive and multi-faceted, and it is in our inter-
ests to be guarded in our influences and to invest our trust with caution. Our ultimate 
question was whether we, as individuals and society, can make truly informed 
choices about data donation with the panoply of issues that may influence our deci-
sions. This might not be a question that can be answered with a straightforward yes 
or no, for all the reasons we have discussed in this chapter, and more besides. It 
might well be impossible for any individual to comprehend the breadth of data use 
and its implications, but if we provide the best available information and engage 
properly with the information presented to us, we stand a more reasonable chance. 
To do that, there is an obvious need for carefully placed trust, demonstrable trust-
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Chapter 6
Posthumous Medical Data Donation: 
The Case for a Legal Framework
Edina Harbinja
Abstract This article explores the options for establishing a legal framework for 
posthumous medical data donation (PMDD). This concept has not been discussed 
in legal scholarship to date at all. The paper is, therefore, a first legal study of 
PMDD, aiming to address the gap and shed light on the most significant legal issues 
that could affect this concept. The paper starts by looking at the protection of the 
deceased’s health records and medical data, finding that this protection in law is 
more extensive than the general protection of the deceased’s personal data, or the 
protection of post-mortem privacy as a concept. The paper then investigates key 
issues around ownership and succession of personal data, including medical and 
health-related data, and how these could affect PMDD and its legal framework.
The author then goes on to explore some parallels with organ donation to determine 
whether there are some lessons to be learned from this comparable regulatory 
framework. The paper concludes with the discussion around the need for a Code for 
posthumous medical data donation developed by the Digital Ethics Lab at the 
Oxford Internet Institute, and a more formal regime that would enable and facilitate 
this practice. Here, the author proposes key law reforms in the area of data protec-
tion and governance related to PMDD. These reforms would include amendments 
to the general data protection ideally, to ensure harmonisation and consistency 
across the EU, as well as between the general and sector-specific data protection 
laws and policies. These changes would contribute to legal and regulatory clarity 
and would help implement this important and valuable practice, which aims to facil-
itate research and advances in medical treatments and care.
Keywords Posthumous medical data donation · Data protection · Legal framework 
· Organ donation · Post-mortem privacy
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Can individuals donate their data in life and post-mortem? In a playful and exciting 
episode, BBC Tomorrow’s world has discussed this attractive idea, trying to invoke 
some of the current issues related to the use and misuse of our digital footprints and 
personal data.1 Individuals are often not aware as to what happens to these digital 
footprints post-mortem, and the law and policy in this area are still very confusing 
and inconsistent (Harbinja 2017). But what if we shift this paradigm and enable 
users to employ their altruistic motivations and aspirations by helping them partici-
pate in ‘citizen’s science’ and medical research through donating their medical data 
posthumously (Vayena and Tasioulas 2015)? This article aims to investigate the idea 
of posthumous medical data donation (hereinafter: PMDD) from a legal perspec-
tive, looking at what the law could do to facilitate this useful practice in the future.
The idea of PMDD is very similar to organ donation, prima facie. Organ dona-
tion has been a well-established topic of legal research and medical practice in 
many countries, including the UK (see e.g. Weimar et al. 2008; Cronin and Price 
2008; Price 2000). The practice has its roots in philosophical, philanthropic and 
humane ideas and reasons, and the law around it has been developing in the last few 
decades in particular (Evans and Ferguson 2014; Skatova 2011). Data donation 
would have essentially a similar goal, i.e. to help save human (or other) lives and 
support medical and clinical practice and research. The aggregation of numerous 
sets of donated data would support advanced and personalised medical research, 
providing the basis for data mining, machine learning and AI, which would help 
generate new understanding of some of the acutest medical concerns that humanity 
is facing nowadays (e.g. cancer or various mental health conditions, Prainsack 
2014).
It is important to distinguish PMDD from medical data sharing of the living, but 
also from medical data philanthropy, which is the opening, to access and use, by 
private companies and public organisations, of one’s data sets, for charitable pur-
poses (Taddeo 2016; Krutzinna et al. 2018). Krutzinna et al. argue that ‘posthumous 
medical data donation is motivated by different reasons, and is less risky and more 
easily achievable than either data sharing or data philanthropy’, therefore easier to 
implement and regulate. Importantly, the argument is that the failure to exploit fully 
the health data available in medical records, which often already exist in digitised 
form as electronic health record in the NHS, is a huge opportunity cost and has a 
negative effect on advancements in research. Apart from this practice being ineffi-
cient and costly, scholars argue that it is also unethical (Krutzinna et al. 2018).
In terms of individuals’ readiness to engage with the option of posthumous data 
donation, a study finds that individuals are willing to donate personal data to 
research for public good, and their motivation is both self-benefit (e.g. enhancing 
their reputation, professional benefit, or to feel good about themselves) and concern 




for others. Surveyed individuals who were less likely to donate are motivated by 
self-interest mainly, whereas those more likely to donate had public good as a main 
motivating factor. The study concludes by arguing that ‘Data Donation holds prom-
ise as a useful tool in the digital economy, providing value to third sector and well- 
being researchers as well as marketing and the private sector’ (Skatova et al. 2014). 
In a different study, Jones et  al. discuss what the non-use of health-related data 
would mean, identifying harms for the society as a whole. The study focused on 
issues with clinical care records, research data and governance frameworks, illus-
trating the types of data non-use that occur, and some of their consequences for citi-
zens and the society (Jones et  al. 2017). There is, therefore, an appetite and 
compelling ethical arguments for data donation more generally, as well as post- 
mortem. An aspect of data donation that is explored more deeply in this paper is 
posthumous data donation.
This article builds on the helpful findings and arguments introduced by social 
scientists and humanities scholars in the area (Skatova et al. 2014; Krutzinna et al. 
2018; Shaw et al. 2016). One of the most tangible results of these endeavours is the 
Code for posthumous medical data donation developed by the Digital Ethics Lab at 
the Oxford Internet Institute and funded by Microsoft (Krutzinna et al. 2018). Thus, 
as research demonstrates, while there may be sound ethical reasons that posthu-
mous data donation is quite straightforward, this is not necessarily the case legally. 
A legal framework that would support this practice has not been discussed in legal 
scholarship to date at all. This paper is, therefore, a first legal study of PMDD, aim-
ing to address the gap and shed light on the most significant legal issues that could 
affect this concept. The focus of this paper is on the UK and English law, and the 
EU, where appropriate. Importantly, the study will look at the general data protec-
tion regime, lex specialis provision (legal regimes regulating health-related data), 
and data governance, thus making some useful parallels and suggestions for a 
reform of general and sector-specific data protection laws and policies. These 
changes would contribute to legal and regulatory clarity and coherence and would 
support the implementation and enforcement of this important and valuable prac-
tice. The legal framework would, therefore, go beyond an ethical framework that is 
considerably more difficult to enforce in practice.
The paper starts with a brief exploration of the current legal protection of health 
data and medical records in the UK more generally, and the protection of deceased’s 
medical data and patients records, more specifically. The purpose of this overview 
is to ascertain if these laws and policies could apply to PMDD, or whether at least 
some of their principles could be borrowed for a novel PMDD legal framework. The 
following section looks at key issues around ownership and succession of personal 
data and how these could affect PMDD and its legal framework. The author then 
goes on to explore some overarching parallels with organ donation to determine 
whether there are some lessons to be learned from this comparable regulatory 
framework. Finally, the paper concludes with the discussion around the need for a 
Code for posthumous medical data donation and a more formal regime that would 
enable and facilitate this practice. Here, the paper proposes key law reforms in the 
area of data protection and governance related to PMDD.
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6.2  Legal Protection of Health-Related Data of the Living 
and the Dead in the UK
Before analysing the law and policy around the data of the deceased, it is useful to 
briefly set out key data protection provisions applicable to medical and health- 
related data more generally, so to determine whether we could apply these to 
PMDD. Alternatively, the paper also investigates if we could translate provisions set 
out in this legislation into principles that would enable the practice of PMDD.
Health-related data in the EU and the UK have been treated as sensitive data in 
the Data Protection Directive 1995, and are included in the renamed category of 
‘special categories of personal data’ in the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 
(GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). These data include, inter 
alia, genetic data, biometric data, and data concerning health. Processing of the 
special categories of data is in principle prohibited by the GDPR, and only allowed 
on the basis of ten general grounds, including relevant grounds for health data, such 
as crucially vital interests of data subject and explicit consent by the data subject 
(GDPR art. 9 2. (a) and (c). Further grounds are where the processing of special 
categories of data is necessary for the purposes of, broadly, health and social care, 
and for reasons of public interest in the area of public health (GDPR art. 9 2. (h) and 
(i). Finally, for research purposes, paragraph 2 (j) applies, and the processing of this 
type of personal data needs to be in accordance with Article 89(1) based on Union 
or Member State law. GDPR, therefore, recognises the benefits of facilitating medi-
cal research and the need for enabling the access to medical registries and data sets. 
This ground is relevant to medical data donation by living individuals, whereby 
member states are to provide for exemptions that would detail conditions and safe-
guards related to the processing of this data (recital 157, article 89). These specific 
safeguards include data minimisation, pseudonymization, and derogations from 
certain data subject rights, such as the right to access, to object, to rectification, to 
the restriction of processing. Moreover, GDPR also recognises the need for further 
measures in the interest of data subject and the need to apply the rules of GDPR in 
the light of these measures (Recital 159, GDPR). This would mean, for instance, 
following specific data regulatory and ethical frameworks that already exist in medi-
cal research, and could potentially include the ethical framework for PMDD. In the 
UK, the above provisions of GDPR have been implemented in schedule 2 part 6 of 
the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018).
GDPR, however, does not apply to anonymised data (see e.g. section 251 of the 
NHS Act 2006), so research conducted using these would not need to meet the 
GDPR requirements, provided that it is not possible to relate back the data to indi-
viduals, which is nowadays increasingly difficult and therefore this option should be 
used with caution. For anonymised data, research ethics would normally still require 
consent and other safeguards for data subject that are participating in a study. The 
further legal basis for processing of medical data in England without consent, and 
overriding the common law duty of confidentiality in the interests of improving 
patient care, or in the public interest, is set out in section 251 of the NHS Act 2006 
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and The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002. 
Applications are administered by the Confidentiality Advisory Group of the Health 
Research Authority, but anecdotally, researchers note that the success rate is low 
and applicants are strongly encouraged to pursue the consent route or to use anony-
mous data where possible (Jones et al. 2017).
GDPR is not a helpful place to identify rules and provisions that would govern 
the use of the data of the deceased, including the data within PMDD. Recital 27 
provides that ‘This Regulation does not apply to the personal data of deceased per-
sons. Member States may provide for rules regarding the processing of personal 
data of deceased persons.’ Some member states have used this option and enable for 
the protection of the data of the deceased more generally (not limited to medical 
data), such as France or Hungary (see Castex et al. 2018). The UK, however, has 
chosen not to legislate in the area so the DPA 2018 retains the old definition of per-
sonal data, emphasising that the concept relates only to ‘living individuals’ (s. 3(2) 
DPA 2018). The fact that the GDPR and DPA do not apply directly to the data of the 
deceased, including posthumous medical data, makes it even more important to 
identify the key legal issues at play in PMDD. We, therefore, need to look beyond 
the general data protection framework in order to identify laws and policies that 
might be helpful in the context of PMDD. The next section will explore laws and 
policies related to the data of the deceased in the health sector, which could form a 
basis for the PMDD legal framework.
6.2.1  The Protection of the Data of the Deceased in the Health 
Sector
Sector-specific protection of deceased’s medical data is somewhat more extensive 
than the protection awarded to the data of the deceased in the general data protection 
regime. For instance, The Access to Health Records Act 1990 provides for the pro-
tection of the access to health records of the deceased, and this access is permitted 
for ‘the patient’s personal representative and any person who may have a claim aris-
ing out of the patient’s death’ section 3 (1) f). These would be next of kin or the 
deceased family who might need to access these to ascertain their claims or causes 
of death for instance. In England, GP health records are passed on to Primary Care 
Support England for storage after the patient’s death and these are generally retained 
for 10  years after death, with the exception of the storage by the Primary Care 
Support for England where this period extends for up to 100 years. For hospital 
records, the Department of Health advises that they are kept for 8 years. These are 
managed by the record manager at the hospital (Department of Health 2010). NHS 
records are also governed by the Public Records Act 1958 which provides that GP 
records become public when forwarded to local authorities after the death of the 
patient. Most of these are closed for 30  years post-mortem and those related to 
physical and mental health are closed for 100 years. Permission can be sought from 
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the Public Records Office to use data from deceased persons in research if confiden-
tiality can be guaranteed (Medical Research Council 2003). Some of the records 
kept longer are then opened fully to the public after this point in time.
Interestingly, the NHS data opt-out regime that allows patients to opt out from 
the use of their data in research, for instance, has been extended to include the data 
of the deceased and honouring their wish expressed premortem by the way of opting 
out (NHS, National Data Opt-out Operational Policy Guidance Document 2018). 
This policy explicitly includes deceased but does not apply if an individual has 
opted into a certain scheme of research by an express consent, for instance. This is 
a policy choice and the projection here goes beyond what is legally required by the 
data protection regime, as indicated earlier in this paper. Also, it provides a useful 
avenue for the regulation of PMDD, as opting into a PMDD scheme would exclude 
that data from the NHS opt-out regime. This policy, therefore, does not need to be 
amended in order to accommodate PMDD.
In addition to data protection, an area of law that would potentially offer a more 
extensive protection to deceased’s patient records is the common law duty of confi-
dence. Case law implies that the duty of confidence which doctors owe to their 
patients might survive the death of the patient. For instance, in Lewis v Secretary of 
State for Health & Anor2, Mr Justice Foskett argued that a limited number of author-
ities in the area, including the ECHR case law and academic views, point towards 
this proposition. Decisions by the Information tribunal support this stance as well 
(see Webber v IC and Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust3 and M v IC and 
Medicines and Health Products Regulatory Authority4). The issue is still unclear 
and unsettled in law, and the case law needs to be much more specific and coherent. 
Nevertheless, it would not be wrong to at least make a claim that this law applies to 
records post-mortem, even if this is an arguable point at this stage of the develop-
ment of the relevant case law. As Lewis shows, the courts would also be likely to 
find the stance of the professional regulators and the NHS highly influential here. 
(see also Munns and Basu 2015). The Caldicott Review 2013 identifies this discrep-
ancy in the law as well, calling for a legal harmonisation and for the Law Commission 
to ensure that there are ‘no legal impediments to giving custodianship of their health 
and social care data within their last will and testament.’ (Caldicott 2013). We will 
turn to this suggestion in Sect. 6.5, as it is very useful when considering a regulatory 
framework for PMDD. Once more going beyond the law in this area, the Department 
of Health, General Medical Council and other clinical professional bodies have long 
accepted that the duty of confidentiality continues beyond death and this is reflected 
in the guidance and policies they produce (Department of Health 2010).
In summary, this section identifies the most significant provisions of law and 
policy that could be applied to PMDD, acknowledging incoherence and the need for 
clarity in statutes, case law, and policies. Contrary to most types of personal data of 
the deceased (Harbinja 2017), confidentiality (as an aspect of a broader notion of 





post-mortem privacy, Edwards and Harbinja 2013) of their health data and records 
is preserved through policy and the NHS data governance in the UK and many other 
jurisdictions (Shaw et al.2016). PMDD would mean that this confidentiality could 
be affected by the wishes of individuals expressed premortem. However, in order to 
make this option clear and coherent in the law, the legislation set out above would 
ideally need to be amended (in particular, The Access to Health Records Act 1990 
and the Public Records Act 1958 would need to at least mention PMDD, so to 
enable the access for research purposes). Before looking at these regulatory options 
in more detail in Sect. 6.5, we will briefly identify some general principles around 
ownership and control of personal data, including medical data of the deceased. 
These principles and values will support and underpin the legal framework intro-
duced later in the paper.
6.3  Some Issues Around Ownership, Privacy, Control 
and Succession of Data
Issues around ownership and control of data, in the context of the data of the 
deceased, are significant as they may influence the direction a legal regime might 
take, swaying it towards propertisation or away from it. It is also important to clarify 
the legal perspectives and discourse around property and ownership of data, as it 
might differ significantly from a similar discourse in social science and humanities. 
For example, while social scientists might use ownership and property more gener-
ally and, perhaps, imprecisely, to refer to control, it is very important not to use 
these in a similar manner in legal discussions and practice, for the reasons set out in 
this section.
Looking at a comparable legal regime, organs or body parts are not generally 
considered a full-blown property in law and their commercial exploitation is mostly 
prohibited, as discussed in the following section. Similarly, and although there have 
been many calls for propertisation of personal data (as there have been for different 
proprietary treatments of body parts), and ideas for using the doctrine of quasi- 
property, a predominant view in the European scholarship is that property is not an 
adequate legal regime to protect personal data and privacy. This regime is human 
rights-based and embeds values such as dignity, autonomy, control and respect for 
personhood. In the European legal doctrine and jurisprudence as well, it has been 
long established that the data protection regime is based on human rights (the ECHR 
and the European Charter of fundamental rights) and propertisation and commodi-
fication of personal data is not an option in any of the EU member states, including 
the post-Brexit UK (Harbinja 2013, 2017; Pearce 2018). Consequently, there can be 
no succession or bequeathing of one’s data, as stricto sensu, only property can be 
passed onto one’s next of kin and heirs (Harbinja 2017). An option of deciding as to 
what happens to one’s patient records is not viable under the succession and probate 
regime at the moment either. Researchers argue that this is unreasonable and that 
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there should be options for individuals to decide what happens to their data on 
death. (Harbinja 2017; Castex et al. 2018). This is now possible for some digital 
assets such as emails or social network content in France or Catalonia, however, this 
does not include one’s medical records and data, and therefore, it is not particularly 
helpful as a framework for PMDD.
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of data included in patient records, it is 
important to consider the concept of post-mortem privacy and the protection of 
individuals’ personal data and personality on death. In a very broad sense, post- 
mortem privacy includes the protection of one’s body parts and organs, and the 
narrow interpretation includes the protection of personal data only, and thus covers 
patient records as well. Research shows that this phenomenon is only partially pro-
tected (Edwards and Harbinja 2013; Harbinja 2017; Buitelaar 2017) and there is not 
a comprehensive regime that would include data protection reform, as well as the 
necessary regulation of digital assets associated with the deceased’s online foot-
prints and digital persona. The UK has not followed the lead of France or the US to 
legislate on this matter and the DPA 2018 excludes the data of the deceased com-
pletely, as noted above. If post-mortem privacy was recognised in law, as argued by 
researchers, then the deceased would be able to decide as to what happens to their 
medical data post-mortem as well, and this would facilitate the practice of PMDD. Of 
course, as noted above, there may be concerns about conflicting familial interests, 
and any regime in relation to posthumous data donation would need to take account 
of this. Some suggestions proposed by Krutzinna et al. (2018) in their Code address 
these concerns.
Looking at post-mortem privacy from a conceptual perspective, Floridi’s notion 
of the informational body would be significant to refer to here as well. For Floridi, 
a human being is constituted and exists through information related to their identity, 
similar to what Marx sees as the inorganic body metaphor, i.e. the idea that in pro-
ducing objects, one is producing oneself at the same time. Floridian ethics empha-
sises the right to control one’s identity, which he understands as an informational 
structure, constituted by everything that defines this identity, including various 
types of digital data. Medical and health-related data are even more closely and 
intimately related to one’s physical body, but also concern their dignity, privacy and 
integrity, so the concept of informational body includes these data as well (Floridi 
2013; Öhman and Floridi 2017). This theory, therefore, provides a further support 
for arguments against propertisation and commercial exploitation of personal data, 
including medical data of the deceased. This is in line with the principles and values 
set out in the Code for PMDD as well since the Code rejects commercial exploita-
tion of patient’s records.
The key arguments set out in the brief discussion above suggest that the legal 
treatment of data, inducing patients’ records, is not based on property and owner-
ship. The basis remains in human rights and personhood. Post-mortem privacy, dig-
nity and autonomy should be used as an underlying rationale for the regime that 
regulates and enables PMDD. These principles do underpin the Code for PMDD, 
and they will form a part of an underlying rationale for a legal framework set out in 
Sect. 6.5. In spite of this proposition, some mechanisms of succession and probate 
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law could be utilised to introduce and support this concept and help implement 
deceased’s wishes. We will explore this further in Sect. 6.5.
6.4  A Comparable Regime: Organ Donation
Having argued that data is not amenable to ownership in a legal sense, we will now 
explore whether key legal principles of organ donation could be borrowed when 
designing the legal framework for PMDD. As noted in the introduction, donation of 
blood, organs and tissue, as well as other comparable forms of donation, share simi-
lar motivations with those that Skatova, Ng & Goulding identify for posthumous 
data donation of patient records and medical data (2014). The purposes of these 
types of donation are similar too, however, benefits might not be as obvious in the 
case of data donation and they may seem somewhat remote as discussed above. In 
law, both would be intrinsically tied to one’s personhood and neither data nor body 
parts would normally constitute full-blown property in law, at least not the type of 
property that can be commercially exploited as other objects of property. There have 
been some instances where certain incidents of property have been assigned to body 
parts, but these were mainly for very specific purposes and cases, such as theft or to 
invoke proprietary remedies for their protection (Doodeward and Spence5; R. v 
Kelly (Anthony Noel)6; Dobson v North Tyneside HA7; Yearworth v North Bristol 
NHS Trust8, The Human Tissue Act 2004, section 32; Skene 2002; Brazier 2002; 
Hawes 2010; Mason and Laurie 2001).
Organ donation and biomedical practices have been regulated by many interna-
tional instruments (e.g. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the 
additional protocols to the Convention of the Council of Europe – Oviedo Convention 
1997, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1997, 
Universal Declaration of Bioethical Principles of the United Nations 2005), as well 
as national statutes in the UK (The Human Tissue Act 2004, the Human Tissue 
(Scotland) Act 2006, Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013). All of these legal 
instruments emphasise the role of consent, either opt-in (as in England) or opt-out 
(or presumed opt-in, as in Wales and Scotland, see s.3 The Human Tissue Act 2004, 
Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013, the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006). 
Consent for organ donation can be written or oral and may be given by the deceased 
before his death or by a third party, usually a close relative or friend.
Requirements for consent in international instruments are slightly divergent and 
include for instance: Oviedo Convention – free and informed, purpose explained, 
the right to withdraw; Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights 1997  – free and informed consent; Universal Declaration of Bioethical 
5 1908 6 C.L.R. 406.
6 [1999] Q.B. 621.
7 [1997] 1 W.L.R. 596.
8 [2009] EWCA Civ 37; [2010] Q.B. 1.
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Principles of the United Nations 2005 – prior, free, express and informed consent, 
adequate and the right to withdraw. All of these international treaties and declara-
tions are based on fundamental principles of dignity, autonomy, privacy and confi-
dentiality. In a similar form, these principles and consent requirements could be 
used for posthumous data donation as well, as suggested in the Code for PMDD 
drafted by Krutzinna et al.
There are some notable differences between organ and posthumous data dona-
tion, however. These need to be taken into account when designing a regulatory 
framework, as well as ethical codes. As Krutzinna et al. note, the first key difference 
between is the lack of physical intrusion on the donor’s side in posthumous data 
donation. The second difference is the donor status and the lack of urgency as the 
utility of the data does not have an immediate expiry date in the same way as organs 
do. A further difference relates to the beneficiaries. Thus, while blood, cord blood 
and gamete donations can be used to benefit the donor in the future, in the case of 
posthumous data donation, the beneficiaries are always other individuals, often a 
group of future unknown beneficiaries of medical research. The additional impor-
tant difference these researchers identify is in the research question, i.e. clinical 
research studies attempt to answer a specific question, whereas posthumous medical 
data would be used for more general research and promote curiosity in research. 
Researchers in traditional clinical studies will have to contact their participants if 
they wish to use the data for further or additional research and ask them to re- 
consent. This requirement does not apply in posthumous medical data donation. In 
addition, living participants can withdraw their consent at any point, so that their 
data is removed from research, the same option does not apply in posthumous medi-
cal data donation. Here, active consent management is impossible after death but 
could be an option premortem (Krutzinna et  al. 2018). All these considerations 
should be taken into account when designing an adequate legal framework for this 
concept. For instance, there will not be an objection based on religious or ethical 
grounds to the use of this data, in the same way as there have been to organ donation 
and the integrity of a human body. For the donation for non-clinical purposes, con-
sent will be broad but the individuals should be explained and given a choice to 
participate or not in this sort of research. Once opted into the scheme, the donors 
will not need to re-consent for further uses of their data, as long as this is broadly in 
line with what they consented for (e.g. the use for purely commercial purposes will 
be prohibited if the data is donated only for public or academic research).
There are also two risks associated with data donation, as identified by Krutzinna 
et al. The first one is the fact that medical data is rarely just about one individual but 
often relates to others, who may be harmed as a result (e.g. their family). The risk 
relates to the potential use that the donated data can be put to (e.g. data revealing 
hereditary diseased use as a basis for discrimination), thus creating a purpose creep. 
In these case, the researchers suggest that that particular dataset should be rejected, 
as it poses risks to other, living individuals. As rightly argued by Krutzinna et al., 
this does not dismiss the practice per se, but rather, it warns of risks researcher and 
stewards need to bear in mind when accepting and handling these medical records 
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and data. In addition, safeguards already in place for medical data can be applied in 
the context too.
The second risk concerns the source of the donated medical data. The potential 
misuse of the data of the deceased naturally comes with a lower harm to the deceased 
as opposed to a living person, but this is also coupled with the ability to control the 
use of the data, which is lower in the case of the deceased’s data. Krutzinna et al., 
therefore, suggest ‘a framework that respects the values and preferences of the data 
donors, and that reassures potential donors that their expressed wishes will be 
respected after death.’, pointing at concerns over the misuse of medical Big Data to 
justify unfair public policies, the implementation of medical profiling by employers 
or insurance companies etc. Any regulatory framework would need to address these 
too. To address these concerns and risks, these scholars propose a value-based code 
that would include principles and values. The code, they argue, is in line with the 
good practice of biomedical data schemes such as the NHS care. Data programme 
or the Personal Genome Project UK.
In terms of specific safeguards within the Code, which would, inter alia, mitigate 
against risks and differences between posthumous organ and data donation, 
Krutzinna et al. mention security, pseudonymization and encryption. It would be 
useful to also include safeguards such as accountability, regulatory scrutiny and 
transparency as required by GDPR for the use of medical data of the living in 
research (art. 5 and 89 GDPR, Article 29 Working Party 2018). It is argued here that 
specifying the need for these principles in the Code, as defined in GDPR (art. 5) and 
the national data protection regimes, would make the Code more robust, ethically as 
well as legally. Moreover, as indicated in Sect. 6.2, GDPR also recognises the need 
for further measures in the interest of data subject, and the Code could be perceived 
in the light of this provision, as it offers measures in the interest of the deceased as 
a data subject in the case of PMDD (notwithstanding the fact that, strictly speaking, 
the deceased are not data subjects under GDPR, but they could be if a member state 
decides so, see Sect. 6.2).
In summary, principles around organ donation and consent requirements (opt-in 
consent as currently required in England or presumed opt-in as in Wales; or), in 
particular, could be used as a blueprint for the data donation post-mortem. Any 
regulatory regime would need to account for risks that are different to those of organ 
donation, especially the one associated with a potential harm to a deceased’s family 
and other living individuals. Consent, however, does not need to be the only or the 
preferred ground for post-mortem medical data donation, and considerations should 
be given to ‘adaptive governance models’ and the potentials to use public interest as 
a ground for this use of medical data (see e.g. Laurie et al. 2015). Relying on this 
ground would be arguably less complicated for the data of the deceased, as these are 
excluded from the general data protection regime. The sector-specific law and gov-
ernance, as indicated above, however, do focus on confidentiality post-mortem, 
implying that consent is valuable and often required for different uses of the 
deceased’s medical data, and the Code acknowledges this as well. We will discuss 
these options further in the following section.
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6.5  International Framework – Code or Law?
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to create an overarching mandatory 
framework for posthumous medical data donation at a global level. In the field of 
organ donation and biomedicine, there are numerous international instruments iden-
tified above, however, these have had limited success due to the number of signato-
ries or the lack of enforcement in international law more generally. Therefore, an 
Ethical Code for Posthumous Medical Data Donation might be a better solution for 
an international level, where countries may choose to follow the lead of those who 
have already subscribed to its principles and implemented this idea successfully, to 
the benefit of research and science. However, as principal authors of the Code 
rightly argue ‘it is important to regulate for the future, i.e. to avoid ethical guidelines 
becoming inapplicable due to technological, legal, cultural or social changes. This 
is the goal of the Code that we propose: to provide normative principles shaping 
PMDD, rather than a set of specific rules of conduct for the involved actors’ 
(Krutzinna et al. 2018). This section will, therefore, set out some guiding principles 
for the legal framework for posthumous medical data donation in England, and the 
UK more specifically. It will also introduce basic ideas for a wider international 
regulation and policy.
At a European and the UK level, it is argued that GDPR would allow this practice 
and amendments are not strictly necessary at this point in time. Anonymised data 
are excluded, but also, the data of the deceased are not covered by GDPR either, nor 
is their protection prohibited. The lack of harmonisation opens the door to recognise 
initiatives like this one but also results in very disparate legal approaches across the 
EU. It is necessary, therefore, to utilise some of the existing sector-specific frame-
works. In France, for instance, The Digital Republic Act 20169 could allow for this 
practice to be one of the specific directives made by a deceased, which is recognised 
by the statute. In the UK, again, DPA 2018 does not allow for the protection of the 
data of the deceased, so an amendment to delete the living from the definition of 
personal data would be helpful. However, even if the Act excludes the application of 
the data protection regime to the data of the deceased, there is no reason why a spe-
cific regime cannot be established as the DPA 2018 does not prohibit the protection 
of this data through other regimes, and we have seen above that this has been a long- 
standing practice in the UK health sector.
This author suggests that the legal framework only includes basic principles, 
such as the need for consent (opt-in or presumed opt-in), and clear exceptions where 
consent can be overridden, e.g. in the interests of family, where there is a case of 
hereditary diseases and data donation could harm others. More detailed principles 
for handling this process would be still set out in the Code, which would go over and 
beyond the existing laws, and would potentially be adopted by the NHS within their 
data governance structure, for instance, the NHS opt-out regime mentioned in Sect. 
6.2. As indicated above, the call for an adaptive governance frameworks questions 
9 Loi n°2016–1321 pour une République numérique.
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whether consent is, in fact, a ‘silver bullet’, and essentially refers to other grounds 
for processing of this data, such as public interest or research. (Laurie et al. 2015; 
Porsdam Mann et al. 2016). Looking at the general data protection regime, consent, 
in this case, is indeed not required. However, I would side with arguments put for-
ward by the Krutzinna et al. to support the need for consent in medical data donation 
post-mortem. Consent, in this case, would mitigate against the caution that the 
Confidentiality Advisory Group expresses, as discussed above, and support the 
notion of post-mortem privacy. It would be helpful if the consent requirement is 
harmonised with GDPR, so to introduce similar standards for the protection of the 
deceased’s medical records as those for the protection of the data of the living. As 
discussed earlier, however, GDPR does not apply to the data of the deceased, but it 
does not prevent member states from legislating in the area, so it is viable to mirror 
most of the consent requirements from GDPR into the PMDD framework. Consent 
would, therefore, need to be freely given, informed and unambiguous, by a state-
ment or by a clear affirmative action, whereby an individual signifies agreement 
with PMDD. This is in line with article 4(11) of GDPR, except for it omits the word 
‘specific’. Researchers suggest that there could be broad and specific consent 
options, covering various or specific research projects and uses (Shaw et al. 2016), 
and the Code for PMDD suggests broad consent too. This also mirrors the consent 
requirements of the Universal Declaration of Bioethical Principles of the United 
Nations 2005, as indicated in the previous section. One could still object to this and 
argue that public interest in advancements in medical research overrides consider-
ations around privacy and confidentiality. However, I would argue that highly sensi-
tive and valuable data included in patient records still require an extent of 
involvement of the individual concerned. This is in line with the sector-specific 
regulation of deceased’s health data as discussed above, including the NHS national 
data opt-out regime.
In terms of implementation of the principles set out above, posthumous medical 
data donation can also be introduced in the Law Commission’s reform of wills for 
England and Wales (The Law Commission 2017). The deceased’s decision to donate 
their medical data can be treated as a part of one‘s will, for example. Solicitors and 
legal profession would then be able to provide advice on these options as well. Data 
donor’s card could be recognised similarly to the recognition of donors cards for 
organ donation (as suggested by the Caldicott review as well). Practically, it would 
also be useful to establish a register of donors in order to record wishes of the indi-
viduals centrally and avoid the need to seek consent from the families, where pos-
sible (Shaw et al. 2016). Apart from this, the Access to Health Records Act 1990 
should be amended to allow for access by researchers when permitted by the 
deceased or their personal representative. Amendments to the NHS Act along these 
lines would be helpful as well. An idea would be to look at PMDD more holistically 
and introduce a separate regulation by the secretary of state, which would amend the 
relevant laws and set out the general principles of PMDD, including the recognition 
of ethical codes and the NHS policies. In the future, these wishes could be recorded 
in a third party data steward if these emerge as the new actor in the data regulatory 
landscape (e.g. data trusts, intelligent agents for interpreting and enforcing 
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deceased’s wishes, see similar ideas in Royal Society and British Academy 2017; 
House of Lords 2018).
In addition to the legal and policy changes, current technology can offer assis-
tance in this area as well. An example is a cooperative model for managing personal 
health data in Switzerland, i.e. health bank and MIDATA10. Ther databox project in 
the UK could be used for this purpose as well.11 These tools enable citizens to be in 
control of the storage, management and access of their personal data, including the 
decision how to share it and participate in citizens science (Krutzinna et al. 2018). 
This could be used as a tech option of recording one’s wishes, however, this mecha-
nism has to be approved by the governance model for posthumous data donation, 
and made sustainable and secure.
In summary, there is a clear need for principled recognition of posthumous medi-
cal data donation in law, at least at a very abstract level, through the introduction of 
the practice in the data protection and sector-specific legislation, which regulates 
the governance of medical data. The framework introduced here includes minimal 
legislative interventions, which could be implemented simply and quickly, without 
amending GDPR or DPA, for example. The options explored above include amend-
ments to the Access to Health Records Act 1990, the NHS Act, as well as the recog-
nition of PMDD in the law of wills. This framework aims to mitigate against 
potential disputes and make the practice enforceable, rather than just voluntary and 
code – based. An enabling and overarching framework would allow for flexibility in 
the implementation through ethics codes and the NHS policies. A more robust 
reform would include amendments to the general data protection ideally, to ensure 
harmonisation and consistency across the EU.
6.6  Conclusion
This paper explores the notion of posthumous donation of medical records from a 
legal perspective. The purpose of this paper is to initiate a broader discussion within 
legal scholarship and set out some overarching considerations and principles that 
can be applied by regulators and other stakeholders in this area.
The paper finds that the protection of the deceased’s health records and medical 
data is more extensive than the general protection of the deceased’s personal data, 
or the protection of post-mortem privacy as a concept. The paper also warns of some 
issues around ownership and succession, suggesting that regulators and researchers 
should refrain from referring to data being ‘owned’ or property in this or any other 
area of law, as this is incongruent with the European legal tradition, normatively and 
doctrinally. Hence the regulatory regime of posthumous medical data donation 





values have helpfully been introduced in the Code for posthumous medical data 
donation, for instance.
Legal framework introduced here follows the main premises of the Code, trans-
lating them into suggestions for law reforms. These reforms would include amend-
ments to the general data protection ideally, to ensure harmonisation and consistency 
across the EU, as well as between the general and sector-specific data protection 
laws and policies. A more viable idea at this point in time includes amendments to 
the sector-specific law, perhaps through a separate regulation by the secretary of 
state for this area as well. A more light touch approach is to introduce an NHS pol-
icy that would govern this practice, akin to the NHS opt-out option from research 
available to the living and the dead as discussed in this paper. Finally, the law 
Commission should ideally consider including this option in the comprehensive 
reform of the law of wills they have introduced recently, so to enable individuals to 
records their decision about posthumous data donation in their wills or otherwise. 
These changes would contribute to legal and regulatory clarity and would help 
implement this important and valuable practice, which aims to facilitate research 
and advances in medical treatments and care.
Looking slightly further in the future, deceased’s wishes to donate his medical 
data posthumously could be recorded using technological tools such as MIDATA 
and databox, or other forms of intelligent agents and data stewards based on machine 
learning and AI. However, in order to explore issues around the law, technology and 
human-computer interaction, a substantive, multidisciplinary future research around 
this idea is required, and it will be within the scope of this author’s future research 
as well.
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Chapter 7
Medical Data Donation, Consent 
and the Public Interest After Death: 
A Gateway to Posthumous Data Use
Annie Sorbie
Abstract Posthumous medical data donation (PMDD) could deliver a longitudinal 
dataset that facilitates significant advances in health research. This chapter focuses 
on a central challenge of PMDD, namely what good governance looks like in cir-
cumstances where consent does not provide a ‘single magic bullet’. The central 
argument is that consent in PMDD must be properly understood as merely one 
aspect of a holistic governance regime, and that more emphasis ought to be placed 
on the role of authorisation. This brings to the fore the potential role of the public 
interest in navigating the various interests in play. As will be demonstrated, this 
proposed re-orientation of governance could deliver tangible benefits in PMDD and 
enhance three key elements of good governance: transparency, accountability and 
engagement with evidence of the views of actual publics. Part I outlines the impetus 
for the examination of PMDD in the context of the (non)delivery of the ‘data shar-
ing revolution’. Part II considers the pressure that temporal aspects of PMDD exert 
on traditional notions of consent, and the interests this brings into play. Finally, Part 
III suggests that authorisation should have a role to play alongside consent.
Keywords Posthumous · Medical · Data · Donation · Consent · Governance · 
Authorisation
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7.1  Data Governance and the Promise of PMDD
Data use and governance is at a cross roads. Across all sectors, unprecedented quan-
tities of data are being captured and repurposed. This is greatly facilitated by emerg-
ing technologies such as machine learning, which have transformed our capacity to 
analyse data in increasingly sophisticated ways (British Academy and Royal Society 
2017; House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence 2018). What may 
appear, at first blush, to be prosaic matters around data usage in fact require us to 
consider the significant (potential) benefits, and risks, of collecting, curating and 
sharing information beyond the purposes for which it was originally obtained or 
generated. As recently articulated by the British Academy and Royal Society, this 
raises pressing questions for society that go directly to how we live our lives and 
flourish in the twenty-first century.
These matters are brought into sharp focus in the context of health and the use of 
medical data.  Here there is the very real possibility that proactive data manage-
ment – whether in the form of data use, re-use or sharing – can deliver improve-
ments in human health. However, this brings with it immediate and legitimate 
questions about boundaries to open science (The Royal Society 2012) and corollary 
responsibilities to protect data subjects and ensure good data governance (Laurie 
et al. 2014). The British Academy and Royal Society also highlight that while health 
data might tend to flow in silos, research uses might require these flows to be dis-
rupted (and potentially significantly extended), for example where mobile phone 
data is used to predict the spread of malaria (Buckee et al. 2013). As well as new and 
varying research uses for health data, new stakeholders – including actors in the 
public, private and third sectors – raise questions about the public acceptability of 
data use and sharing initiatives that span the public / private divide (Aitken et al. 
2016).
While the value and potential of data-driven medical research is well recognised 
(Knoppers et al. 2014) the jury is out on whether the data reuse revolution has, in fact, 
been delivered (Pisani and Abou-Zahr 2010). Indeed, various solutions have been 
proposed to bridge the gap between aspirational policy and pragmatic practice, from 
facilitating cross-border collaboration, to ensuring that the work invested in curating 
data sets is appropriately acknowledged. Despite this attention, a persistent stumbling 
block to progress is not so much the absence of available data, but rather how the 
potential of existing data might be harnessed and made available to facilitate advances 
in health research.
A proposal that speaks to this stubborn problem, and has attracted increasing 
attention in recent years, is the broad notion of data philanthropy. Taddeo (2016) 
understands this as ‘the donation of data from both individuals and private compa-
nies’. The recipients of such data are not specified, but could include international 
organisations like the UN, actors undertaking research in the public sphere, or those 
working in industry (Taddeo 2017).
Much of the literature on data philanthropy has focused on the donation of data 
by private companies (Taddeo 2017). However, the donation of data by individuals 
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has also been subject to high-profile scrutiny. In January 2018 the late British 
Labour MP, Baroness Tessa Jowell, delivered a speech to the House of Lords that 
was extensively covered by the media following her own diagnosis with a brain 
tumour. She called for ‘...sharing access to more and better data to develop better 
treatments’ (Hansard 2018) and highlighted the work of the Eliminate Cancer 
Initiative (ECI). Baroness Jowell was subsequently reported to be the first to donate 
her medical data to the Universal Cancer Databank (BBC 2018). This kind of ‘altru-
istic giving’ is typical of many conceptions of data donation, where the language 
and metaphors of donation are frequently invoked to suggest admirable exercises of 
autonomy for the sake of the common good.
The ECI was positioned by Jowell as a new initiative, but there are now a range 
of data sharing schemes and repositories in operation. For example, disease specific 
registries, which collect information from patients, often without relying on indi-
vidual consent, are well established in the UK and beyond (Nelson et  al. 2016). 
There are also other projects, such as the Scottish Health Research Register 
(SHARE), which allows members of the public to voluntarily sign up to allow their 
coded NHS data to be checked to identify whether they would be suitable for certain 
health research projects, on the basis they will then be invited to participate if a 
match is found.1These projects operate in different ways, but both speak to the 
desire to maximise the potential of existing of health data, and to harness this to 
deliver collective improvements in health and social care. This too is an aim of a 
research project developed by Krutzinna, Taddeo and Floridi of the Digital Ethics 
Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, and funded by Microsoft, 
to investigate posthumous medical data donation (referred to hereafter as PMDD). 
An output of this project is to develop an ethical code for PMDD in order to set out 
the guiding ethical principles for such donations.
By way of context, it is only recently that there has been any sustained consider-
ation of the use of data for research after death (Shaw et al. 2016). Although PMDD 
on a case-by-case basis might, in theory, be possible if an individual were so inclined 
to anticipate this before their death, there is currently no cogent framework within 
which such a donation may be offered up, or indeed received, and then the relevant 
data disseminated for research or other purposes.
To the extent that PMDD on a wider, systemic scale has previously been tenta-
tively explored in scholarly works, this has tended to use organ donation as a com-
parator. Thus, an example of a potential model is Taylor’s suggestion in The Lancet 
(2000) that card-carrying data donors could volunteer their data for use by brain 
researchers in the event that the data donor were to succumb to a brain condition. 
This expression of willingness to provide data would be effective in the event that a 
brain disorder set in, with the advantage that researchers could access information 
both before and after the onset of the brain illness or damage. More recently, Shaw 
et al. (2016) have revisited the question of how data is used after death in more 
detail, arguing for PMDD as a way to prevent the waste of data which might other-
wise be used for valuable research. The authors identify a number of drivers of such 
1 https://www.nhsgresearchanddevelopment.scot.nhs.uk/share/ Accessed 17 August 2018.
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a scheme, including: low levels of awareness of how data is used (or not) after 
death; the thicket of regulations that can make data from the deceased difficult to 
access; and the significant benefits that such use might yield, as demonstrated 
through the example of the German National Cohort study.
One of the assumptions of a scheme of PMDD, such as that proposed by Shaw 
et al. and by Krutzinna et al, is that this would be a widespread undertaking whereby 
individuals could, for example, opt in as a matter of course at some point in their 
life. Here the analogy with organ donation holds: the individual might be asked to 
agree to PMDD at the point where she applies for a driving licence, or perhaps signs 
up at a GP practice. However, for both practical and principled reasons, the organ 
donation analogy has significant limitations. These range from the practical matter 
in PMDD of locating medical records and related (but perhaps dis-located) data that 
may be held in different formats across multiple sites,2 to the potential impact on 
living family members where shared genetic information is donated (Shaw et al. 
2016 and Krutzinna et al. 2018). As will be explored later in this chapter, another 
divergence is that data is not exhausted by re-use in the same way as a donated 
organ, nor depleted by repeated use, like a biological specimen. Indeed, the longitu-
dinal value of data potentially increases significantly over time and with increased 
sharing and re-use. Any effective governance mechanisms must reflect these par-
ticular features of data, its protection, and also its value maximisation.
Returning to Krutzinna et al’s model of PMDD, many of the key features of this 
scheme are detailed elsewhere in this volume, some of which are beyond the scope 
of this chapter. However, the following bear repetition as they are particularly perti-
nent to the discussion that will follow:
• The scheme is intended to be user friendly and widespread, to encourage and 
enable those individuals who wish to participate to easily donate their data 
posthumously;
• This model of PMDD is designed to facilitate sharing of a comprehensive medi-
cal dataset, as included in participants’ personal medical records (PMRs);
• Such a scheme should be voluntary and participatory – OII explicitly reject the 
argument that informed consent is not required for PMDD, though acknowledge 
the merit in further consideration of how informed consent operates where data 
is repurposed in ways that cannot be anticipated at the point of data collection. 
(Krutzinna et al. 2018)
This chapter responds to this call for scrutiny of what good governance looks like in 
circumstances where consent does not, as I will argue, provide a ‘single magic bul-
let’ (Laurie et al. 2015). The central argument advanced – that consent in PMDD 
should be understood as merely one aspect of a holistic governance regime – is 
wholly consistent with the OII’s position that PMDD should enable willing 
2 This point was made by Kerina Jones of Swansea University at the OII workshop at the University 
of Oxford on 20th April 2018.
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participants to consent to volunteer their data. However, the proposed re-orientation 
of governance in PMDD will further enhance the transparency and accountability of 
any such scheme, and support the delivery of a longitudinal dataset that has the 
potential to facilitate significant advances in heath research.
In the sections that follow I will first, in Part II, consider the pressures that PMDD 
exerts on traditional models of consent. These are analysed with reference to both 
the temporal regulation of PMDD, and the interests this may bring into play. This 
discourse serves to delineate the role of consent in PMDD, as well as its limits as a 
complete governance solution.
Having proposed that consent in PMDD is more properly understood as merely 
one aspect of a holistic governance regime, Part III suggests that authorisation has a 
role to play. This is where certain uses of data may be permitted by an access com-
mittee, in the absence of consent, and is illustrated by the work of the Confidentiality 
Advisory Group and the Public Benefit and Privacy Panel, as described further below 
(Laurie et al. 2015). Consideration of the operationalisation of this re- orientation, 
in the context of PMDD, brings to the fore the potential role of the public interest in 
navigating the various interests engaged.
7.2  Timing, Interests and the Limits of Consent
It is trite that issues of consent and autonomy are a central concern of health research 
regulation (Laurie and Postan 2013) and therefore bear scrutiny in the context of 
PMDD. Shaw et al. (2016) suggest that participants in PMDD would, prior to their 
death, be asked to provide consent for the use of their data either for individual 
projects, or by way of ‘broad consent’. As already indicated, it is a key feature of the 
governance scheme proposed by OII that PMDD should operate on the basis of 
‘informed consent’ (Krutzinna et al. 2018). In order to analyse these proposals a 
crucial distinction must be made between how data is donated into such as scheme 
(during a donor’s life), and then collected and disseminated out of the scheme (once 
the donor is deceased). This distinction emphasises the temporal aspects of regulat-
ing PMDD, and exacerbates a frequent criticism of consent as an ‘up-front, one-off 
event’ that is unable to account for ‘all interests that are in play’ (Laurie et al. 2015). 
In the section that follows these criticisms are each examined before turning to 
specific models of consent.
7.2.1  A Matter of Timing
The criticism of consent as an ‘up-front one-off event’ has particular resonance in 
the context of PMDD. Here, the consent of live data donors’ to the posthumous col-
lection and use of their data is held in stasis at the point they die. This is so because 
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there is, self-evidently, no scope to go back to the deceased donor to provide any 
information about how their data will be used, or by whom. This static consent can 
be contrasted with the use and value of the data provided by the donor, which pro-
liferates over time and might be used for a multitude of research projects by a range 
of stakeholders in the public and commercial sectors. Given that consent to donation 
may come at any time prior to death, there is a considerable temporal disjuncture 
between the giving of consent and the use of the data; this even includes the act of 
collecting the data (to say nothing of its subsequent use in research) because these 
events will likely take place many years later. Further, and as recognised by 
Krutzinna et al, it is probable that, both due to the passage of time and the breadth 
of the information contained within a donor’s PMR, the data collected will subse-
quently be used in ways that simply cannot be anticipated at the point of consent. 
This practical reality underscores the impact of the temporal aspect of PMDD gov-
ernance, where the necessarily static interaction with the (dead) donor, through the 
medium of consent, contrasts starkly with the continuing use of the data itself. 
Indeed, the subject – namely the donor – is never temporally co-located with the 
object of use  – the donor’s data  – given that this is only collected and used for 
research once the subject is no more.
This analysis has obvious implications for how data is donated into a scheme of 
PMDD (during a donor’s life) in terms of the practical limitations of the information 
that can be provided to the donor at the point of consent. However, this also impacts 
on the operation of the scheme after the donor is deceased, and particularly on how 
data is disseminated out for use in health research. More specifically, any scheme of 
governance directed to the responsible dissemination of data must be able to respond 
to changing expectations – including those of research communities and wider pub-
lics – about how data can and should be used. The failure of the care.data initiative3 
in England provides the paradigmatic example of the perils of assuming public 
acceptance of new and disruptive data usages which challenge the norms of expected 
data flows (Carter et al. 2015; Wellcome Trust 2016). Conversely, adopting a con-
servative position at the point of data dissemination may be equally ethically prob-
lematic, in circumstances where participants have donated data on the understanding 
that this will be utilised for research.4 The disjuncture in timing between obtaining 
consent and the realisation of value in data far beyond what could be anticipated at 
the time of consent should lead us to question seriously what informed consent 
could look like in these circumstances.
3 This was an initiative in England that was designed to extract information from primary health 
records for use in secondary purposes, including research.
4 See OII’s first justification for a scheme of PMDD: that ‘it is unethical to frustrate the ‘will-to-do-
it’ without proper justification (Krutzinna et al. 2018).
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7.2.2  Interests in PMDD
Such temporal considerations are compounded by the equally thorny criticism of 
consent as a governance mechanism that does not account for all of the interests in 
play in health research. This too calls for a ‘robust assessment of what is at stake’ 
(Laurie et al. 2015) in PMDD.
First to mind are the interests of data donors who consent (during their lifetime) 
to PMDD. Although these interests may be presented in different ways, few would 
dispute that a donor should be able to exercise their rights to self-determination or 
autonomy in life (Laurie and Postan 2013). On their death donors may leave behind 
living relatives who could also have an interest in the data that has been donated 
(Shaw et al. 2016). As noted by Krutzinna et al. (2018), a distinguishing feature of 
data is that it rarely relates to a single individual, which raises the possibility of 
harm to others.
At first blush the ‘thicket’ of regulation that applies to data relating to living 
individuals might appear less dense post-mortem. As was the case for its predeces-
sor legislation, neither the General Data Protection Regulation5 nor the Data 
Protection Act 20186 apply to information about a deceased person. However, the 
absence of an omnibus legislative framework does not signify a ‘free for all’ in 
terms of how the data of the deceased may be used, nor does it preclude donors’ 
interests surviving their death. For example, Sperling (2008) argues that due respect 
should be given to individuals’ preferences in life about how their data should be 
used after their death.
A growing body of scholarly work also addresses broader matters of posthumous 
privacy and informational self-determination (see, in particular, Buitelaar 2017; 
Edwards and Harbinja 2013). Buitelaar argues that the assumption that privacy 
rights are extinguished upon death cannot be maintained in our networked society. 
These matters are often considered in the context of digital assets, but many of the 
features of this medium, as identified by Edwards and Harbinja – such as its per-
sonal and intimate character and shareable nature  – might equally be applied to 
electronic PMRs.
In the medical context, the persistence of obligations post mortem is reflected in 
guidance issued by the General Medical Council, which has long acknowledged 
that a doctor has a continuing duty of confidence to a patient after their death (see 
GMC  2018). With some equivocation, it was also found that such an obligation 
exists in law in the case of Lewis v Secretary of State for Health7 (Choong et al. 
2014). This case concerned whether documents (including medical records) relating 
to deceased patients could be disclosed by a GP to an inquiry into human tissue 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
6 c.12.
7 [2008] EWHC 2196 (QB).
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analysis in UK nuclear facilities. In Lewis, disclosure of the records in question 
turned upon whether to do so was in the public interest.8 Here it was recognised that 
the public interest (which was distinguished from ‘what the public found 
interesting’)9 was multifaceted and could encompass both individual and collective 
interests including those in: disclosure; maintaining the patient’s confidentiality; 
and maintaining confidence in the institutions under investigation. 10
This analysis again draws attention to the temporal and varying nature of the inter-
ests that may arise in PMDD, both during a donor’s life when their consent is obtained, 
and after their death when their data is collected and used. However, here the resolu-
tion of these interests is crystallised at the point that decisions are made about how 
data collected by PMDD should be disseminated out for use in health research. Herein 
lies the governance dilemma at the heart of PMDD:if individual consent at the point 
of donation is constructed too widely, then this may not only stray unacceptably far 
beyond the intensions of the donor, it may also fail to take into account other interests 
that are in play, such as those of family members. However, should that original con-
sent be construed too narrowly, this also risks frustrating the donor’s desire to contrib-
ute to sustainable health research, in circumstances where uses go beyond what was 
anticipated at the time of donation, but are not necessarily unacceptable. Such a 
restrictive approach may also fail to take into account the full range of interests in 
play, including collective public interests. This leads one to question whether over-
reliance on any model of consent is appropriate to legitimise PMDD.
7.2.3  Models of Consent
Questions around what constitutes an optimal model for the consent of health 
research participants, and the limits of that consent, have been closely and exten-
sively scrutinised in the academic literature. There remains disagreement on termi-
nology as between broad and blanket consents (De Vries et al. 2016) and in particular 
as to whether broad consent can, or cannot, be sufficiently informed in ethically 
robust terms (Sheehan 2011; Kaye et  al. 2014). A comprehensive review of this 
ongoing debate falls outside of the scope of this chapter. However, briefly reviewing 
some potential models of consent, in light of the analysis of PMDD above – which 
pays close attention the subject / object disconnect and interests at play in PMDD, 
and also how data received into and disseminated out of such a scheme –reveals 
insights that can inform its good governance.
Laurie and Postan identify the ‘many different qualifying adjectives’ that are 
used to describe consent in the context of health research (2013). However, this 
8 Ibid. Paragraph 58.
9 Ibid. Paragraph 59.
10 The Judge’s order for disclosure was explicitly subject to proper safeguards being put in place to 
ensure that the information did not become ‘public’ beyond the inquiry. Ibid. Paragraph 58. I return 
to further consider the role of the public interest in PMDD at Part III below.
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chapter will focus on the proposals outlined by Shaw et  al, and developed by 
Krutzinna et al, which both suggest that some form of ‘broad’ consent will be most 
appropriate in the context of PMDD, with Krutzinna et  al emphasising that this 
should be ‘informed’.11 In the analysis of this model I will argue that, because of the 
temporal disconnect inherent in PMDD, and the multiple interests in play, while 
consent (of any type) might be a basis for signing people up to participate in PMDD, 
it is not well placed to be the enduring governance tool over time and certainly not 
after the donor’s death. To the extent that such issues are a reoccurring theme in 
health research regulation more broadly, this is particularly so in PMDD in circum-
stances where the subject – the donor –is no more, while the object – the data – not 
only endures but proliferates over time.
Although not proposed in either of the PMDD models referred to above, I turn 
first (and briefly) to ‘open’ consent, where a donor passes over data posthumously 
on the basis that the recipient can ‘do whatever they want with it’. This bears brief 
scrutiny as it could be said that this is workable precisely because the donor is 
deceased; indeed, in the case of organ donation, the donor is not consulted on 
exactly how that organ is used and who should be the recipient. While this analogy 
could appear persuasive, there are, I would argue, good reasons why this does not 
hold good (Shaw et al. 2016). Despite the data usage occurring post mortem, many 
of the ethical concerns raised in relation to open-ended consent – such as whether 
this could ever be meaningful or take account of the multiple interests in PMDD as 
outlined above –persist and are exacerbated by the multitude of ways in which the 
data might subsequently be used (Lunshof et al. 2008). Further, robust open con-
sent, as operated in the context of the Personal Genome Project,12 is a rigorous and 
onerous process that requires ‘a high degree of ‘information altruism’ … thereby 
introducing a strong moral motive’ (Lunshof et al. 2008). This might set the bar too 
high for many and impact negatively on rates of participation. This would be fatal 
to a scheme of PMDD that relies on willing data donors and aspires to a streamlined 
donation procedure.
This brief critique of open consent underlines why a scheme of broad consent is 
the scheme of choice in both PMDD proposals. For the purposes of this chapter I 
park the question of whether broad consent can be informed consent (see, for exam-
ple, Caulfield 2007; Sheehan 2011; Kaye et al. 2014). Further, ‘broad consent’ itself 
is not an entirely settled term, and so, for expediency, I will use, as my starting 
point, Sheehan’s (2011) understanding of this as ‘…encapsulat[ing] consent to a 
range of different conditions’. He sees this primarily as agreement to an arrange-
ment whereby a governing body will make decisions about how data might be used, 
11 For the purposes of this chapter, I have discounted the possibility of specific consent and dynamic 
consent, which are clearly not possible in circumstances where a dead donor cannot be re-con-
sented. See Kaye et al. 2014, for the benefits of dynamic consent in biobanking, as compared to 
broad consent. For the sake of space, and because it has not been proposed as a solution for PMDD, 
I have also omitted any consideration of consent by proxy in PMDD, which would occur after the 
donor’s death.This model raises numerous ethical issues.See, for example, Wrigley (2007).
12 See: https://www.personalgenomes.org.uk/sign-up
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but notes that this can also include other matters such as ‘an account of a general 
program of research, an account of the general goals of research or an account of the 
institutional values and aspirations’.
Two recent studies, both of which are broadly supportive of broad consent as a 
governance tool for ethical research, echo the multiple elements that broad consent 
encompasses. Steinsbekk et al. (2013) see broad consent as signifying acceptance of 
a framework to review future research, part of which includes ‘strategies to update 
regularly the [biobank] donor’ and also potentially the option of withdrawal and/or 
re-consenting. The authors further suggest that this interactive aspect of broad con-
sent may be improved though the use of some of the communication methods used in 
dynamic consent (see also Kaye et al. 2014 for a description of this model). De Vries 
et al. (2016) suggest that the challenge in broad consent is to combine ‘transparency 
about sponsored research together with governance models that assure the donor 
community and the public that their interests and moral concerns are being respected’. 
In the case of live donors to biobanks, they note that this can be achieved through 
access to information – for example by providing up-to-date descriptions of projects. 
These academic interpretations of broad consent are consistent with the recruitment, 
retention and access policies for UK Biobank,13 which is recognised as operating 
under a scheme of broad consent. This governance model makes specific provision at 
the outset for ‘active engagement with participants… in particular regarding the 
research that is being conducted on [the resource] and the research findings that 
emerge’ (Summary), as well as incorporating provisions for the re- contact of partici-
pants in some circumstances (Section B6) and re-consent (Section B6.2).
When these recognised conditions for obtaining legitimate broad consent are 
considered in the context of PMDD model – where the donor’s initial consent is 
held in stasis at the point of their death, and no form of ongoing interaction is pos-
sible – it could be concluded that consent is redundant in these circumstances. In 
particular, it fails to resolve the central governance dilemma of PMDD, as delin-
eated above, and results in either an overreach (where this is construed too widely) 
or an under reach (where this is construed too narrowly), respecting neither the 
temporal aspects of PMDD, nor the interests in play.
 Returning to the analysis above of how data is donated into such as scheme, as 
well as how it is disseminated out for research use, provides a more nuanced inter-
pretation, in light of the foregoing discussion. Taking the OII scheme as our starting 
point, a key element of this framework is that participation should be both ‘volun-
tary and participatory’ (Krutzinna et al. 2018). In terms of the voluntariness of the 
donor, there is a clear role here for a scheme of broad consent as a threshold device 
to legitimately recruit participants into the scheme. For example, the donor can sign 
up, at the point of consent, to express their ‘willingness to volunteer their data’ 
(Krutzinna et al. 2018) within a broader governance structure. However, the analy-
sis above also underlines the limitations of consent in the context of PMDD, when 





in play, which crystallise at the point that data is disseminated out of such a scheme. 
It therefore follows that consent in PMDD is better understood as merely one aspect 
of a holistic governance regime, and that it is necessary to look to a range of 
approaches to deliver effective and enduring data governance.
So far this chapter has considered the work that different models of consent can 
do and concluded that, in PMDD, this will not deliver a complete solution. The 
circumstances of PMDD, as discussed above, preclude the discharge of some ele-
ments of broad consent, namely any form of ongoing interaction with the donor. 
However, some aspects of this approach, such as the review of prospective research 
projects by a committee to identify whether access requests should be granted to the 
data resource, are achievable. In the context of broad consent, this mechanism is 
traditionally framed as part and parcel of the consent process, effectively sitting 
behind the donor’s consent. This chapter calls for a re-orientation of governance, 
such that consent in PMDD is more properly understood as merely one aspect of a 
holistic governance regime. In the section that follows I consider another potential 
aspect of such a regime in PMDD, namely the role of authorisation.I propose 
that this governance mechanism should be seen as sitting alongside consent. In 
considering how this might operate in the context of PMDD, this brings to the fore 
the potential role of the public interest in navigating the various interests in play.
7.3  Authorisation and the Role of the Public Interest
Authorisation is now an established, if under-researched, part of the data sharing 
landscape in health research (Aitken et al. 2016). Often billed as an ‘alternative to 
consent’ (Laurie et al. 2015), some of the most well-known examples that relate to 
data reuse are the Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG) in England and the Public 
Benefit and Privacy Panel (PBPP) in Scotland. To provide some context, CAG is a 
statutory body14 that advises the Health Research Authority on requests to access 
NHS patient records without consent for research purposes.15CAG’s legislative 
framework allows the common law duty of confidentiality to be lifted in specified 
circumstances so that identifiable information may be shared for purposes, includ-
ing medical research. There are various safeguards within the legislation, one of 
which is that the activity in question must be in the public interest or in the interests 
of improving patient care. In Scotland, PBPP has a similar mandate in terms of 
scrutinising requests to use NHS Scotland-controlled data, and some data controlled 
by the Registrar General, for research or specified ‘other’ purposes.16In contrast to 
its English counterpart, PBPP does not operate on a legislative basis, but rather as 
14 The CAG discharges its function pursuant to Section 251 of the National Health Services Act 
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part of the governance structure of NHS Scotland. The public interest – including 
that both in protecting individual privacy and in optimising the use of health and 
social care data  – is at the heart of PBPP’s guiding principles. As a result, any 
request for access to either of these data resources must first show, amongst other 
matters, that the proposed use is demonstrably in the public interest.
For both CAG and PBPP, authorisation as a governance mechanism is invoked 
on the basis that neither consent nor anonymisation are appropriate or practicable 
(Aitken et al. 2016). How, then, might a scheme of authorisation work alongside 
consent to meet some of the governance challenges that are specific to PMDD? 
There are, as outlined below, tangible benefits this could deliver to PMDD in order 
to enhance three key elements of good governance: transparency, accountability and 
engagement with evidence of the views of actual publics.
First, by viewing the authorisation mechanism as sitting alongside consent, this 
will provide donors with a more realistic and informed understanding, at the point 
of consent, of how their data will be managed in the future, and particularly after 
their death. This re-orientation of governance, in response to the context of PMDD, 
explicitly acknowledges the temporal disconnect identified in this  chapter as 
between the subject – being the donor who consents to the data donation in life – 
and the object – being the multitude of ways that the data may be used after the 
donor’s death. This shift therefore delivers greater transparency in relation to the 
work that broad consent can do as a threshold device, while acknowledging that, on 
death, the donor is effectively handing over control of their data to the PMDD 
scheme and its longitudinal governance mechanism.
Next, such a mechanism, which I propose should regulate the dissemination of 
data on the basis that access will only be granted where this is in the public interest,17 
would potentially be capable of accounting for the multiple individual and collec-
tive interests at play in PMDD (British Academy and The Royal Society 2017). In 
the course of the preceding discussion, various interests in PMDD have been identi-
fied, including those of: donors (both pre and post mortem); family members; 
funders and researchers in the academic, commercial and third sectors; as well as 
the collective interests of wider publics in the benefits of responsible health research. 
As has been acknowledged, consent is able to take into account some of these inter-
ests, particularly in relation to the individual interests of the donor, but is inadequate 
to deliver upon all of the interests that are in play (Laurie et al. 2015).
In proposing demonstrable public interest as the basis on which access to data 
will, or will not, be granted, it is fair to acknowledge this remains a ‘notoriously 
uncertain idea’ in health research regulation (Taylor 2011), which requires further 
intellectual scrutiny (see various commentators in Sorbie 2016). The parameters of 
17 Shaw et al. do not go into the detail of such a governance mechanism, while Krutzinna et al. 
propose that access decisions should be made on the basis of the common good. I favour the public 
interest as this reflects the practice of established governance mechanisms (e.g. CAG, PBPP and 
UK Biobank) and reflects ‘the importance of ensuring that data uses align with public interests or 
preferences’ (Aitken et al. 2016). This scrutiny of the role of the public interest in health research 
regulation is addressed more specifically in my doctoral research.
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this chapter do not allow for this task to be executed in detail, save to tease out the 
contours of a holistic conception of the public interest that might lend itself to the 
governance challenges of PMDD.  In particular, this moves away from a narrow 
account of the public interest that pits individual interests against collective benefits, 
and towards an account that is described by Rid as a ‘pluralistic conception of pub-
lic interest’, i.e. an account that is capable of recognising that multiple interests are 
in play (in particular, see Rid and Taylor in Sorbie 2016). This approach is evident 
both in the operation of CAG and PBPP,18 and is in line with the judicial interpreta-
tion of a multifaceted public interest in Lewis. The operation of a similar scheme 
can be seen in the case of the UK Biobank, which uses the public interest to regulate 
third party access to its resource (Capps 2012). However, PMDD, which only col-
lects and disseminates data in the future once its donors are deceased, can be distin-
guished from most biobanks, whose aim is to create a more immediate resource, 
often for use during a donor’s lifetime.
Third, an authorisation mechanism, which allows access to data gathered by 
PMDD when this is in the public interest, has the potential to connect the governance 
of a scheme of PMDD, with the mounting empirical evidence of public attitudes 
towards data sharing and linkage, thus closing the gap between aspirational policy 
and pragmatic practice. This chapter has already touched on the perils of disregard-
ing the need for a ‘social licence’ for any such scheme, and the need to tread care-
fully in the case of new, and potentially disruptive, data flows. This is also illustrated 
in Wellcome’s recent research, as commissioned from Ipsos MORI, on public atti-
tudes to commercial access to health data for research purposes (Wellcome Trust 
2016). This found that, when considering data uses, ‘a strong case for public benefit 
is the most important factor for many people: without it, data use by any organisation 
is rarely acceptable’. While these findings did not relate specifically to PMDD, this 
is particularly relevant in the context of a scheme that relies on a voluntary and par-
ticipatory model, as without wiling data donors, the scheme will fail before it begins.
Given that authorisation schemes are an established part of the data sharing land-
scape, Aitken et al.’s finding that there is a lack of evidence of public views on this 
topic is striking. The conclusions of this chapter certainly suggest that further scru-
tiny of authorisation as a governance mechanism is likely to have wide application, 
reaching beyond the current modes in which this is deployed. In the case of PMDD, 
any proposed governance model would be well-advised to undertake a  comprehensive 
public engagement exercise to gauge both understandings of access decisions that 
are made in the public interest, and also the extent to which this might be tolerated 
by publics. In shaping the contours of how a consent and authorisation model might 
work in tandem, this exercise could explore matters such as whether authorisation 
should always seek to take donors’ early consent into account, the extent to which 
18 For example, the Terms of Reference for the PBPP explicitly recognise that: ‘To ensure the right 
balance is struck between safeguarding the privacy of all people in Scotland and the fiduciary duty 
of Scottish public bodies to make the best possible use of the health and social care data collected – 
it is important to note that each is in the public interest’. See: http://www.informationgovernance.
scot.nhs.uk/pbpphsc/home/about-the-panel/
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donors should be able to place conditions on the use of their data, and whether there 
could ever be circumstances, such as the passage of time, that would legitimately 
allow an authorisation mechanism to allow access to data in the public interest that 
goes beyond the scope of the original consent.
7.4  Conclusion
PMDD is a proposal that speaks directly to the persistent challenge of harnessing 
existing data in order to facilitate future research, and holds the promise of deliver-
ing significant advances in human health. This chapter has scrutinised what good 
governance looks like in circumstances where, as I have argued, consent does not 
provide a ‘single magic bullet’ (Laurie et al. 2015).
This central argument – that consent in PMDD must be properly understood as 
merely one aspect of a holistic governance regime, and that more emphasis ought to 
be placed on the role of authorisation – has brought to the fore the potential role of 
the public interest in navigating the various interests in play in the context of 
PMDD. This chapter has further set out how a re-orientation of governance could 
deliver tangible benefits to the good governance of PMDD, thus enhancing its trans-
parency, accountability and engagement with evidence of the views of actual 
publics.
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on PMDD by elucidating the 
impact of temporal regulation on good governance in this context, where the neces-
sarily static interaction with the (dead) donor, through the medium of consent, con-
trasts starkly with the continuing use of the data itself. Indeed, it has been highlighted 
that the subject – namely the donor – is never temporally co-located with the object 
of use – the donor’s data – given that this is only collected and used for research 
once the subject is no more. This analysis has also highlighted the need to account 
for multiple individual and collective interests at play in PMDD that are likely to 
change over time. Taken together, this points to the need for an adaptive governance 
model that is reoriented to meet the specific challenges of PMDD, and thus provides 
a gateway to posthumous medical data use.
These contributions also have wider application in health research regulation that 
go beyond PMDD. In particular, this chapter proposes a framework to analyse inno-
vative data governance regimes with reference to how data flows into, and is dis-
seminated out of, these models. By highlighting temporal considerations in health 
research regulation, and the multiple individual and collective interests engaged, 
this underlines the need for novel and bold mechanisms that do not seek to over-play 
the role of consent, nor that suggest that third party permissions alone can deliver 
good governance solutions. Dynamic governance that captures the strengths of each 
of these approaches is required to bring about a crucial step-increase in health 
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Chapter 8
The Personal Data Is Political
Bastian Greshake Tzovaras and Athina Tzovara
Abstract The success of personalized medicine does not only rely on method-
ological advances but also on the availability of data to learn from. While the gen-
eration and sharing of large data sets is becoming increasingly easier, there is a 
remarkable lack of diversity within shared datasets, rendering any novel scientific 
findings directly applicable only to a small portion of the human population. Here, 
we are investigating two fields that have been majorly impacted by data sharing 
initiatives, neuroscience and genetics. Exploring the limitations that are a result of a 
lack of participant diversity, we propose that data sharing in itself is not enough to 
enable a global personalized medicine.
Keywords Genetics · Personalized medicine · Neuroscience · Data sharing · 
Diversity · Open data · Machine learning
8.1  Introduction
Personalized or stratified medicine has been one of the hot topics in health care, 
reaching well beyond the launch of the Precision Medicine Initiative in the United 
States (Collins and Varmus 2010). The promise of personalized medicine is to iden-
tify individuals at risk and find optimally tailored health care solutions based on 
their genetic and environmental makeup (Lu et al. 2014). Although personal medi-
cine spans over a variety of medical and biological disciplines, two subfields are 
particularly promising due to their growing adoption: genetics and neuroscience. 
Indeed, many current examples of precision medicine come from pharmacogenom-
ics in general, specifically from oncology, where cancer treatments are picked to 
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match the mutations found in tumours (Kummar et al. 2015; Smith 2012; Tan and 
Du 2012).
While this use of genetic data in health care is projected to become more central 
in the next years, its success will depend on multiple factors. As for most things in 
healthcare, cost plays a huge role. But while the costs for performing a high preci-
sion medical examination, like a brain scan, or sequencing a human genome con-
tinue to drop (Wetterstrand 2018), their usefulness is bound by both our ability to 
quickly process these large amounts of data as well as the lack of medically-relevant 
scientific knowledge we have about individual genetic variants (Dewey et al. 2014), 
or complex neurobiological processes. As such it is key that science be able to gen-
erate genetic knowledge more quickly (Kohane 2015).
Two recent trends in science, big data and artificial intelligence, appear to be 
promising for not only accelerating our genomic and neurobiological understanding 
but also for diagnosing in a precision medicine framework (Moon et  al. 2007; 
Dilsizian and Siegel 2014). The idea is that artificial intelligence can be used to 
mine large data sets to find the smallest associations between genetic variants / neu-
romarkers and disease phenotypes, and to track disease progression or predict opti-
mal treatments. To effectively create such large data collections it thus becomes 
central to link and share individual data sets (Kohane 2015). But while the total 
number of basepairs sequenced per time as well as the total number of participants 
included in neuroscientific studies have exponentially increased over the last years, 
sharing practices for such data has not kept up a similar speed (Kovalevskaya et al. 
2016), despite individual efforts to enable open sharing of genetic (Mao et al. 2016; 
Greshake et al. 2014) or neuroscientific (Poline et al. 2012) data.
8.2  Sharing Genomic Data
To alleviate these shortcomings individual academic consortia have been founded to 
pool data sets across institutions and individual researchers. National efforts include 
the UK10K (“UK10K” 2018), which aimed to sequence 10,000 participants in the 
United Kingdom and the similarly structured 100,000 Genomes Project by Genomics 
England (“Genomics England” 2018). In the United States, the Exome Aggregation 
Consortium (ExAC) (“ExAC” 2018) – which has collected over 60,000 exomes - 
and more recently the All of Us initiative (“All of Us” 2018) are collecting and 
aggregating more patient data for research purposes. And it  is not only academic 
research that is starting to collect large data sets for personalized medicine, com-
mercial companies are starting to explore the field too.
Since deCODE Genetics and 23andMe released the first Direct-To-Consumer 
genetic tests back in 2007 (Vorhaus 2010), the market for commercial genetic test-
ing has grown significantly: Not only in terms of companies like MyHeritage, 
FamilyTreeDNA, AncestryDNA or Veritas that have entered the market, but also in 
terms of the number of people who have gotten genetic tests through these services. 
Today, AncestryDNA has over five million customers and industry veteran 23andMe 
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has genetic data for over two million people (McAllister 2017). These sizable com-
mercial databases are of interest to academic and commercial researchers. 23andMe 
has collaborated with academic researchers on numerous research papers (“23andMe 
Research” 2018) and has done commercial for-profit collaborations with pharma-
ceutical companies like Pfizer and Genentech.
Who profits from such large-scale research remains open. As an example, in 
psychology the need to look into how representative study participants are has been 
acknowledged. After all, around 80% of all participants in psychology studies are 
from WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) countries and 
do thus not represent human diversity (Henrich et al. 2010). As such, only WEIRD 
participants can fully profit from much of psychological research. To avoid the over-
representation of WEIRD individuals found in psychology, it is key that our genetic 
research data resources reflect human diversity across populations. Indeed, this 
issue of representativeness becomes even more central in the genetic framework of 
Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS). These studies are commonly used to 
inform personalized medicine by identifying genetic risk factors, e.g. for cancer 
(Agyeman and Ofori-Asenso 2015). Unfortunately, most of these identified risk fac-
tors are mere correlations, not genes directly causing a disease. As these correla-
tions depend on the ancestry context in which they were found, findings of a GWAS 
are not necessarily applicable outside the human population in which an association 
was initially found (Bush et  al. 2012) and cannot be replicated in many cases 
(Marigorta et al. 2013).
Indeed, many data sharing efforts show such a lack of population diversity: More 
than 50% of the over 60,000 samples in the ExAC consortium come from a European 
population (“ExAC” 2018). Similarly, commercial databases like the ones of 
23andMe suffer from ancestry and race biases (“Problems with 23andMe Ancestry 
Composition” 2015; Euny Hong 2016). Open genomic databases – like the Personal 
Genome Projects and openSNP – are not fairing much better: 75% of participants in 
one of Harvard’s Personal Genome Project studies identified as white (Mao et al. 
2016) and amongst a survey of over 500 openSNP participants over 70% come from 
the US, UK and Canada. Additionally, over 75% of openSNP participants had at 
least a Bachelor’s degree, hinting at a highly skewed demographic (Haeusermann 
et al. 2017).
8.3  Sharing Neurobiological Data
Similar to genetics, neuroscience has gone a long way when it comes to data shar-
ing: While initial attempts to share data mainly focused on post-processed data, like 
coordinate-based results or statistical maps of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
(Fox and Lancaster 2002), more recent initiatives enable sharing of entire functional 
or structural MRI datasets (Gorgolewski et al. 2015; Poldrack et al. 2013) and mag-
neto- or electro- encephalography (M/EEG) data (Niso et al. 2016).
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As in the case of psychology and genomics, neuroscience research is largely 
based on data of individuals from WEIRD societies (Falk et al. 2013), despite a 
plethora of studies showing that brain development is affected by socioeconomic 
status, early life stress, or cultural differences (Hackman et al. 2010; Marshall et al. 
2018; Chan et al. 2018; Duval et al. 2017; Liddell and Jobson 2016). Indeed, within 
or across household socio-economic variables during childhood, such as family 
income, parental education (Ellwood-Lowe et al. 2018; Weissman et al. 2018) or 
neighbourhood poverty levels (Marshall et al. 2018), can be traced on trajectories of 
brain development, and result in differences in brain structure (Ellwood-Lowe et al. 
2018) and cognitive functions (Hackman and Farah 2018), or gene expression 
(Parker et  al. 2017). Differences in brain networks according to socio-economic 
status are also evident during adolescence (Weissman et al. 2018) and adulthood 
(Chan et al. 2018).
Furthermore, culture has been shown to influence neural functions (Liddell and 
Jobson 2016). Cultural and ethnic differences have an impact on emotion perception 
and expression, and brain responses to emotional or social cues (Derntl et al. 2012). 
Moreover, ethnic differences have been found in physiological responses to fear or 
novelty (Martínez et al. 2014; Kredlow et al. 2017), which are commonly used to 
assess anxiety or post-traumatic stress disorders (Bach et al. 2017). This situation is 
aggravated by the fact that ethnicity can influence skin conductance responses 
(Kredlow et al. 2017), which are commonly used as laboratory measurements of 
fear mechanisms (Tzovara et al. 2018), potentially leading to the exclusion of eth-
nicities despite being at higher risk e.g. for post-traumatic stress disorders (Roberts 
et al. 2011).
How much existing data sharing efforts for neuroscience are affected by these 
biases is hard to estimate at this point: Although these initiatives generally tend to 
support standardized data formats for data sharing (Niso et al. 2018; Gorgolewski 
et  al. 2016), they only rarely include concrete guidelines for reporting of socio- 
demographic variables (Madan 2017).
8.4  Data Sharing as a Social Movement
All of this paints a bleak picture: The populations we are using to develop personal-
ized medicine are highly WEIRD (Henrich et al. 2010). Even worse, we might often 
not even be aware of this, as we are not collecting the needed demographic data to 
identify our biases. Depending on the field, research studies can furthermore only 
contain small sample sizes, making it hard to evaluate how ethnicity or social fac-
tors influence neurobiological functions and gene expression. Only by sharing 
diverse datasets, and including rich demographic information will it be possible to 
make our understanding of disease progression, and neurobiological functions rel-
evant for all individuals, irrespective of their social or ethnic background.
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Back in 2005, Thomas Friedman firmly believed that next great breakthrough in 
bioscience could come from a 15-year-old who downloads the human genome in 
Egypt (Pink 2005). Today, we have to acknowledge that there is a good chance that 
this 15-year-old would not be able to profit from their own breakthrough. Because 
of this, we are still far away from a truly personalized medicine, making our per-
sonal data political. It is up to us, the generators of data and the people sharing data 
to work on changing this, ensuring that the promise of personalized medicine is 
equitable. Or to say it with Carol Hanisch’s words: There are no personal solutions 
at this time. There is only collective action for a collective solution (Hanisch 1969).
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Chapter 9
Personal Data Cooperatives – A New Data 
Governance Framework for Data 
Donations and Precision Health
Ernst Hafen
Abstract Personalized health research depends on aggregated sets of personal data 
from millions of people. Given that personal data can be copied, individuals are 
entitled to copies of their data and individuals are the ultimate aggregators of all 
their personal data, citizens are elevated to new roles at the center of health research 
and a novel personal data economy. There, citizens, not some multinational com-
pany, control the use of and benefit from the intellectual and economic value of 
these data. Here, I show that democratically controlled nonprofit personal data 
cooperatives provide a governance and trust framework for data sharing and data 
donation. They also provide a means of attaining improved precision health and a 
digital society in which socio-economic asymmetries can be balanced.
Keywords Personal data · Electronic health records · EHR · Data portability · 
Data protection regulation · Empowerment · Cooperatives · Common good · Public 
health · Precision medicine · Artificial intelligence
9.1  The Unique Features of Personal Data
Medicine is transitioning from a heuristic science that is relying on relatively small 
numbers of cases to an increasingly data driven science involving large numbers of 
cases. Much of the data relevant to health research and efficient healthcare are per-
sonal data. These include data stored in medical records, registry databases and 
increasingly personal data recorded by patients/citizens themselves with the sensors 
in their smartphones. The challenges in using these data for research and better 
healthcare span from issues such as data silos, interoperability, data accessibility 
and obtaining the consent of individuals to access and use their data. Before 
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addressing these issues and offering at least partial solutions, I would like to high-
light three special features of personal data: (1) Personal data, like other data, once 
generated, can easily be copied at near zero marginal costs. The copies can be used 
for different purposes. Data are a non-rivalrous good. Therefore, it is difficult to talk 
about data ownership. The doctor is bound by law to keep medical records for 
15 years. Patients in most countries, however, have the right to obtain a copy of their 
medical records. (2) Personal data, or copies thereof, are a new asset class (World 
Economic Forum 2011). They comprise one of the few assets that are fairly equally 
distributed among people. All humans are billionaires in genome data since their 
genomes contain a unique set of six billion base pairs of DNA. Likewise, people 
have similar numbers of heart beats, steps and they consume a similar number of 
meals and liters of water. It is clear that access to resources like food and data is 
currently not equally distributed around the world. However, the rapid spread of 
smartphones and broadband internet in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) 
has the potential to change this in the near future. (3) Individuals are the ultimate 
aggregators of their data. Only they will be in a position to aggregate data from their 
medical records, their genome data, their shopping data and their smartphone data. 
This is of course under the provision that they can obtain a copy of all these data. A 
right that, as we will see, has been strengthened greatly by the European General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (De Hert et al. 2017). The fact that data can be 
copied, data are equally distributed amongst individuals and that each individual is 
the ultimate aggregator of the data, forms a basis for a new role for patients and 
healthy individuals at the center of health research, prevention and care.
9.2  The Need – Aggregated Datasets on Millions of People
The human genome can be compared with the operating system of a smartphone. A 
smartphone app interacts with the operating system and produces a certain effect 
(e.g. recording and visualizing one’s daily steps). A drug interferes with the human 
operating system to elicit an effect (e.g. relief of pain). We may ask why it takes two 
weeks to develop a smartphone app at a cost of $ 20,000, whereas it takes 15 years 
and $ 2bn to develop a drug. Moreover, we can expect the app to work on all smart-
phones using the same operating system, while drugs only work less than 50 percent 
of the time (Chhibber et al. 2014). Of course, the reasons for this difference are 
manifold. Above all is the fact that the smartphone operating systems were engi-
neered and are thus completely understood, whereas the human operating system is 
a product of evolution (i.e. random mutations and natural selection evolution). 
Another difference, however, is that the copies of the operating system on smart-
phones are identical, whereas the human genomes of individuals differ in 1/1000 
base pairs. The effectivity of drugs in pairs of identical twins is significantly higher 
than in fraternal twins or unrelated people (Chhibber et al. 2014). To improve the 
odds of medicine we need to learn how differences in genomes in combination with 
differences in environmental and behavioral factors affect health, disease and the 
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treatment of disease. In other words, we need to make correlations between geno-
types (genome) and phenotypes (health status) for millions of people. This is only 
possible with the active participation of the individuals as the rightful data aggrega-
tors and data access controllers themselves.
9.3  The Opportunity – The Legal Right of Citizens to Obtain 
Copies of Their Personal Data and Their Willingness 
to Contribute These Data to Research
9.3.1  The European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) – Data Portability
The new European Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) specifies in Article 20 the 
right of citizens to data portability permitting them to obtain machine readable cop-
ies of all their personal data (De Hert et al. 2017). This includes data on social net-
works, shopping data, medical, education data and other data. Initially planned as a 
way to create competition among data collectors in much the same way mobile 
phone providers guarantee that one’s smartphone number is portable when chang-
ing providers, it results in a true empowerment of citizens in a data-driven environ-
ment. While individuals have little secondary use for their mobile phone numbers, 
they can aggregate and use copies of their medical, shopping, genome and fitness 
data in a variety of different ways. For example, they can actively participate in 
research projects by making their aggregated data sets accessible or they can profit 
from personalized data analysis services via apps provided by companies.
9.3.2  The Willingness and the Right to Citizen Science
There is a great willingness of people to actively participate and contribute to scien-
tific research. This is evident from the millions of people who contribute their time, 
knowledge and data to citizen science platforms such as Zooniverse.org. On this 
platform, people help to annotate galaxies or wild-life in webcam images from the 
Serengeti, transcribe weather reports from old ship log books for oceanic climate 
information and annotate histological sections for the existence of cancer cells. 
Increasingly, people also contribute to science not only as data scientists as in the 
above examples but also by directly collecting and contributing their own data to 
scientific projects. For example, the large majority of patients consent to using their 
medical data for medical research. At the university hospital in Lausanne a recent 
study showed that over 80 percent of the cancer patients provide a general consent 
for using their data including genome data for research (Mooser and Currat 2014). 
The willingness to contribute personal data to research is by no means limited to 
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patients. Surveys with university students or elderly people who attend university 
programs for the elderly showed that roughly 60 percent would order a direct to 
consumer genetic test. The ability to support scientific research was mentioned by 
more people than to find out more about one’s own genetic health risks (Vayena 
et al. 2014). Millions of citizens have even given their genome information to com-
mercial companies such as 23andme.com or ancestry.com, even though they had to 
agree that their data is used commercially for the benefit of the companies’ share-
holders. Giving citizens the right to aggregate and control sharing of their personal 
data empowers them to become active participants in science (Vayena and Tasioulas 
2016). In doing so, health relevant data collected continuously with smartphone 
sensors can be combined with medical and other data. The active participation in 
research projects also provides an excellent means to improve the scientific literacy 
of citizens and patients.
9.4  The Challenge
Smartphones have been available for more than 10 years and medical records also 
have existed, at least in some countries, in digital forms for even longer. Why then 
have citizens and patients not taken a more active role in managing their personal 
data and contributing to research? The reasons lie at least in part in the dynamics of 
the nascent personal data economy. Internet and social media companies, as well as 
app providers, provide their services for free in exchange for personal data. Because 
of the ease of use we have gotten used to paying for digital services with our per-
sonal data. These data fuel a nascent and rapidly growing personal data economy 
that is largely controlled by large multinational companies and data brokers. The 
value lies in the aggregation of these different data types for the purpose of digital 
and personalized advertising (Lanier 2010). As the recent case of Cambridge 
Analytica and Facebook shows, these data are increasingly also used for more sub-
tle psychological manipulation including influencing political voting behavior 
(Dehaye 2017). Moreover, the companies controlling the largest amounts of data 
will have the best resource to train their artificial intelligence algorithms, thereby 
further increasing the socio-economic asymmetry between individuals all over the 
world and a few multinational companies (Haynes and Nguyen 2013; Lee 2017).
In the case of medical records, these are often locked in incompatible data silos 
in hospitals and the private practices of physicians. Even in countries where elec-
tronic health records (EHR) have been established, patients can access the records 
and make them accessible to other healthcare providers only for the primary use of 
the data, i.e. healthcare. There are few options to actively decide on the secondary 
use of these personal data for medical research or other data services. In order to 
aggregate medical and other health-related data under the control of the individual, 
a new governance framework that provides trust and empowerment for citizens/
patients to aggregate and actively manage the access to their data is needed.
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9.5  The Solution – Data Cooperatives and Personal Data, 
a Perfect Match
We posit that citizen-owned nonprofit data cooperatives provide the basis for a dem-
ocratically controlled and fair personal data ecosystem from which society at large 
will profit. Democratic governance and self-help are part of the DNA of coopera-
tives and this sets them apart from other organizational forms including foundation 
and shareholder-controlled companies. The match between cooperative governance 
and personal data control rests on the three unique features of personal data.
First, data can be copied and individuals possess the right to obtain a digital copy 
of all their personal data according to the data portability article of the EU 
GDPR. This offers the possibility for a new parallel personal data ecosystem under 
the control of the citizens without directly interfering with the current personal data 
economy. Second, the fact that all people have similar amounts of personal data 
aligns well with the democratic one-member-one-vote governance of cooperatives. 
Third, the fact that individuals are the ultimate aggregators of their personal data 
offers the opportunity for entirely new data services, artificial intelligence and 
research on different data types that hitherto have been locked in different silos or 
whose access without the consent of the data subject is protected.
Data cooperatives operate a secure IT platform on which individuals can store, 
manage and control access to all their data copies. Much like the case of financial 
bank accounts, individual data account holders are in complete control over the use 
of their data. In contrast to most of the current banking software where administra-
tors have access to customer data, however, in the personal data platform each 
record is encrypted and only the account holder has the key. Therefore, neither the 
administrator of the IT platform nor the management of the cooperative has access 
to the data. Account holders can become members of the cooperative and in this way 
also participate in the democratic governance of the cooperative. Their duties 
include the election of the board of the cooperative and to vote on how proceeds are 
invested (Hafen et al. 2014).
9.5.1  Data Cooperatives, Business Model, Non-profit, 
Financial Incentives
Data cooperatives act as the fiduciary of their respective account holders’ data. 
When individuals make part or all their data accessible for academic or pharmaceu-
tical research or for data services from other companies, the management of the 
cooperative negotiates access to these data with the researchers, pharmaceutical or 
data companies. It ensures that data access is fair. For example, data accessed by a 
data company providing a mobile app must not be sold to third parties, as is the case 
currently with all the “free” apps in the app stores. For research projects and clinical 
trials the cooperative ensures that the results generated with these personal data will 
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be published irrespective of whether the results are positive or negative, and that 
copies of the data generated during the project will be returned to the individuals’ 
accounts. It will also negotiate a fair price for data access by third parties. This can 
be a fee on mobile apps running on its platform, or for the recruitment of patients 
for clinical trials.
Will this cooperative model be profitable? The personal data economy, also 
called the digital identity economy, with the currently freely accessible data via 
social media, free apps and internet access is projected to reach a market volume of 
€ 1 billion in 2020 in Europe (The Boston Consulting Group 2012). This figure does 
not include medical data, access to which is restricted by data protection laws. 
Combining these different data types under the control of the individuals will gener-
ate a vastly larger market value of which data cooperatives will obtain a significant 
share. By acting as the fiduciary of people’s data and their decisions as to who and 
for what purpose their data can be accessed, data cooperatives negotiate the terms 
for data access with industrial partners, including pharmaceutical companies and 
data companies. The revenues generated from data access and also from the recruit-
ment of consenting participants for clinical trials will be used to maintain and 
develop the platform, regular security checks and data services on the platform. 
Moreover, members of the cooperative will be able to vote on which research funds 
or data services revenues will be objects for investment. The nonprofit character of 
the data cooperative model specifies that these financial benefits will go back to 
society and not to the individuals who make their data accessible. There are two 
arguments for this statement, which at first glance may appear somewhat counterin-
tuitive. First, although the aggregated data set of an individual is more valuable than 
the partial aggregates that companies and institutions possess of the same individ-
ual, the societal, intellectual and economic value lies not in the data set of a single 
individual but in those of all the participating individuals. We argue that this value 
should be returned to society at large. A distribution of dividends to members of the 
cooperative would be unfair, since many account holders may not want to become 
members and would therefore not profit from these dividends. Second, offering 
financial incentives for data sharing corrupts the motivation for sharing in much the 
same way blood donations work better without financial incentives (Sandel 2012).
9.5.2  Challenges to the Cooperative Model
Even though in general financial cooperatives fared better in the financial crisis than 
shareholder-controlled companies, there are plenty of reports about the failure of 
cooperatives (Birchall 2013). The establishment of personal data cooperatives faces 
two main challenges. First, establishing a truly participatory democratic governance 
with large numbers of members requires new tools such as liquid democracy, also 
called delegative or proxy democracy (Rutt 2018). Second, a major challenge for 
cooperatives is the initial financing. Even though data cooperatives will be hugely 
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profitable with millions of account holders actively sharing data, establishing the 
platform, the initial services that provide a benefit for the users and the legal frame-
work for the cooperative and data governance are challenging. In contrast to 
shareholder- controlled companies, cooperatives cannot give equity to financial 
investors, since they are owned by their respective members. Thus, cooperatives 
require initial financial support from foundations, from philanthropists and through 
research grants. Crowd financing is an obvious option but that would also require 
some tangible short term benefits for it to succeed.
9.5.3  Example: MIDATA Data Cooperative
The MIDATA cooperative is a first example of a data cooperative that shows how 
data can be used for the common good, while at the same time ensuring the citizens’ 
sovereignty over their personal data. Founded in 2015, the non-profit cooperative 
operates a data platform, acts as a trustee for data collection and guarantees the 
sovereignty of citizens over the use of their data. The citizens actively contribute to 
research as users of the platform by providing access to data sets and as cooperative 
members to control and develop the cooperative. Currently, the Swiss MIDATA 
cooperative accepts only residents of Switzerland. With partners in Germany, 
Belgium, the  Netherlands and the United Kingdom, we are setting up MIDATA 
cooperatives in these countries.
The articles of association of the cooperative define its nature as a non-profit 
organization and enshrine the sovereignty of users over their data and its use (includ-
ing use in anonymized form). An internal cooperative data ethics review board, 
whose members are elected by the general assembly, controls the ethical quality of 
the services and related projects. Members and non-members of the cooperative can 
open an account and possess the same rights on the platform. Members participate 
also in the governance of the platform.
9.5.4  The Data Platform and Governance Form the Core 
of a New Innovation Ecosystem
The data platform used by MIDATA is being developed by ETH Zürich and the 
Bern University of Applied Sciences. It allows citizens to collect their health data 
and to freely decide on the use of that data in research projects. They can thus play 
an active role in medical research as “citizen scientists”.
The platform model allows the separation of the IT platform (data storage, access 
and consent management) from the data applications (mobile applications) and 
thus enables an open innovation ecosystem. Users will have access to various data 
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services and can decide to participate in research projects. Start-ups, IT service 
 providers and research groups can offer mobile apps on the platform, for example, 
health apps or apps for the management of chronic diseases.
The IT platform is operational and is currently being used in several data science 
projects. In one project, patients after a gastric bypass operation record their condi-
tion, fitness and weight at home and share the data with the attending physician at 
the Bern University Hospital. In another project at the Zürich University Hospital, 
patients suffering from multiple sclerosis are testing the effect of treatments using a 
tablet app that assesses their cognitive and motor status. In the allyscience.ch proj-
ect, people suffering from hay fever record their symptoms and contribute to a 
Swiss-wide allergy map in relation to pollen data provided by Meteo Swiss. More 
than 8,000 people have downloaded the AllyScience App and actively contribute as 
citizen scientists to this project.
9.6  Data Cooperatives and Data Donations
In the Middle Ages, feudal lords argued that they could not pay their serfs money 
for their work since the serfs could not handle the responsibility and would imme-
diately spend it on drink and women. Today, most people in high income countries 
have a bank account and decide how to invest or spend their money. This forms the 
basis of our current economy and the globally improved standards of living. 
Inheritance of financial assets is also clearly regulated. In 5–10 years, people will 
possess their own data bank account and decide to whom and for what purpose they 
will provide access to their data. As in the case of banks today, there will be different 
business models for such data banks. Some may offer citizens financial incentives 
and maximize the profits for shareholders, others will be non-profit cooperatives 
whose revenues will be invested for the common good. Personal data is much more 
personal than money. Trust will be the most essential factor in generating a citizen- 
controlled personal data economy. In such a trusted environment people will become 
active contributors and actors in the digital society. By learning the benefit of data 
sharing for public health and as well as their own health and wellbeing they will be 
prepared do donate their data post mortem for the common good.
Even though the digital revolution threatens to further increase the global digital 
dependence of individuals from data and AI service providing companies and aug-
ment the socio-economic asymmetries, it also offers a new avenue out of this depen-
dency. With their unique personal data assets, individuals can help to democratize 
the personal data economy and contribute to John Rawls’ vision of the most just 
form of society, a property-owning democracy in which people possess not only a 
political but also an economic vote (Rawls 2009). With their personal data, citizens 
all over the world now possess an equally distributed economic value that in combi-
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Chapter 10
Defining Data Donation After Death: 
Metadata, Families, Directives, Guardians 
and the Route to Big Consent
David M. Shaw
Abstract This chapter explores what we actually mean by data donation after 
death, and what different types of data donation metadata are involved in the pro-
cess. It then provides an analysis of the ethical ramifications of each of these differ-
ent types of data, outlines the concepts of data advance directives and data donation 
guardians as one way of dealing with these issues, and considers alternative gover-
nance mechanisms. The degree of control given to the first data donors may need to 
be high in order to maintain trust, but over time attitudes may evolve towards every-
one giving “big consent” to data donation.
Keywords Data donation after death · Ethics · Big consent · Posthumous data 
donation · Advance directives · Data guardians
10.1  Introduction
With the advent of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU 2016) and 
the Cambridge Analytica scandal (Schenble et al. 2018), public awareness of the 
issues surrounding data governance has never been higher. The GDPR aims to bet-
ter protect citizens’ data rights, while also enabling research and other important 
activities to proceed under certain conditions. In this context, the very idea of data 
donation might seem naïve; who would want to donate sensitive data, when ‘dona-
tion’ implies an unconditional gift for the recipient to dispose of as he or she pleases? 
Data donation after death might be seen as more attractive because the donor can no 
longer be directly affected by (mis-)use of data, but dead people also cannot raise 
concerns about any such misuse. In this chapter, I explore what is actually meant by 
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“data donation after death” (DDD), and analyse the advantages and disadvantages 
of various potential governance mechanisms.
I begin by setting out what is meant by DDD in general terms, before illustrating 
the issues by means of comparison with the established practice of posthumous 
organ donation. I then explain and analyse the ethical ramifications of the five main 
types of data donation metadata: whether the related item of medical data can be 
shared at all, who else is affected by the data, with whom the data can be shared, in 
what form the data can be shared, and who has authority to change any of the previ-
ous four ‘settings’. I then sketch the outlines of a potential system whereby donors 
could impose certain conditions on their data donations. I conclude by considering 
alternative forms of governance, including ethical oversight of unconditional DDD.
10.2  Defining Data Donation After Death
When people die they leave lots of data behind. This includes financial data, data on 
social media, governmental and tax data, and personally owned data including (for 
example) electronic movies and songs, and in some cases creative data such as 
songs and literary compositions. But for the purposes of this paper, I focus on clini-
cal data and medical research data. When a patient dies he leaves behind not only a 
medical record, but also any data used in research projects. Despite the person’s 
departure, this data remains an immensely powerful resource, particularly if it can 
be combined with other datasets. (Indeed, in many cases the nature of the person’s 
departure will also be a relevant data point, if disease linked.) But how can this data 
be donated? The simplest way to explain DDD is to use organ donation as an exam-
ple. There are many parallels but also some dissimilarities between DDD and 
deceased donation of organs (DDO) (Shaw et al. 2015). Both the similarities and the 
differences are helpful in terms of determining how we should think about DDD and 
how it should be governed.
In DDO, organs are donated after one’s death and distributed among one or more 
recipients. Consent can come from the donor, via the organ donor register, or from 
a family member, where there is no record of consent. In ‘opt-out’ jurisdictions 
consent can also be ‘deemed’ or presumed if there is no record of objection. It is 
important to note that, despite having no legal right to do so, family members often 
overrule donation even when there is evidence of consent (NHSBT 2017) – this may 
also be relevant to data donation. DDO is essentially unconditional; no terms can be 
imposed on who or what type of person can receive the organs (to avoid any dis-
criminatory criteria being imposed), and there are no guarantees that any organs will 
be transplanted at all. However, donors can stipulate which organs they want to 
donate; most donors donate all organs, but some choose not to donate specific 
organs such as the eyes, or the heart.
Should DDD be approached in the same way as DDO? In both cases the patient 
is dead, and if the language of donation is being used then presumably consent must 
be given – or at least presumed. Should data donors be able to stipulate who they 
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donate to, or what types of data? To answer these questions and others we first need 
to consider the various types of data donation metadata.
10.3  Data Donation Metadata
For each item of data in a person’s medical record, or associated research data, there 
could be several items of metadata indicating that donor’s preferences regarding 
how their data should be used, and setting the terms of their donation. Specifically, 
each piece of data could(at least) five key data concerning it: whether it can be 
shared at all; who (if anyone) else it concerns; who it can be shared with; what form 
it can be shared in; and who (if anyone) needs to give consent for any other type of 
sharing (see Box 10.1). Each of these must be examined in turn.
First, a person might not want some categories of data to be shared at all. This is 
most likely to be the case for sensitive sexual health data, or genetic data, which 
could yield paternity information relevant to other family members. If a category of 
data is excluded from sharing with anyone, there need be no data regarding it in the 
second, third or fourth categories of metadata, though there should also be a corre-
sponding entry for the fifth type, as a representative might be empowered to give 
future consent for this type of data to be shared.
Box 10.1: Data Donation Metadata
Whether it can be shared
Who (if anyone) else it concerns
Who it can be shared with
What form it can be shared in
Who needs to give consent for any other type of sharing
Second, medical data can concern not only the patient to whom it pertains 
directly, but also his or her family. Though it can also concern other types of medical 
data, this is particularly true of genetic data. A well-meaning data donor might not 
consider the fact that if he makes an unconditional donation, it could reveal that his 
son or daughter also has (or is likely to have) a particular genetic condition, with 
potential ramifications for privacy and insurance. Should people be able to donate 
their genetic data when they die? It is “theirs” but it also concerns others, even if this 
is only in terms of probabilities rather than certainties in many cases, due to genetic 
data often yielding no definitive answer. In organ donation, families often refuse to 
give consent to donation or overrule consent because they are upset by the idea of 
losing ‘more’ of their relative. Should families have a right to veto data donation, at 
least in terms of genetic data? In organ donation there is normally little ethical basis 
for a genuine overrule of what the patient wanted (UKDEC 2016), but given that 
genetic information can apply to other family members, there are potentially more 
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solid grounds for legitimate objection. Another possibility would be for the rights of 
families to be protected by some oversight mechanism such as an ethics committee, 
but this might be impractical (see next section). (As noted above, non-genetic health 
information can also yield information on family members; for instance, if a 
deceased patient had a history of heart disease, this information might be of use to 
insurers. However, genetic information can reveal definitively whether offspring 
have or do not have a particular condition, and thus might be regarded as more 
sensitive.)
Third, people might be happy to donate their medical data posthumously, but not 
without imposing conditions on who can access that data. For example, evidence 
from a large UK study suggests that (living) citizens are generally happy to share 
their data with the National Health Service and associated researchers, rather less 
happy to share data with university researchers, and downright unhappy to share 
data with private companies such as the large pharmaceutical ones (Wellcome 
2013). People might be more relaxed about sharing data posthumously, but they 
might also want to exert some degree of control over the potential recipients of their 
data. If people are denied this control, they might simply refuse to donate any data 
at all; this was one of the unfortunate features of the ill-fated care.data initiative in 
England, where patients only had a binary option: either all their data was shared, or 
none of it at all (Shaw 2014). However, one problem with limiting the recipients of 
data in this way is that industry often collaborates with the National Health Service 
(NHS), and vice versa. Ultimately, it transpired that even this simple binary option 
was too complex; those who opted out had their data shared anyway, indicating the 
lack of seriousness accorded to data consent in the NHS (Ramesh 2015).
Fourth, data can be shared in four main forms: fully identifiable, de-identified, 
pseudonymised and fully anonymised. Fully identifiable data reveals a donor’s 
name, date of birth, address, demographics and full medical history. Anonymised 
data reveals only the medical history, with no location or other data revealed. 
De-identified data removes personal and demographic information. Pseudonymised 
information is anonymized data that can be re-linked to patient identifiers using an 
encoded key (Ohmann et al. 2017). People might be reluctant to share the first of 
these, but be more content with sharing of pseudonymised data. Generally, people 
are more comfortable sharing anonymised data as it cannot be linked back to them 
(Wellcome 2013), but they might be more comfortable sharing de-identified or fully 
identifiable data in the case of DDD because there is (even) less risk of any adverse 
consequences to donors who are dead; however, the potential risk to surviving fam-
ily members remains. It is important to note that in the era of big data and machine 
learning, de-identified and even anonymised data could potentially be linked with 
other datasets and thus to specific donors, so the distinctions between these four 
forms of data are being eroded (Schneble et al. 2018).
Fifth, donors might want to grant authority to a trusted person or organisation to 
give consent to other future uses of the donated data. This might be prudent because 
once a person is dead, she can obviously no longer be involved in any such decisions, 
and circumstances might mean that she would have wanted to change something 
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were she not dead. By donating, donors give consent to any uses of his or her data 
within the terms set in their metadata (perhaps subject to further safeguards – see 
next section). The nominated person would not be required to give consent to all 
uses of data, but would be approached where a project outwith the scope of the 
donor’s metadata settings wanted to use data.
Finally, it is also important to bear in mind that all of these metadata are inter-
linked. For example, a person might be happy to share anonymised general medical 
data with everyone, but restrict use of identifiable medical data and any genetic data 
to the NHS. They might also be willing to grant authority for a trusted person or 
organisation to change their preferences for some types of data, but not for all.
10.4  Data Advance Directives
What is the best way to record one’s data donation preference metadata? I have 
previously suggested a data donor card similar to an organ donor card (Shaw et al. 
2015) but an instrument for setting preferences in advance already exists in medi-
cine: the advance directive. A data advance directive (DAD) would record all the 
relevant information mentioned in the previous section, setting the defaults for use 
of that donor’s data.
Setting up a DAD would be a one-time procedure, thought it could of course be 
altered at any point up to a person’s death. Users would be guided through setting 
up each metadata preference via a decision tree for ease of use. From the initial 
question  - something like “would you like to share your data after death to help 
researchers?” - questions would probably best be focused on categories of medical 
and research data, with each group of data having its own metadata preferences as 
set out above. The second category, regarding who else data concerns, would not be 
available as a preference but would be set by system guardians. Depending on the 
jurisdiction, it is possible that genetic data could be shared only with the permission 
of family members. Thus for each type of data, the user could determine whether to 
share it at all, and if so (and dependent on whether it also concerns family members) 
who it can be shared with, in what form, and whether the terms they set for the use 
of their data can be altered in future by a designated person.
10.5  Posthumous Data Guardians
As stated above, DADs will go a long way towards governing deceased persons’ 
data responsibly. But the final part of setting up a DAD should be to nominate a 
survivor who can be consulted above any exceptions to the set terms, or potentially 
to change them permanently. These Posthumous Data Guardians (PDGs) would 
perform an important backup role, made all the more significant by ongoing rapid 
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advances in data handling techniques. For example, it might be that in 10 years the 
category of “de-identified” data will disappear entirely, necessitating a change in 
DAD preferences to reflect what that user would probably have wanted to do in 
such circumstances. In addition, some people might not want to set up a DAD, 
preferring to delegate responsibility for posthumous use of their data to a surrogate. 
This could be implemented as an option, but would require this person to be con-
tacted for each potential data useage, which would really mean that the data was not 
donated at all.
10.6  Objections
The combination of DADs and PDGs offers a flexible way for donors to set their 
preferences and safeguard their (and their families’) interests after they die. The 
main objection to the metadata, DAD and PDG proposal detailed above is that dona-
tion should be unconditional, for two main reasons: enabling preference-setting 
would be against the spirit of donation, and that it would be much more practical to 
simply have donation of all data.
Is enabling some preferences to be set against the spirit of donation? As already 
mentioned, organ donors can choose which organs to donate. When people die they 
can allocate their financial reserves and possessions to wherever they want. Data is 
highly personal, and if people want to set limits on its use after they are dead, there 
must be a strong argument against letting them do so – not least because removing 
the ability to set preferences will push people towards refusing entirely to donate 
their data.
The second argument about practicality has more force. The more preferences 
that can be set, the more complicated it is for researchers to combine datasets and 
some patients’ data might be rendered entirely inaccessible. But as stated above, it 
might be even less practical to alienate donors by not enabling preference-setting.
One other possibility in addition to DADs and PDGs would be to enable donors 
to set a “data death date” beyond which their data can no longer be used  – for 
example, at 50 years after death. This would set a final boundary on the use of 
donated data, but it is not obvious that many would find this option attractive. Why 
share data after your death, but only for a limited period? One potential reason 
would be that the the risk of unanticipated types of research using ones’ data might 
increase over time, and a time-limit on its use would decrease this risk. However, 
after decades have passed, a donor’s data could have been aggregated and imbedded 
in thousands of different analyses, and stopping use of it might be highly impracti-
cal even if there was a good reason for allowing donors to set such an expiry date. 
Allowing control so far beyond the grave would also constrain the public benefits 
flowing from the initial donation.
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10.7  Other Governance Mechanisms
Taken together, even for just one person, the amount of data involved in DDD means 
that we are essentially talking about big data, and hence not simply data donation 
but actually ‘big data donation’. That in turn means that what is needed is big data 
protection; protection not only of the data concerning an individual, but also of the 
potential benefit to the public of big data research (Shaw 2017). DAD would be one 
way of providing this. But if we were to reject detailed preference-setting as set out 
above, and aim to embrace a less controlling, more openly altruistic model of data 
donation, what alternative governance mechanisms exist?
One option would be for donation to be regarded as broad consent to future 
research, subject to future research ethics committee (REC)  review. This option 
already exists outwith the context of donation; in many consent forms, participants 
can not only agree to take part in a given study, but also for their data or samples to 
be used in any future study, subject to REC review. This model could work, but suf-
fers from two main drawbacks. First, giving certain limited data and perhaps one or 
two biological samples is rather different from donating all the medical data ever 
generated about yourself. Donating unconditionally all your medical and genetic 
information and trusting RECs to always approve only ‘safe’ projects may be ask-
ing too much of potential donors, particularly in the coming era of ethics review 
equivalency, where some have suggested that additional REC review may not be 
required when new countries start participating in a study. Second, any uncondi-
tional donation will last essentially forever. Setting preferences and nominating a 
guardian at least offers some degree of control over future use of data.
Another alternative would be a move towards not research ethics committees, but 
research ethics communities, where it is assumed that everyone will contribute their 
data both while living and once dead in order to show solidarity with and benefit 
their community (Shaw 2017). This would be the ideal solution; a world in which 
everyone unconditionally donates their data. But it may be unrealistic to try to step 
straight to such a world. The combination of DADs and PDGs in DDD is a safe first 
step towards encouraging people to trust researchers with their data. Following this, 
the use of this preference scheme could be extended to data donation whilst alive, 
before trialling unconditional donation after death and ultimately a community 
where everyone shares their health data all the time. Notably, any such research eth-
ics community would at a stroke solve the issue of family data sharing – if all family 
members share data routinely through solidarity, no concerns about genetic infor-
mation need remain.
However, families remain an issue for unconditional data donation in the present 
day. While many, or even most relatives might be happy for their family members to 
donate genetic and other data when they die, others might not, and it is difficult to 
see how someone can donate data that is not entirely theirs, as it is thus not entirely 
in their gift. The fact that genetic data concerns not only ourselves but also our 
family members may be a significant barrier to the very concept of data donation. 
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It might be objected that family members have no say in whether we share our 
genetic or other medical data while we are alive; why, then, should they have a say 
when we are dead? It is true that each living person is free to share any personal 
medical information that he or she pleases with researchers, without constraint by 
any relatives. However, this is because a living person has certain rights regarding 
his or her data, even if it affects their family members. Once that person is dead, the 
only people that can be directly affected by use of that data are the deceased’s fam-
ily members, and the balance of control should shift accordingly – not entirely to the 
family, but towards shared control over the data.
For this reason it might be better to think in terms of dual consent to data dona-
tion after death, rather than simple data donation after death. A person can consent 
to donation, and this donation can proceed only if potentially affected family mem-
bers also consent. A data donor can consent to use of his or her data, but cannot 
consent regarding data that also concerns family members. Therefore, a type of dual 
consent might be required for full data donation after death. This is unfortunate, but 
the path towards full data sharing will not be paved with good intentions if families 
are not on board with the first models of data donation. Ultimately, as stated above, 
a move towards a research ethics community, where every one is happy to give not 
specific or narrow, nor broad, nor general but ‘big consent’ to all use of all ‘their’ 
big data without restrictions, whether or not it concerns their family members.
10.8  Conclusion
In this paper, I have suggested that, while DDD could ultimately be unconditional, 
any such scheme must begin by allowing donors to set certain preferences. 
Encouraging potential donors to create data advance directives is the first step 
towards a world in which data sharing for the common good is ‘automatic for the 
people’, both in the sense of being a common good, but also being second nature. 
The route to big consent must begin with dual consent to data donation.
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Chapter 11
Enabling Posthumous Medical Data 
Donation: A Plea for the Ethical Utilisation 
of Personal Health Data
Jenny Krutzinna, Mariarosaria Taddeo, and Luciano Floridi
Abstract This article argues that personal medical data should be made available 
for scientific research, by enabling and encouraging individuals to donate their med-
ical records once deceased, in a way similar to how they can already donate organs 
or bodies. This research is part of a project on posthumous medical data donation 
(PMDD) developed by the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet Institute. Ten 
arguments are provided to support the need to foster posthumous medical data 
donation. Two major risks are also identified—harm to others, and lack of control 
over the use of data—which could follow from unregulated donation of medical 
data. The argument that record-based medical research should proceed without 
the need to ask for informed consent is rejected, and it instead a voluntary 
and participatory approach to using personal medical data should be followed. 
The analysis concludes by stressing the need to develop an ethical code for data 
donation to minimise the risks providing five foundational principles for ethical 
medical data donation; and suggesting a draft for such a code.
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Numerous health conditions affecting large parts of the population remain under- 
researched. The consequence is that preventative measures, treatments and/or cures 
are lacking. Some of these illnesses, such as Alzheimer’s dementia or Parkinson’s 
disease, have devastating effects on their sufferers, and currently lack adequate 
treatment. While some progress has been made in discovering genetic or biological 
markers to identify people at greater risk of contracting certain diseases, little is 
known about the interpersonal differences that make someone a sufferer while spar-
ing others with identical markers. Identifying and understanding these underlying 
differences is hard partly because of a lack of relevant data. The data required for 
such scientific progress need to be wide and longitudinal, but this is difficult and 
costly to obtain within traditional clinical research studies. At the same time, some 
data that exist are currently unavailable to research due to the absence of an ade-
quate framework to streamline the currently onerous access procedures. Although 
individuals can volunteer while alive their data to private corporations by accepting 
terms and conditions to this effect, it is not yet possible to give one’s medical data 
(whether during life or after death), for research purposes to a public institution. Nor 
is there any regulatory or ethical framework in place to guide the donation process. 
In this article, we argue that this constitutes an unethical failure to utilise data that 
are of immense value and importance in the quest to improve public health and to 
promote the common good. The focus is on posthumous medical data donation 
(PMDD), which should be enabled as a matter of urgency by putting in place an 
ethical code of PMDD.
The article starts with an outline of what is meant by PMDD, followed by an 
explanation of the reasons for enabling PMDD. These consist of 10 arguments in 
favour of PMDD, as well as arguments against the alternative approach suggested 
by some researchers (e.g. Mann et al. 2016), namely the removal of the need for 
individual informed consent in Big Data health research. Comparing PMDD to 
other types of biomedical donations that already take place, we argue that the 
existing ethical frameworks from other donation schemes provide useful guid-
ance, but do not suffice to ensure ethical PMDD. Therefore, we stress the need to 
define an ethical code specific to PMDD, and propose five foundational principles 
for such a code.
11.2  What Is Posthumous Medical Data Donation?
Posthumous medical data donation (PMDD) refers to the act of donating one’s per-
sonal medical data after death. Medical data is meant to describe here data that are 
routinely collected in a health system, whenever individuals use health services, 
throughout their life. Such data hold enormous potential for medical research and 
for health and care improvements on a large scale. However, personal medical data 
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currently remain mostly inaccessible for researchers due to a lack of enabling regu-
lation. Issues of consent, ownership, and privacy, among others, mean that upon 
death, an individual’s data become ‘locked in’. Depending on the jurisdiction, gain-
ing access for research purposes is cumbersome, if possible at all (Shaw et al. 2015). 
An effective way to solve this problem is by making provisions for enabling the 
donation of one’s own medical data after death. So far, the donation of medical data 
has received limited attention (Shaw et al. 2016).
PMDD is different from medical data sharing,1 which happens while one is alive, 
and from medical data philanthropy, which describes the opening, to external access 
and use, by private companies and public organisations, of their data sets, for chari-
table purposes (Taddeo 2016).2 Data sharing and philanthropy are important sources 
of medical information, but, as we shall argue in the rest of this article, posthumous 
medical data donation is motivated by different reasons, and is less risky and more 
easily achievable than either data sharing or data philanthropy (Table 11.1).
Other types of donation in the medical field are already very common. Indeed, a 
significant part of the medical system relies on donations to save lives, educate and 
teach the medical profession, and advance medical knowledge in general. Examples 
include blood, organ and tissue donations, gamete donations, stem cell and cord 
blood donations, as well as brain and body donations for research and educational 
purposes. It is even possible to donate one’s body for commercial or artistic pur-
poses, albeit controversially, for instance to the anatomist and inventor of plastina-
tion, Gunther von Hagens, and his (in)famous “Body Worlds” exhibition.3
Unlike these types of biomedical donation, the donation of medical data is con-
ceptually problematic: a lack of materiality and the simultaneity of data pose a 
challenge to the notion that data can be “donated” in the conventional sense 
(Prainsack 2018). However, at least in the context of post-mortem donations, the 
use of ‘donation’ appears preferable to more general terms, like ‘sharing’, as the 
former rules out the possibility of a retraction of the data by the donor or of joint 
use with the donor.
When it comes to donating medical data, there are specific subsets of data that 
can currently be donated. One such example is genomic data (Haeusermann et al. 
1 It has been argued that data sharing is a misleading concept and should be abandoned: See “Why 
we should stop talking about data sharing”, Barbara Prainsack, (2015), http://dnadigest.org/why-
we-should-stop-talking-about-data-sharing/ (accessed July 20, 2018).
2 Also see: “Data Philanthropy: Where Are We Now?” United Nations Global Pulse. https://www.
unglobalpulse.org/data-philanthropy-where-are-we-now (accessed March 5, 2018).
3 See https://bodyworlds.com/ (accessed November 5, 2018).
Table 11.1 Differences between data donation, sharing and philanthropy
Data source Dataset
Data donation Deceased individual Single dataset
Data sharing Living individual, researcher Single or multiple
Data philanthropy Institutional Multiple, large-scale
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2017). For instance, the Personal Genome Project enables individuals to “donate” 
their full genome for research purposes.4 Another example is data given during 
participation in medical research projects, studies, or clinical trials. However, the 
donation of a more comprehensive dataset, such as in the form of personal medical 
records (PMRs) has not been systematically enabled so far. The collection and use 
of medical data for research purposes has mostly been via the aforementioned 
patient surveys, clinical studies, and trials. As the type and number of patients 
recruited to these is rather limited, a vast amount of potential data is not included 
and remains unused. At the same time, the infrastructure of our health services is 
changing to enable—in theory—the wider sharing of data with health care profes-
sionals and researchers. For instance, through the electronic health records (EHRs) 
currently being introduced within NHS England, individuals can share their own 
records via a link. This still faces some challenges, partly due to different data 
formats and a lack of data system interoperability.5 In addition, serious limitations 
of this approach relate to the quality of information and the fact that the data available 
in these EHRs tend to be incomplete, and vary from General Practitioner (GP) 
practice to GP practice, but these are predominantly practical obstacles that could 
easily be overcome (Floridi and Illari 2016).
The failure to utilise fully the health data available in PMRs, which often already 
exist in digitised form as EHRs, has a huge opportunity cost. It has a negative effect 
on medical research, given that an incredibly valuable resource remains untapped 
when its utilisation could lead to significant advances in medical knowledge. In 
times when public health is in desperate need of improvement and when many seri-
ous health conditions are poorly understood, this is unacceptable and, it is argued, 
unethical. It is crucial to enable individuals to donate their medical data and enable 
its use for research for the common good.
11.3  Why We Should Enable PMDD
In light of the potential benefit to be derived from the utilisation of PMRs for 
research purposes, some have suggested that obtaining informed consent from 
individuals is inappropriate for record-based research (Mann et al. 2016). This position 
emphasises the benefit for society at large, and maintains that because of a “duty to 
easy rescue”—i.e. that individuals are under a moral obligation to benefit others 
where there is no or minimal risk to themselves—one would be justified in bypassing, 
in this particular context, what is otherwise a fundamental principle in research ethics: 
informed consent. Indeed, the current legal rules in many Western jurisdictions 
4 The use of “donate” in the context of the PGP is based on the PGPs own description: See https://
www.personalgenomes.org.uk/ (accessed July 20, 2018).
5 An additional and often overlooked challenge lies in the fact that at least the textual passages of 
any medical records are likely to be the subject of copyright and would need to be released prior to 
any donation. However, practical solutions to such challenges could be found, for instance, by 
reaching an agreement with public health institutions, such as the NHS, on an organisational level.
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allow for this type of research to proceed without such consent, but this article is 
concerned primarily with the ethical considerations relating to PMDD, and not with 
legal frameworks.
There is clearly some merit in reconsidering how informed consent operates in 
modern data- or record-based medical research, where in order to maximise utility, 
data often need to be repurposed in ways that could not have been anticipated at the 
time of data collection. Rather than negating a need for consent in such instances, 
however, we consider it ethically preferable to enable those individuals already 
willing to volunteer their data to do so, even if this may lead to an initial and perhaps 
unavoidable bias, but one which may also be acceptable in order to start the pro-
cess.6 Note that empirical research into patient attitudes suggests that they are 
many.7 This approach will foster trust and encourage wider social acceptance of the 
collection and re-use of medical data. However, if such a fully voluntary approach 
does not yield sufficient participation, a move towards an alternative approach is 
conceivable, e.g. through an opt-out system or record-based research with less con-
sent requirements attached. In addition, abandoning the informed consent require-
ment on the basis of an analogical reasoning in terms of rescue seems inappropriate, 
where no discernible individual is immediately saved or even treated. The long-term 
time horizon of most medical research projects also makes it rather unlikely that the 
patient data subjects will ever become beneficiaries of any research findings resulting 
directly from their own records. This is obviously impossible in the case of data of 
the deceased. Therefore, the idea of simply using the available data without first 
obtaining informed consent is dismissed, even where this would be within the 
current limits of the law. Instead, from an ethical perspective, PMDD should be 
enabled and encouraged as a fully voluntary action for the following ten reasons.
 (1) It is unethical to frustrate the “will-to-do-it” without proper justification. 
Although no individual donor will receive a benefit at the point of donation, 
the ability to contribute to the advancement of medicine and act as a moral 
agent can provide a significant benefit during one’s lifetime. Studies with 
organ, body, and brain donors show a strong desire to do post-mortem good, 
and suggest that medical data would be no different (Steinsbekk et al. 2013). 
Indeed, the Personal Genome Project and patient networks, such as patients-
likeme.com, offer good examples of the case in point.8
 (2) The concept of altruism is well-established and should include data donation 
for the common good.9 There is evidence that most individuals already desire 
6 This approach is clearly associated with some trade-offs, such as the creation of a dataset that is 
biased in favour of individuals who are willing to donate. However, this is not as such an argument 
against the choice of focusing initially on those willing to donate, as it has the benefit of using these 
“low-hanging fruit” to grow a wider social acceptance of PMDD and thus increasing the willing-
ness to donate data.
7 For example, see: Wellcome Trust Monitor: Wave 3 (full report). https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/
default/files/monitor-wave3-full-wellcome-apr16.pdf (accessed Sept 21, 2017).
8 See https://www.personalgenomes.org.uk/ and https://www.patientslikeme.com/
9 In the present context, the concept is to be broadly understood, as it is of course difficult to ascer-
tain whether an individual really is an altruist, or whether other motives are behind a choice to act 
ethically.
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to act morally, and may do so without the need for further encouragement 
when provided with the right information, a straightforward procedure, and 
appropriate safeguards (Richardson and Hurwitz 1995). With regard to PMDD, 
the lack of regulatory guidance and practical possibilities of donating data 
hampers the moral agency of potential donors.
 (3) Fairness is also crucial, as it ensures that burdens and benefits are shared 
across society. If one receives healthcare, it is only fair that one gives back. 
This is an infra-generational argument, since members of the current genera-
tion will be donating data for the benefit of others, much like they currently 
benefit from the contributions of previous generations to medical knowledge. 
Arguably, there is a moral obligation to participate in scientific research 
(Harris 2005).
 (4) PMDD is an appeal to inter-generational solidarity, as future generations will 
benefit from past generations and will become more motivated to donate to 
future generations in turn. Recently, the notion of solidarity has experienced a 
revival as a framework to direct biomedicine beyond the dichotomy of per-
sonal benefit and the common good (Prainsack 2017). Such arguments suggest 
that there is a need to nudge less altruistic individuals to act more responsibly, 
and to take on their share of the collective burden of contributing to medical 
knowledge (Prainsack and Buyx 2017).
 (5) PMDD would foster a (human) right to science. It has been argued that this 
includes a human right to participate in the scientific process in its entirety 
(Vayena and Tasioulas 2015). Of course, this is not to say that a right to donate 
one’s medical record implies a receiver’s duty to use these data, as it is advis-
able to retain the option to reject a donation where this carries significant ethi-
cal risks. This is standard practice in whole-body donation programmes, where 
acceptance of a donation is contingent on the health status of the donor and the 
demand by the accepting institution (Riederer et al. 2012).
 (6) There is a strong economic argument to be made. Using the data that are 
already being collected during health and social care to advance the body of 
medical knowledge would enable a more cost-effective administration of 
healthcare. In addition, the more data are donated, the more value the old data 
have. This scale issue is typical of the digital, and makes it economically sen-
sible to encourage PMDD.10
 (7) It is crucial to facilitate PMDD immediately, as the trend towards commerciali-
sation of personal health data is growing, and this may leave the public at risk 
of missing out. Public and commercial benefits are often intertwined, but there 
is a great risk that a lack of public systems that enable the donation of data may 
lead to the collection of such data occurring exclusively in the private/commer-
cial sphere and that, consequently, the use of data for public  benefit may become 
10 See the NHS Digital Business Plan 2017–2018. https://digital.nhs.uk/business-plan-2017-2018 
(accessed March 5, 2018).
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impossible, or at least restricted to research that has significant commercial 
value. Such a market is already emerging for individuals to sell their own data 
to companies. This is the case of Zenome.io, which combines blockchain tech-
nology and digital currency to allow individuals to sell their personal genomic 
information.11 Soon, more comprehensive platforms might encourage individu-
als to sell their full electronic health records, as these become increasingly 
available to patients. A socio-political decision to take the initiative on PMDD 
is thus urgently needed to seize this opportunity and to avoid serious negative 
implications for public health research, once this will be locked out of an 
increasingly commercialised industry in personal medical data, or has to pay 
for access, in the absence of a public data donation scheme.
 (8) PMDD is also a matter of logical coherence. Considering that (most) people 
can already donate their organs and blood, and that it is possible to extract 
substantial data from those donations, it is logically incoherent not to allow 
PMDD.  Furthermore, implicitly, individuals are already allowed and often 
enabled to give away freely their personal data to private corporations, often 
for uncertain purposes, as the terms and conditions of many commercial plat-
forms make clear.
 (9) Two key risks are diminished in PMDD, as both consent and privacy are less 
troublesome where the data relate to a deceased as opposed to a living person. 
This would avoid or at least mitigate many of the problems currently arising in 
the context of data sharing, as PMDD poses significantly less pressure on indi-
vidual privacy, ownership, and consent.
 (10) Finally, data sharing by research institutions has been encouraged in recent 
years and is now considered part of good scientific conduct, as it fosters trans-
parency, replicability of studies, and leads to efficient use of research data. 
Given that most of the reasons for scientific data sharing also apply to PMDD, 
a decision to promote one but not the other is logically and ethically 
inconsistent.
While other types of medical donation (such as tissue donation) have been the sub-
ject of extensive debate, resulting in ethical and governance frameworks and 
national schemes, this has yet to occur for medical data donation. At the same time, 
public relations campaigns are ongoing to promulgate the need to utilise health data 
wisely and ethically. The high-profile UK campaign “Understanding Patient Data”, 
which is jointly funded by the Wellcome Trust, the Medical Research Council, the 
Department of Health and Social Care, the Economic and Social Research Council, 
and Public Health England, aims to “support discussions with the public, patients 
and healthcare professionals about uses of health and care data”.12 This is an unethi-
cal asymmetry, since the lack of opportunity for individuals to donate their PMRs 
11 Zenome  – Your DNA is an asset. Zenome is a market. https://zenome.io/ (accessed Oct 31, 
2017).
12 Understanding Patient Data. http://understandingpatientdata.org.uk/ (accessed November  5, 
2018).
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prevents them from acting altruistically by donating their data for the common 
good, despite public funding invested in educating the public about the need to 
make such data accessible for research within the health service. Research into the 
harms of non-use of health data has concluded that these are hard to prove, but that 
there are significant consequences that need to be addressed in a move towards 
socially responsible reuse of data (Jones et  al. 2017). In addition, the aforemen-
tioned study did not consider the social harm of preventing people from doing what 
they deem to be morally important. That this is a real concern was shown by some 
participants in a large biobank study in Norway, where the desire to contribute to the 
common good was frequently brought up (Steinsbekk et al. 2013). Once all this is 
combined with the potential value that such data hold for medical research, it pro-
vides a strong reason for remedying the current missed opportunity. The fact that the 
current lack of a mechanism for PMDD is more likely to be explained by regulatory 
inertia than a deliberate decision against it on ethical grounds provides even more 
reason to remedy the situation. So, how does PMDD compare to the existing types 
of biomedical donation that are already managed by specific ethical guidelines and 
governance frameworks? The next section addresses this question.
11.4  How Does PMDD Compare to Other Biomedical 
Donations?
A number of types of biomedical donation are already firmly established in several 
health systems around the world. Currently, there are at least seven types of physical 
donations, plus two where the donation consists of a specific data set. Given this 
abundance of donation schemes, one might question the need for yet another frame-
work and suggest instead an ethical approach by analogy. However, as Table 11.2 
indicates by focusing on the United Kingdom, there are some morally significant 
differences among existing schemes and the proposed PMDD.
11.4.1  Key Differences Among Existing Biomedical Donation 
Schemes
The first key difference between PMDD and the most common donation schemes is 
the lack of physical intrusion. Although donating medical data can be described as 
being intrusive to private life, it does not involve a physical act, or indeed any action 
on behalf of the donor other than giving consent. This is also a one-off task, as there 
is no opportunity for re-contact when the donor is deceased.
This leads to the second key difference: donor status. Blood, gametes, cord 
blood, and tissue are usually donated by living people, as are some organs (e.g. 
some kidneys). However, even where the donations are by the deceased, the living 
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relatives are typically directly involved: organ donations are checked with family 
members prior to proceeding, and the urgency of the process (with arrangements 
typically made within 24 h of death) can put immense pressure on relatives. With 
PMDD, it might be equally sensible to bring family members on board, even where 
the deceased have clearly expressed their wishes, but no urgency is required as the 
utility of the data has no expiry date.
A third difference relates to the materiality of data: medical or any kind of digital 
data are non-material, unlike other biomedical donations. This means, for instance, 
that data cannot be “taken out” of one individual and put into another – as would be 
the case in organ or blood donations.
This is linked to a final difference worth stressing, namely that of the beneficiary. 
While blood, cord blood, and gamete donations can be used to benefit oneself in the 
future (although that might be more accurately described as a safeguard than a 
donation), with other donations, including PMDD, the beneficiaries are necessarily 
others. In addition, where the purpose of the donation is non-clinical there is no 
immediate benefit to anyone in particular. The benefit is of a more general nature, 
such as the advancement of clinical knowledge through research, or the teaching 
and training of future health care professionals. When it comes to donations that 
involve health or medical data, as opposed to a physical donation, the key difference 
lies in the research question. Typically, clinical research studies and trials will 
attempt to answer a specific question, or address a concrete hypothesis, whereas 
PMDD would be used for more general research and promote serendipity in 
research.13 Researchers in traditional clinical studies will have to re-contact their 
participants if they wish to use the data for further or additional research, this 
requirement does not apply in PMDD. In addition, living participants can change 
their mind at any point and withdraw their consent, meaning that their data is 
removed from any research in so far as this is practically possible, which again does 
not apply in PMDD, where active consent management is an impossibility.
These differences listed above are only some of the most significant ones between 
existing forms of biomedical donation and PMDD. The list is by no means exhaus-
tive. Yet, the comparison suffices to highlight that reliance on existing frameworks 
is likely to fall short of offering the ethical guidance required to enable safe 
PMDD. This is also because, although some important risks are minimised, PMDD 
is not without its own risks. These risks need to be carefully managed while maxi-
mising the future utility of the donated data. This makes it of utmost importance to 
ensure that PMDD is done ethically, and in particular safely and fairly, without 
creating any unnecessary impediment to either the donor or the health researcher 
using their data.
13 With the exception of biobanks, where data are collected for a range of future research studies.
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11.5  The Need for an Ethical Code
Broadly speaking, two main sources of risks can be associated with PMDD, one 
resulting from the non-individual nature of medical data and one resulting from 
source of the data being a deceased individual without any control over future uses 
of the data.
The first source concerns the nature of the donated medical data, specifically that 
medical data is seldom just about one individual but also often relates to others, who 
may be harmed as a result Some of the donor’s medical data may reveal sensitive 
information about related people. Relational issues arise, for instance, where 
genomic data reveal information about family members. Similarly, information 
found in psychological or psychiatric records may well contain sensitive informa-
tion about others, including family members, as this often plays a significant part in 
the treatment of mental illness. Sexual health and reproductive information are fur-
ther examples of sensitive medical data that typically relate to at least one other 
person. Harms to others might also be caused when insights derived from donated 
data are used for profiling purposes, which might be discriminatory and unfair to 
individuals to whom it is applied. This risk becomes more acute when donated 
medical data is sensitive, for example when relating to a particular (other) individ-
ual or a sensitive condition. In some cases, the risks may be such to embargo a dona-
tion, or in extreme cases to disallow an individual from participating in PMDD, 
despite a personal desire to do so. An example could be close relatives of acting 
politicians, where there is a national interest in avoiding the exposure of vulner-
abilities to outside influences. Similarly, some conditions, like hereditary diseases 
or mental illness, may carry a significantly greater risk of becoming a target of 
discrimination, making it preferable to avoid PMDD. The overall cost of this restric-
tion would be minimal, as the value of PMDD lies in well-curated, large data sets, 
rather than individual data sets. It is important to understand that, when shared data 
pose a serious risk, it would be ethically justified and sensible to reject the particular 
data donation, as the limited value of a single data set (or even of a particularly 
valuable one), is outweighed by the risks to other, living members of society. The 
decision as to when to reject a donation should be strictly limited to those cases 
where the risk to others is likely and serious, to avoid that overcautiously approaches 
may lead to the dismissal of valuable data sets that could be useful to study less 
common conditions and rare diseases.
In summary, fears around potential harms to close relatives do not represent an 
argument against PMDD. The risks just highlighted are not specific to PMDD but 
rather refer to the kind of data in question, not the actual act of donating. This means 
that all the risks generally associated with biomedical data also apply in this context 
(Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016). The consequence is that one can rely on similar safe-
guards, especially in terms of the procedures, policies and tools that are already 
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applied in the healthcare context, such as de-identification and encryption.14 The 
fact that these data would be donated does not affect these concerns substantially.
The second source of risks concerns the provenance of the donated medical data 
and the potential use to which the donated data can be put. Because the donor is 
deceased, PMDD has a lower (or perhaps no) negative impact on the donor, com-
pared with sharing one’s medical data when alive. However, safeguarding is also 
lower, since individuals may indicate how their data may be used or repurposed 
while they are alive, but of course have no control once dead. It is therefore crucial 
to develop a framework that respects the values and preferences of the data donors, 
and that reassures potential donors that their expressed wishes will be respected 
after death. In particular, concerns over the misuse of medical Big Data to justify 
unfair public policies, the implementation of medical profiling outside of the health 
care context (e.g. by employers or insurance companies), and the application of IP 
rights to lock-in or restrict access to medical insights and advances derived from 
donated medical data have to be taken seriously, and need to be addressed.
For all these reasons, an ethical code of PMDD is needed to these issues effec-
tively. With regard to the first risk (of harm to relatives), encouraging the active 
involvement of family members and relatives prior to a decision to participate in 
PMDD could resolve many of the potential concerns, similar to the existing recom-
mendations in organ or body donation. As it has been argued, a “do not use if in 
doubt” approach is also practicable, as the value of any single data set is limited and 
unlikely to have an impact on the utility of the overall PMDD database. Note that 
this is also an argument against the need to impose a “duty to easy rescue”, and 
hence a suspension of the need to have informed consent: one organ not donated 
may mean a life not saved, but one data set not included makes in itself little differ-
ence to population-based medical studies.
The second risk (lack of control once deceased) can be mitigated by means of a 
value-based framework that firmly places key ethical principles—such as respect 
for persons, human dignity, privacy and integrity, amongst others—at the heart of 
PMDD. Two valuable resources can be drawn on to inform such a code. First, the 
lessons learned from past mistakes made in the context of biomedical data schemes, 
such as the NHS Care.data programme, as well as the best practices of ongoing 
initiatives, such as the Personal Genome Project UK. And second, the ethical and 
governance frameworks currently in place for other types of donations, most cru-
cially those used in biobanking, organ and body donation. An ethical code for 
PMDD must learn from the solutions already found for both these resources, and be 
coherent with them. In the next chapter, we set out to codify some of the lessons and 
best practices that currently exist in an unstructured form to develop a functional 
ethical code for PMDD, as well as leverage the important work done by others in 
developing ethical frameworks for other types of biomedical donations (see Chap. 
12).
14 For example, see the Wellcome Trust’s 2013 “Summary report of qualitative research into public 
attitudes to personal data and linking personal data”, available at: https://wellcomelibrary.org/item/
b20997358#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0
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11.6  How to Implement Ethical PMDD
The first step towards the development of an ethical code for PMDD presented in 
this article was a thorough review of existing ethical frameworks. The focus was in 
particular on tissue, brain, and body donation, as well as the sharing of genomic 
information, because of their similarities with PMDD. However, our analysis also 
revealed some key differences (discussed above), limiting direct comparability with 
our proposed scheme, and reinforcing our belief that a dedicated code is needed for 
PMDD. In this section, some past and current biomedical data projects are considered 
to identify relevant lessons and best practice.
11.6.1  Learning from Mistakes and Codifying Best Practice
Big Data in health care is often described as the biggest opportunity of our times to 
improve public and individual health, and it is therefore no surprise that a vast 
number of data-related projects are ongoing in health care. While there are key 
differences among the initiatives, including in data ownership, access rights and 
purpose, their success—in terms of ethics—can be evaluated on the basis of adherence 
to a number of fundamental principles.
At the unsuccessful end of the spectrum, initiatives like the UK’s disastrous 
Care.data serve as a reminder that neglecting these principles can lead to the com-
plete failure of a well-intended scheme. As the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has 
explained, “Care.data is a salutary lesson in the need for robust and timely public 
engagement – as opposed to mere communication – and in understanding the range 
of ways in which data subjects might perceive harms arising from uses of their 
data.”15 The consequences of this incident can still be felt, and have led to a deep 
distrust in data sharing between the NHS and commercial partners. This is in con-
trast with other countries, where better management of communication and public 
engagement has led to wide public support of similar programmes (Patil et al. 2016).
Unfortunately, it seems that some of the lessons learnt from the Care.data deba-
cle have not yet been applied. The recent introduction of the “GP at hand” video- 
consultation smartphone app, for which NHS England partnered with Babylon 
Health, has met with skepticism both from GPs and the general public. Concerns 
quickly arose over inequality in the treatment of patients, especially those with 
complex health needs, ultimately leading to a suspension of the planned wider roll- 
out of the service (Finlayson et al. 2017). The lack of proper evaluation of the ser-
vice has also been criticised (Rosen 2017), and concerns raised over the privacy 
management, given Babylon Health assumes ownership of the recorded video 
15 See: Laurie et al. (2014) “A review of evidence relating to harm resulting from uses of health and 
biomedical data” available at https://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-Report-on-
Harms-Arising-from-Use-of-Health-and-Biomedical-Data-30-JUNE-2014.pdf
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 consultations in its terms and conditions.16 Although this might seem unlikely to be 
enforced in practice, in theory this means that patients are not allowed to share their 
video consultations with health care professionals who are not enrolled with 
Babylon’s GP at hand service without the company’s prior permission. Considering 
that the service was commissioned by NHS England, most patients are likely to be 
unaware of this restriction, and hiding such an important point in the legal text does 
not exemplify good communication or foster trust between the NHS, its third-party 
partners, and patients.
In the context of genetic data, the Icelandic genetic testing company, deCODE 
Genetics, provides another example of how public trust is all too easily disap-
pointed. In 2012, the company decided to sell out to the American pharmaceutical 
company Amgen—including the DNA and health data of approximately 140,000 
Icelandic individuals held by deCODE. Most of these people had volunteered their 
data on the basis that the company would create a universal health database of 
Icelanders for research purposes, as it had promised in the late 1990s but never 
delivered (Greely 2012).
Sustainability is crucial for any health-related Big Data project, as its success 
will depend on a long-term commitment to research. Unfortunately, this aspect is 
often neglected. A few years ago, the Finnish government (in cooperation with some 
private sector companies) launched the ambitious project of setting up a single plat-
form for the storage of information on the health and well-being of the population. 
The idea was that this could be accessed by health care providers to offer more 
efficient and effective care, and to prevent ill health. The service, taltioni.fi, was 
lauded as sustainable and trustworthy, not least because of its cooperative nature 
and the fact that it involved both the public and private sectors (Riso et al. 2017). 
However, the platform vanished shortly after its launch, and it is not known what 
happened to any data stored within it.17
At the other end of the spectrum are projects like the “Patients Like Me” network, 
which according to its website, is “unleashing the power of data for good (…) by 
empowering people to take control of their health.”18 The company provides a detailed 
and clear privacy policy, including plain language explanations in addition to legal 
texts, and provides users with comprehensive options to manage the sharing of their 
data with third parties, such as private corporations and commercial vendors.
The Personal Genome Project UK (PGP-UK) is equally transparent about data 
access, but goes one step further by providing the de-identified genomic informa-
tion as fully Open Data. Individuals can choose to withdraw their data at any point 
but are made aware, before enrolment, that such a withdrawal cannot necessarily 
prevent all future uses of the data, as copies of it may have been downloaded from 
the website. The PGP-UK is complex in that it involves sharing of genomic data as 
16 See: https://web.archive.org/web/20171114123501/https://www.gpathand.nhs.uk/legal/terms 
(accessed March 5, 2018).
17 As reported by the Finnish Data Protection Office: http://www.tietosuoja.fi/fi/index/
blogi/6IUtCELFH/2017/XHtWkkNPr.html.stx (accessed March 5, 2018).
18 See: https://www.patientslikeme.com/about
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Open Data, and this is reflected in the informed consent procedure, which requires 
participants to pass an enrolment exam before being admitted to the project.
Even a deep commitment to ethical principles offers no guarantee that things will 
never go wrong, as accidental breaches are always possible. In 2014, the PGP suf-
fered a setback when it accidentally disclosed some of the participant email 
addresses and names to other participants.19 Due to a configuration error, replies to 
an email from the PGP-UK were sent to the entire mailing list rather than the 
PGP-UK staff only, thereby revealing the sender’s identity to the members of the 
list. Some 220 people were affected, and the issue was quickly discussed within the 
ethics community, where it was described as a failure both in privacy and trust.20 
This is just one interpretation, as the PGP-UK notified and apologised immediately 
after the event, but the incident indicated that risk from human error is hard to elimi-
nate. As one of the commentators in the discussion noted, the email blunder was a 
suitable way to identify those prospective participants who merely pay lip service to 
the idea of openly sharing their data.
Recently, cooperative models for managing personal health data have gained 
popularity. Switzerland currently has two such schemes, healthbank and 
MIDATA. Both enable citizens to be in control of the storage, management and 
access of their personal health and health-related data, including the decision how 
to share it. Schemes like these find their inspiration in citizen science, whereby 
members of the public can contribute actively to medical research by providing 
access to their personal data. As these platforms are fairly recent developments and 
are not yet in place in most countries, it remains to be seen how they will be adopted 
by the public. However, their cooperative approach certainly carries great potential 
for the future management of personal health data.
11.6.2  Deriving Relevant Ethical Principles
Drawing on the review of the literature and relevant biomedical donation schemes 
and projects, and the input from the participants of two workshops on the ethics of 
data donation,21 the following five ethical principles or categories emerged as most 
relevant to PMDD:
19 See: https://www.personalgenomes.org.uk/archive/email-storm-incident-and-apology (accessed 
March 5, 2018).
20 See, for example, Boddington (2014) “Personal Genome Project UK email disaster: If you can’t 
guarantee privacy, at least try to ensure trust”, available at: http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.
uk/2014/05/personal-genome-project-uk-email-disaster-if-you-cant-guarantee-privacy-at-least-
try-to-ensure-trust/ (accessed March 5, 2018).
21 Two workshops on the ethics of medical data donation were held in Oxford in October 2017 and 
April 2018, which included experts from academia, policy-making and industry. In addition to 
common principles from the academic literature, valuable points from practice were shared and 
contributed to the identification of key ethical principles for PMDD. The workshops were sup-
ported by a research grant from Microsoft Research.
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 1. Human dignity and respect for persons
 2. Promotion of the common good
 3. The right to “Citizen Science”
 4. Quality and good data governance
 5. Transparency, accountability, and integrity
These might at first glance appear rather generic and hardly ground-breaking. One 
might also question how these can be applied in practice. In response, we lay out the 
specific requirements for an “Ethical Code for Posthumous Data Donation” in the 
Appendix, which provides more detail on a practical implementation. The Code is 
not a governance framework, so some practical issues will still need to be addressed 
before implementing a PMDD scheme. With regard to the generality of the princi-
ples, this is crucial to preserve sufficient flexibility to account for future develop-
ments. Considering that PMDD is going to be a long-term endeavour, it is important 
to regulate for the future, i.e. to avoid ethical guidelines becoming inapplicable 
due to technological, legal, cultural or social changes. This is the goal of the Code 
proposed here: to provide normative principles shaping PMDD, rather than a set of 
specific rules of conduct for the involved actors. These are not based on any singular 
ethical approach (such as a consequentialist ethics) but build on human rights, the 
concept of human dignity and bioethical principles, including research ethical 
principles.
11.7  Conclusion
In light of both the benefits and potential risks involved in wide donation of personal 
medical data, there is a need for an ethical code of PMDD that addresses key chal-
lenges, including consent, privacy, security and ownership. The previous work done 
in relation to other types of biomedical donation acts as a useful resource to inform 
such a code but cannot simply be extended to PMDD, which comes with its own 
particular ethical challenges.
It is argued that most of these issues have practical solutions, and that the pri-
mary focus should be on managing permissible access and use of the collected data. 
Procedural safeguards have already been developed in other relevant and compara-
ble areas of medical research and could be adopted to foster PMDD. Consider for 
example the broad consent procedures currently used in biobanking or the “educate- 
before- you-sign” approach similar to the one used by the PGP-UK.  This would 
ensure that any individual wishing to donate medical data could make a decision 
that is maximally informed  (Sheehan 2011). Privacy risks could be mitigated by 
managing carefully access to donated data. At the same time, it is important to 
emphasise that no safety measures will ever be fail-safe, and openness about this 
fact should form part of the ethical design of PMDD procedures.
The code developed here (see the following chapter) addresses the key ethical 
issues arising from PMDD. Arguably, before being adopted, further input should be 
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obtained from a wider audience, for instance through public engagement, to investigate 
public support. However, this is only the first step towards more comprehensive use 
of health-relevant data for the common good. In the future, combining corporate 
data (via data philanthropy) with data sharing and PMDD might open up even 
greater possibilities for supporting health care and research. But for this to work, 
PMDD must first be brought to life.
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Chapter 12
An Ethical Code for Posthumous Medical 
Data Donation
Jenny Krutzinna, Mariarosaria Taddeo, and Luciano Floridi
Abstract This chapter follows the argument that personal medical data should be 
made available for scientific research by enabling and encouraging individuals to 
donate their medical records after death, provided that this can be done safely and 
ethically. While medical donation schemes with dedicated regulatory and ethical 
frameworks for blood, organ or tissue donations are already in place, no such ethical 
guidance currently exists with regard to personal medical data. In addressing this 
gap, this chapter presents the first ethical code for posthumous medical data dona-
tion (PMDD). It is based on five foundational principles and seeks to inform and 
guide the implementation of an effective and ethical PMDD scheme by addressing 
the key risks associated with the utilisation of personal health data for the promotion 
of the common good.
Keywords Data donation · Medical data ethics · Ethical code · Health records · 
Personal health data · Data philanthropy · Data ethics
12.1  Preamble
The importance and value of brain, body, organ and tissue donation after death has 
long been recognised, and relevant regulatory and ethical frameworks have been put 
in place to manage it. Medical data, which also hold enormous potential for medical 
research and for the improvement of health and social care on a large scale, has not 
as yet been incorporated into such frameworks. Neither is it currently possible to 
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donate one’s medical data posthumously.1 However, enabling such posthumous 
medical data donation (hereafter PMDD) is in the interest of individuals and society 
at large. It is important to make medical data available for scientific research by 
enabling and encouraging individuals to donate their medical records2 after death, 
similarly to how they can already donate bodies or body parts. This is why a research 
project on PMDD, developed by the Digital Ethics Lab at the Oxford Internet 
Institute has led to the formulation of this Ethical Code for Posthumous Medical 
Data Donation (hereafter the Code), which sets out the guiding ethical principles for 
such donations. An important limitation to note is that the Code focuses exclusively 
on ethical aspects. This means that important practical issues relating to law and 
governance will have to be addressed prior to and during its implementation.3
12.2  Considerations
• Recalling the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of the Council of Europe, Rome, 4.XI.1950;
• Recalling the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and the additional 
protocols to the Convention of the Council of Europe, Oviedo, 4.IV.1997;
• Recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10.XII.1948 and the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 11.XI.1997 
and the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data of the United Nations, 
16.X.2003;
• Recalling the Universal Declaration of Bioethical Principles of the United 
Nations 19.X.2005;
• Recalling the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical Association, 1.
VI.1964;
• Recalling the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (GDPR), and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC.
1 Arguably, there are no particular barriers to donate one’s data, at least in some jurisdictions such 
as the UK, where this could be done via an Advance Directive. However, the lack of coherent ethi-
cal and legal structure to facilitate such donation makes it practically impossible.
2 The term “medical records“is to be loosely understood, as the availability and format will vary 
between jurisdictions and it is unlikely that medical data are consolidated in one place.
3 See the concept of post-compliance soft ethics in Floridi, L. 2018. Soft ethics, the governance of 
the digital and the general data protection regulation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society A 376 (2133): 20180081.





The sale, lease or commercial licensing of the data. It shall also include uses 
of the data to produce or manufacture products or services for general sale.
Donor The person-source of the data, or data subject.
Data Any donor-related data.
Database Repository (often online) built to facilitate access to data.
Directly identifying 
data





Any data that make possible the identification of the person concerned only 
through the use of a simple tool, such as a key.
Fully-anonymised 
data




Any data which is either predictive of genetic disease or can serve to identify 
the person as a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or detect a genetic 
predisposition or susceptibility to a disease, whereas scientific proof for 
validity of that information is present.








The giving of one’s PMR for research purposes upon death.
PMDD activities Activities such as obtaining, handling, processing, storing and distributing of 
data, including all associated research activities.
PMDD institution 
(PMDDI)
The PMDDI is the institutional body acting as steward of all donated data.
Researcher Any person with a legitimate interest in conducting research, whether 
affiliated with an academic, commercial, public, private or other institution. 
It shall not include private individuals.
Steward Institution holding and maintaining the data. The steward assumes full 
responsibility for compliance with the legal and ethical rules that apply to 
collecting, processing and managing the data.
User Any person involved in collecting, storing, handling, processing, accessing, 
or managing the data.
12.4  Overview
The Code of Ethics on Posthumous Medical Data Donation (hereafter ‘the Code’) has 
been developed to establish the guiding ethical principles for Posthumous Medical Data 
Donation (hereafter ‘PMDD’), in recognition that PMDD constitutes an act that is both 
meaningful to an individual and valuable to the public and as such should be facilitated.
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12.4.1  Objectives
The key objective of the Code is to state the fundamental ethical principles which 
should govern all PMDD activities. In addition,
• any applicable national laws or local regulations are to be complied with at all 
times. The Code does not replicate, amend or overrule but complements any such 
instruments;4
• participation in PMDD activities is and remains voluntary; this includes every 
person’s right to accept or refuse participation at any point;
• the autonomy and confidentiality of all donors and their families shall be 
respected;
• special care will be taken in all PMDD activities to avoid discrimination against, 
or stigmatisation of, an individual, a family or a group;
• every care will be taken that the collected data is used, and in line with the pur-
poses for which it was donated, namely for ethically and scientifically sound 
research, and that it is not abandoned;
• the research process and the ethical guidelines will be reviewed by an indepen-
dent body on a regular basis to take into account any new developments in tech-
nology, law, and society. The results of such a review will be made public.
12.4.2  Scope
The Code shall apply to the full range of PMDD activities involving donated personal 
medical records (hereafter ‘PMR’). It shall not apply to other types of health- related 
data, nor shall it apply to donations made by living donors. For the purposes of the 
Code, PMDD shall not include donations made to private institutions for the purposes 
of commercial exploitation. The Code shall apply to donors, users, and researchers.
12.5  Foundational Ethical Principles
Five foundational principles aim to guarantee a minimum ethical standard to be 
maintained in all PMDD activities:
 1. Human dignity and respect for persons
 2. Promotion of the common good
 3. The right to Citizen Science
4 The Code presupposes some basic data protection and privacy safeguards in line with the legal 
instruments set out under “Considerations” above. This means that the Code may not be suffi-
ciently detailed in jurisdictions that do not subscribe to those international conventions, and further 
guidelines may be required.
J. Krutzinna et al.
185
 4. Quality and good data governance
 5. Transparency, accountability, and integrity
12.5.1  Human Dignity and Respect for Persons
Human dignity and respect for persons shall be paramount in all PMDD activities. 
In particular,
• the dignity of the donor shall be protected at all times;
• the preferences and values of the donor shall be honoured at all times;
• the privacy of the donor shall be maintained;
• potential harm to the donor, any relatives and/or next of kin shall be minimised.
12.5.2  Promotion of the Common Good
The purpose of the PMDD database is to provide the means to generate and dissemi-
nate new medical knowledge to benefit the public. The donor’s wish to promote the 
common good by contributing to biomedical research shall be respected. This means:
• to maximise the morally good outcome, all PMDD shall be publicly accessible, 
and all research findings and results based on the data shall be published under 
an open licence;
• where the acceptance of a donation to the database carries a significant risk to 
relatives and/or family members, a careful balancing of harms and benefits 
should take place, which may lead to the rejection of the donation. Such rejec-
tions should be limited to serious cases of harm, to reduce the risk of excluding 
particularly valuable datasets, such as those relating to rare diseases and less 
common conditions. In all instances, the relatives and family members of the 
donor should be engaged in the process as much as is practically feasible to gain 
their support for the donation;
• prohibition of unethical research using PMDD without exception;
• prohibition of commercial exploitation of PMDD data where this could unfairly 
restrict access to treatments or cures;
• requesting proof of adequate benefit sharing measures prior to granting access to 
the PMDD database to a researcher.
12.5.3  The Right to Citizen Science
Citizens’ right to participate in the scientific process in its entirety should be recog-
nised and respected at all times. In particular,
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• all donations should be accepted, unless there are solid grounds for rejecting a 
particular donation, such as a disproportionate risk of harm to others;
• the optimal use of donated data shall be guaranteed, and data shall not be 
abandoned;
• all results and findings shall be shared with the public in an accessible and timely 
manner;
• the public shall be actively involved in the further development of PMDD and 
encouraged to participate in deliberations about the wider social impact of 
PMDD.
12.5.4  Quality and Good Data Governance
Quality management and data governance shall be taken seriously when accepting, 
handling or using PMDD data. In particular,
• users and other PMDDI staff shall be adequately trained for their respective roles 
within the PMDD activities, including knowledge and understanding of this 
Code and any applicable data protection and privacy laws and regulations (such 
as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation);
• safe and secure storage facilities shall be used for the data, including use of 
adequate and updated encryption techniques, to minimise the risk of unauthor-
ised access, data loss, or misuse. Proper record-keeping and access management 
shall be maintained to ensure full traceability of the location of, and access to, 
any PMDD;
• PMDDs shall be de-identified using currently available standards, and re- 
identification shall be prohibited. Quality control mechanisms for PMRs shall be 
applied prior to data being added to the database;
• mechanisms should be adopted for ensuring the sustainability of the database for 
future use, including procedures to be followed in case of discontinuance of the 
PMDDI.
12.5.5  Transparency, Trust, and Integrity
Transparency, trust, and integrity shall inform all PMDD activities, including com-
munications with the donor and the public. In particular,
• communications with donors, any relatives or next of kin, and the public shall be 
open, honest, clear, and objective. Any information provided shall be compre-
hensible to a non-expert person and shall be accessible;
• clear and transparent procedures for deciding requests for data access shall be 
established and made public, and shall apply equally to all researchers regardless 
J. Krutzinna et al.
187
of their affiliation. All access requests, whether granted or declined, shall be 
made public;
• mechanisms to ensure accountability and to handle complaints shall be imple-
mented, including mechanisms for identifying, reporting and managing incidents 
such as breaches, losses of data, or unauthorised access. Any incident shall be 
followed by rigorous investigation, and corresponding sanctions shall be insti-
tuted. In addition, procedures for handling lawful requests from law enforcement 
agencies shall be established;
• full disclosure of any financial arrangements involving PMDD data or financial 
gains derived from PMDD activities will be made.
12.6  Obtaining PMRs for Research Purposes
PMR shall be obtained and used for research purposes in accordance with applica-
ble national laws and local regulations, and the principles set forth in the Code.
Due to the anticipated benefit to be derived from the research to be conducted 
using the data, resources shall be dedicated to encourage participation in PMDD. In 
particular, information shall be provided to the public to encourage donations, while 
at the same time safeguarding the voluntariness of participation.
Consent shall be required for all collections of PMDD and for the use of PMDD 
for biomedical research purposes, even where local laws do not require such authori-
sation. As part of the consent procedure, participation will be explained as an oppor-
tunity to contribute in the long term to the improvement of other people’s health. 
Broad consent to research falling within the guidelines of this Code shall be deemed 
sufficient, as it is not possible to anticipate all ethically and scientifically sound 
future research uses.
12.6.1  Obtaining Consent
Prior to giving informed consent, the person concerned shall be offered appropriate 
information about the nature and purpose of PMDD, including examples of the type 
of research for which it will be used, the financial interests of the data collecting 
entity, and the management of access to and use of the data, including the kinds of 
safeguards that will be maintained.
Donors shall be informed that the full PMRs will be transferred to the PMDDI, 
including identifying information, to enable linkage between different datasets 
which is necessary to ensure maximum scientific utility of the overall database. 
However, donors shall be free to place restrictions on the use of their data and to 
exclude subsets of data from their donations. These preferences shall be recorded in 
the PMR in full. Donors shall be informed of their right to make changes to their 
preferences or to withdraw consent at any point prior to their death.
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Donors shall be encouraged to discuss their decision with their relatives, espe-
cially those with close genetic links.
Donors shall be informed that the use of their PMDD is not guaranteed and that 
in some rare instances a particular PMDD may be rejected if it poses a significant 
risk of harm to an individual or a group. Information shall be provided on possible 
reasons for exclusion.
Consent shall be appropriately documented in the PMR and at the PMDDI.
12.6.2  Persons Unable to Give Consent
To avoid the exclusion of vulnerable populations from benefiting from the scientific 
advances resulting from large-scale biomedical research, and to ensure their repre-
sentation within the data underlying such research, an active effort shall be made to 
include PMRs from all groups.
Where an individual is permanently unable to provide consent, due to a lack of 
legal capacity, the registration of a donor and subsequent donation may be carried 
out with the authorisation of the person’s legal representative or guardian. The indi-
vidual concerned shall be involved in the decision-making process as far as 
possible.
Similarly, where a minor is concerned, the parents or legal guardian shall be 
permitted to authorise a donation. The opinion of the minor shall be taken into con-
sideration in proportion to the age and degree of maturity of the child.
Where an individual is temporarily unable to provide consent, due to a lack of 
legal capacity, registration as a donor shall be held off until capacity to consent is 
regained or a permanent incapacity has been confirmed by the medical 
professional.
12.6.3  Changing or Withdrawing Consent
Donors can withdraw consent for participation in PMDD at any time by submitting 
a revised authorisation form, or by notifying a health care professional. The objec-
tion will be recorded in the PMR and will ensure that data is not submitted to the 
PMDD database on the donor’s death.
It shall also be possible for a person to record an objection to PMDD in their 
PMR.
A decision to object to PMDD, or to change or withdraw consent once given, 
shall not have a negative impact on the medical treatment or care of the person or 
lead to discrimination against that person.
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Where a legal representative or guardian gave the authorisation for PMDD, the 
right to change or withdraw consent remains with that person for as long as they 
shall have legal guardianship of that person.
12.6.4  Refusing Donations
There may be ethical reasons for excluding a particular PMDD donation, which 
may be grounded, inter alia, in the nature or the source of data. The following list is 
not exhaustive, and there may be other grounds on which a PMDDI may decide to 
refuse to accept a PMDD.
The right of a PMDDI to refuse a PMDD shall be maintained, as the overall cost 
of these refusals would be minimal, since the value lies in well-curated, large data-
sets, rather than individual datasets.
12.6.4.1  Refusing a PMDD on Grounds of the Data’s Nature
Where the donor’s data may reveal sensitive data about related people, a stewarding 
PMDDI may decide to refuse a PMDD. In particular, where genomic data reveal 
information about family members, it may be preferable to exclude such data from 
the donation where a comprehensive risk assessment reveals an unacceptably high 
risk to living people. This may apply especially where the relatives are vulnerable 
people and/or the condition is a hereditary disease, which may lead to stigma and/
or discrimination.
12.6.4.2  Refusing a PMDD on Grounds of the Data Source
In some rare cases, there may be reasons to reject a PMDD on the basis of its source. 
This means disallowing a particular individual from participating in PMDD, where 
a donation would carry a disproportionate risk to others. An example could be close 
relatives of acting politicians or diplomats, where there is a national interest in 
avoiding the exposure of vulnerabilities to outside influences.
12.6.4.3  Other Grounds for Refusing a PMDD
An institution may refuse to accept a particular PMDD on other grounds, including, 
for example, the potentially illegal nature of the collected data, but any reasons 
should be made sufficiently clear to the potential donor.
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12.7  Research Approval, Conduct and Oversight
In accordance with the foundational principles of the Code, it will be fundamental 
for the success of the PMDD activities that public trust is maintained. For this, it is 
crucial to manage research activities carefully, by maintaining transparency and 
ensuring accountability of any individual involved.
12.7.1  General Principles
12.7.1.1  Prohibition of Financial Gain5
It shall be prohibited to gain financially from PMDD. Therefore, donors will not be 
offered any financial or other inducement to participate in PMDD. Since participation 
does not entail any expense for the donor, the issue of reimbursement does not arise.
The PMDDI shall not be permitted to sell data obtained from PMDD activities, 
or to make a profit from such activities. Any profits resulting from the charging of 
access or licencing fees have to reinvested in the maintenance and improvement of 
the PMDD database. The sole purpose of any fee shall be to support the financing 
of costs, maintenance and improvement of the PMDD database, and shall not be 
used to make profits.
12.7.1.2  Confidentiality6
All data in relation to donors and their families shall be collected, processed and 
used in accordance with the principle of confidentiality and the right to respect for 
private life.
The steward will ensure that data are anonymised, linked, and stored to the high-
est standards of security. Researchers will only be given access to anonymised data.
All users and staff handling the data will receive appropriate training for main-
taining confidentiality and adherence with all relevant legislation.
Systems for data security and storage will be kept up to date and will be of the 
highest technical standard.
5 It is important to note that the research in this article has focused exclusively on the ethical issues 
of PMDD, which means that governance questions have not been answered. This includes the ques-
tion of the legal nature of the institutional body (the PMDDI), which will need to be addressed 
prior the implementation of a PMDD scheme.
6 These technical issues will need to be addressed more fully prior to the implementation of a PMDD 
scheme. Maintaining confidentiality through anonymization will have to  be  reconciled 
with the need to retain an option for re-identification for quality management purposes. The Code 
follows current practices in other types of medical donation schemes, e.g. biobanking, where ano-
nymized data is made available to researchers and identifying data is kept separate and is not made 
available for research.
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12.7.1.3  Data Custody
Custody of the data will be transferred to the PMDDI upon the donor’s death. This 
conveys a range of rights to the stewarding institution, in particular the right to take 
legal action against unauthorised use or abuse of the data. Donors will not have 
property rights in the data.
The PMDDI will not exercise their right to sell the data to third parties but will 
act as steward of the database, maintaining and developing it for the common good 
in accordance with its purpose.
This does not affect the right of the donor to give away, sell, or donate data to 
other parties.
12.7.1.4  Data Protection
All data will be collected, stored and handled in accordance with applicable data 
protection laws and regulations to safeguard the integrity of all data, e.g. in compli-
ance with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.
12.7.1.5  Directly Identifiable Data
Directly identifiable data, which will necessarily be included in the transfer of the 
PMR to the PMDDI, will be separated from the medical data of the donor prior to 
being added to the database. An arbitrary code without any external meaning (that 
is, for example, not a National Insurance number or similar) will be attached to link 
the personal identifying information to the medical information. This option for re- 
identification is necessary for data quality management: to eliminate redundant 
data, verify data accuracy and completeness, to establish correct linkages among 
databases, and to identify data which may need to be withdrawn.
Identifying information will be held in a separate data vault with restricted 
access, controlled by a senior steward at the PMDDI. The access key to the code for 
re-linking identifying information to the data will never be shared with external 
agents, such as researchers, and will only be accessible to a select few PMDDI staff 
who are ethically trained and sign special confidentiality agreements.
12.7.1.6  Information on Health and Hereditary Disease
The PMDDI will not share data or health information with living relatives or other 
interested parties under any circumstances. This includes information on potential 
hereditary disease.
It is, however, possible for the donor to nominate specific individuals who are to 
receive a copy of the PMR upon the donor’s death. It is the responsibility of the 
donor to ensure that the contact details of the recipients are kept up to date.
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12.7.2  Research Access
The PMDDI will retain full control of all access to, and uses of, the data in the data-
base. No exclusive access will be granted to any party.
To build and maintain a relationship of public trust, the PMDDI will inform the 
public of the rules for access, any requests made, access granted or refused, and any 
research results.
Access to the database by law enforcement agencies will be granted only under 
court order, and will be resisted in all other circumstances. Any such requests will 
be reported to the public in so far as this is legally permissible (see also clause 
12.7.2.1).
The PMDDI may charge a reasonable fee for access to the data for approved 
research purposes. This fee may vary depending on the expected financial benefit 
from use of the data. However, the fee should not be so excessive as to prevent 
legitimate research from being conducted due to purely economic reasons, and it 
may in some circumstances be advisable to waive the fee entirely. Any profit occur-
ring as a result of the fee system is regulated by clause 12.7.1.1.
12.7.2.1  Access Requests
The PMDDI will have overall decision-making authority over any access requests 
to the database. A special advisory board may be set up and charged with this task. 
However, routine applications may be delegated to appropriate working groups to 
provide more efficient services to the research community and to the public.
The PMDDI will provide public explanations of all policies and procedures for 
research access. These documents will continue to be developed to reflect relevant 
technical, legal and social changes, but will never abandon the principles of fairness 
and transparency in decision-making.
Access to the data will be granted only for scientifically and ethically approved 
research. Requestors will have to demonstrate benefit-sharing mechanisms and will 
have to have obtained research ethics approval from an appropriate body prior to 
being granted access to the data.
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12.7.2.2  Research Results
All researchers accessing the database will be required to provide the results from 
their analyses made using the data, and any relevant supporting information, to the 
PMDDI to make them subsequently available to all other legitimate researchers 
with approved access to the database.
It is a requirement on all researchers seeking access to place the findings, whether 
positive or negative, from all research based on the PMDD data in the public domain. 
Publication of results shall be in peer-reviewed scientific literature wherever this is 
possible, open access by preference, or on the website of the PMDDI.
12.7.3  Research Oversight
Any PMDD activities will be conducted in accordance with national research gov-
ernance frameworks and national research guidelines.
Independent periodic reviews of the quantity and quality of access requests, the 
research conducted, and the published results will be conducted and the findings 
will be made public.
As the purpose of PMDD is to generate new knowledge to promote population 
health, particular focus shall be placed on the dissemination of research outcomes. 
Where the independent reviewers are not satisfied that the principles of the Code are 
sufficiently upheld by the researchers, the PMDDI shall be required to review its 
access procedures to ensure that only those research requests are granted that prom-
ise to honour the principles of the Code.
12.7.4  Contingency Planning
The PMDDI shall develop a detailed contingency strategy for handling the PMDDI 
data and database in case of liquidation or termination of the PMDDI. The goal of 
the strategy must be to ensure the continuous protection of the rights of the donors 
and their families, and to respect their wishes that their data be used for research 
purposes. As such, the strategy should provide detailed plans for transferring the 
data to another steward so that research may continue on the data.
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Annex: Sample PMDD Authorisation Form
To be completed by donor and signed by a witness.








I WISH TO DONATE MY MEDICAL DATA AFTER MY DEATH.
I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MAY BE USED FOR RESEARCH 
PURPOSES.
Please read the “Notes on completing these forms” then tick as 
appropriate
 1. Data retention
⎕ I consent to my medical data being retained indefinitely.
OR
⎕ My medical data can be retained for a maximum of ___ years.
 2. Data types
⎕ I consent to all my medical data being used.
OR
⎕ I wish to exclude the following data from my donation:
_____________________________________________
 3. Research purposes
⎕ I consent to my medical data being used for all research that has received 
ethics approval by an official REC within the European Economic Area 
(EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).
 4. Copy of record
⎕ I wish the following named individuals to receive a complete copy of my 








Date, Signature of donor
Date, Signature of witness
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